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This chapter examines some deficiencies in the present
methodology of economics. The deficiencies referred to may¬
be summarised as follows
1. The problems arising from the compartmentalisation
of economics into disconnected academic fields.
2. Problems arising from the tendency of economists
to define the scope of economics too narrowly,
possibly thus excluding s number of important
cutural variables from their models.
3. This tendency creates a further difficulty; that
one can often not be sure to whet range of cul¬
tures, historical periods, or actors' circum¬
stances, the models are applicable.
4. The over-eraphasis which economists have placed
on macro-economic statistical relationships in
'constructing forecasting models. Without a
proper investigation and understanding of these
relationships at the "micro11 level, i.e. that of
individual actors, there is some danger of using
spurious relationships, end again of the problem
referred to under (3) above.
Finally, the argument calls for an integrated model of
the household's economic behaviour, taking in all three main
aspects of its economic activity (expenditure, work and
saving) which have hitherto been dealt with by economics
mainly in isolation from each other. Such a model should be
based on relationships empirically verified at the level of
the individual household. It should incorporate as variables
the norms, goals and interaction patterns of the household
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end its members, from- which their economic actions arise.
Since these may be difficult to ascertain on a macro-
economic level, some demographic or economic indicators
of sociological variables which are salient for the model
must also be identified.
Chapter 2
The second chapter reviews some recent literature relating
to the supply of labour by the household to the max-ket.
(This chapter does not attempt to give a complete coverage
of the aspects of the field of labour economics which are
relevant to the objectives of the thesis; raost of the
literature on the labour force participation of married
women is left over to chapter 6, where it is examined in
conjunction with my empirical findings on the family's labour
supply). The interdependence of the supply of, and demand
for labour, are considered as they relate to the issue of how
much work is available to the individual employee. There
follows a discussion of the determinants of the individual's
supply of labour to the market. This involves a consideration
of how the utility which the individual household member
derives from his marginal earnings is effected by the dis¬
tribution of these earnings amongst personal and collective
uses. The question is then raised as to whether such
variations in the utility of marginal earnings might bo used
to predict the reactions of workers to wage increases and
hence the elasticity of supply of labour to the individual
to the individual firm.
Chapter 3
i *■' 111. ,mmm
This chapter sets out the data available from existing
sociological studies about the distribution of income within
the family, end the nature of each spouse's responsibilities
within the family budgeting system.
Chapter 4
This chapter describes the design of a small survey under¬
taken amongst working-class families in Edinburgh to investi¬
gate the nature of the distribution of income end budgeting
responsibilities within the family, end their relationship
to the husband's end wife's supply of labour#' The methods
used to analyse the data ere also outlined.
Chapter 5
This chapter gives the findings of the survey on the dis¬
tribution of income within the family and the nature of the
budgeting system. Factors effecting the size of the husband'
personal expenditure ere examined. Two main systems of
budgeting are identified, together with their cultural
correlates.
Chapiter 6
This chapiter gives the findings of the .survey on the family's
supply of labour. An overall analysis is made of the deter¬
minants of the husband's and wife's propensity to work, and
the importance of the distribution of income within the
family is assessed in relation to other factors. A summary of
the rather complex conclusions of this chapter will be found
at the end of it.
Chapter ?
Chapiter 7 concerns some implications of the savings behaviour
of families in the sample for contemporary theories of the
consumption function. The data suggest a basis for a fox>e~
casting model of consumer demand which would treat some types
of saving as' commodities. A mathematical model is' therefore
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developed for predicting the cross-elasticities of sub¬
stitution between current consumption of particular com¬
modities „ and that part of saving which is made towards
future planned purchases« The implications of this type of
substitution effect for the aggregate savings ratio ore also
considered*
Chapter 8
This chapter develops the notion of a utility tree - that is,
a clustering of commodities according to the degree to which
they are substitutes for one another in the consumer's ex¬
penditure* A utility tree enables the economist to identify
groups of commodities, such that the demand for all
commodities in the group is effected to the same extent by a
price change of a good external to the group. Such findings
greatly simplify the work of calculating the cross-elasticities
of substitution. The typical division of expenditures between
husband and wife, identified in chapter 5, forms a logical
basis for the classification of commodities into groups be¬
tween which the cross-elasticity of substitution is low.
Using this division as a basis for classification, a
hypothetical utility tree is constructed, tested on consumer
expenditure data from the National Incomes Blue Book, and
found to be reasonably correct.
Together with the work on saving in the preceding chapter,
the notion of a utility tree suggests a basis for the inte¬
grated model of household economic behaviour called for in
Chapter 1, It is then shown that leisure could be included in
the model as a commodity, given the right sort of macro-
economic data.
Chapter 9
In conclusion, the possibilities of such an integrated mode
ere further considered. An attempt is made to assess what
data would be required to complete the model; how it incor¬
porates the ideal types of the family budgeting system
developed in chapter 5 and the findings about the
determinants of the family's labour supply in Chapter 65
end what further work needs to be done to find out how
generally valid are the sociological assumptions on which
the model is based. Finally, I examine the question of
what simple demographic indicators are available of the
sociological variables used in the model.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: SOME COMMENTS ON THE
HETU0D(TlUU7 i^l^OHOnigs
This chapter is designed to state the reasons why an
investigations of the type presented in this thesis may be
useful. By examining some faults in contemporary economic
methodology, I shall attempt to show the need for en inte¬
grated model of household economic behaviour, which spans
three fields of economic theory? the theory of the savings
function, theory of demand for individual commodities, and
the theory of the individual's supply of labour to the
market. 1 shall also attempt to demonstrate that it is
necessary for a good economic model to go beyond the con¬
ventional scope of economics, and to take in some variables
commonly regarded as the sphere of sociology.
One of the main characteristics of economic models is
that they treat economic variables to a large extent as being-
set in a world of their own. The effect of the simplification
which is necessary to develop theory by the methods usual in
economics, is to divide off economic variables from
sociological or psychological ones, and even to split this
economic dimension of behaviour into subsets of variables
(academic "fields") which ore convenient for formulating
models. Variable interaction takes place only within sub¬
sets; the models allow for little interaction between sub¬
sets. For example, the economic theories concerning house¬
hold economic behaviour fall into three sets; demand theory,
the theory of the household's supply of labour, and theories
of the consumption function. In demand theory, we assume
that income is fixed; yet in theories of the household's
supply of labour we assume that income is variable, and that
the household's desire for money is determined by its
> •
members* relative valuation of leisure and material goods,
usually treated as an undifferentiated mass. Theories of
saving fail to consider the possibility that the house¬
hold's income may be capable of expansion by extra work. An
inter-disciplinary approach may be able to suggest what are
the boundaries of economic models; more precisely, what other
variables of human behaviour they hold constant or ignore
entirely.
/in important tacit assumption made by economists is
that there is an area of behaviour in which decisions can be
assumed to be made according to the principles of conscious
maximisation of utility. This area is then identified by
economists with those activities which are related to material
goals, namely (for the household) earning, spending and
saving; but this identification seems to be without
empirical basis. Yet it is obvious to everyone, including
economists, that a great many decisions in all types of
social interaction are made not out of a pure "gain" motive,
but out of love, hate, anxiety, fear and habit. Such motives
ere relevant to the economic activities of spending, earning
and saving, as well as to "non-economic" activities. At the
same time, ealculetive maximisation of utility may be a
decision process which is applied to some non-economic
decisions. Thus, there seems no good reason to identify the
area of celculative maximisation with the sres of economic
3
activity. In so far as decisions are not made according to
the principle of conscious -maximisation, th^rasy not be
1
i.e. the ares of actions wholly or partly directed to
material goals.
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predictable. Yet one of the major purposes of economic
theory is to predict behaviour and this may be why economists
have been reluctant to question the assumption of conscious
maximisation.
Even those decisions which are made according to a
calculation of gains and losses for the individual arc
circumscribed by the constraints and directives of his cul¬
tural background. Economists tend to assume that the effect
of cultural norms is constantt and thus they assume that the
area within which the conscious maximisation assumption is
correct is not something which we have to define with
reference to empirical evidence. Yet one has every reason
to think that the limits of this area are not the same for
all cultures, or even for all sorts end classos of people
in our ownvestern culture. Nor can one rule out inter¬
action between the "calculation" process and other mental
processes of a kind which cannot be represented simply by
the concept of cultural "constraints" on utility - maxi-
2
raising behaviour." Tho individual's very concept of his own
utility must be culturally determined. His economic status
end circumstances must be included amongst cultural in¬
fluences on his behaviour, so that instead of thinking of
utility as being maximised subject to normative constraints,
P
Examples of such constraints might be that cut-throat
competition is considered unethical; that thrift is a ■
virtue, even where no foreseeable risk requires it,
or that "rate-busting" is letting fellow-workers down.
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one should think of cultural feetors as variables within a
utility function which may be interdependent with economic
x
variables- It is, however, plausible that one can define
an area of decision Risking in which conscious maximisation
of utility is the only process going one, if one makes this
area small enough - The question is whether theories thus
confined by their own definitions and assumptions are the
most useful kind of theories.
Economic theories are required to predict> ; end a
theory which only predicts correctly in o narrow range of
circumstances is less useful then a theory which is valid
for a wide range of circumstances. And the greater the
number of assumptions of a theory, the smaller the range
of circumstances for which it is valid. It is the con¬
tention of this thesis that economic models could be im¬
proved by a much more extensive incorporation of non-
economic variables than has hitherto been envisaged. This
would reduce the number of variables which ore so often
assumed to be constant under the heading of tastes.
The economists' segregation of the economic dimension
of human behaviour is neither unconscious nor pragmatic.
It is a common argument on the part of economists that this
segregation should be made; that economics must deal only
with activity directed towards material ends, and with that
x
The need to examine this sort of interdependence may be.
illustrated with reference to Duesenberry's theory of
saving. He says that the marginal propensity to save
depends on the saver's relative income position; the
implications of this is that the marginal propensity to
save, and. the overage propensity too, is inversely re¬
lated to the difference between ego's income end the
average income of his reference group. But if this gap
becomes too wide, the sever may take up the standards of
a different reference group. Consequently, it is
necessary to examine how and why a saver may adopt a
different reference group.
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pert of the decision-making process of such activity which
consists of conscious maximisation. The question of what
variables to take into account, which the economist must
ask in his capacity of social theorist, has been somewhat
confused with the question of the economist*s neutrality or
objectivity in bis capacity as political adviser. Lionel
Robbins (1952) says that economists should be concerned with
means, not with endst-
"Here, then, is the unity of the subject of Economic
Science, the forms assumed by human behaviour in
disposing of scarce moans." ( p. 15^)
He counterpanes this definition of economics against
an alternative conception of economics as "the study of the
causes of material welfare" (page 3.5)«, Thus, Robbins con¬
siders social action as a problem-solving process, and the
economic dimension as an aspect of this process, which he
says properly extends to some non-material as well as material
goals. Robbins insists, emphatically, that "ends" should be
-excluded from the scope of economics. This is pax>tly because
the economist in his advisory capacity should not make
normative statements, but rather should advise upon the best
way of achieving a given end. But it is also partly because
it is not the concern of the economist to ask why people want
whatever they do want. The first consideration is really
irrelevant to the business of theory construction, whatever
its suitability as a professional ethic. The second con¬
sideration seems to arise out of e pre-occupstion with the
need for academic objectivity. Indeed, it is none of the
economist's business to ask what ethical justification a
mother of seven children may have for going to bingo five
times a week. But it is surely academically valuable, and
by no means un~objective, to ask "why" in another sense.
Unless the economist knows why she spends so much money on
bingo, unless he has some understanding of individuals'
motivation and the life style which underlies it, his models
will surely be mechanistic. It will not be possible to say
in what social and cultural circumstances they will be true.
A demand function for bingo which includes only income and
the size of family, is a less valuable model than s demand
function which includes some variable or variables standing
for life style and values, The growing use of dummy
variables to deal with the problem of nominal scales in
regression analysis, makes it no longer a reasonable excuse
that "life style" cannot be measured. It is merely a
question of finding reliable, simple indicators, which is a
matter for sociological theory.
To apply the principle that "ends are given" to
analytical economics, is to assume that ends are obvious,
and not things which have to be found out. This means, in
practice, assuming that the actor perceives the economic
situation or circumstances confronting him in exactly the same
way as does the economist. Keynes realised the importance of
the actor's perception of the situation when he emphasised the
importance of businessmen's expectations as a determinant of
investment behaviour. These expectations may not agree with
those of the economists. In other fields, less attention has
been paid to the point that the actor's perception is
essentially subjective. For example, economists generally
agree that utility con only Foe measured by the individual
experiencing it; but the natural corollary of this statement,
that not all individuals will define utility in the same
way, has some implications which have commonly been over¬
looked. In analysing the consumer's c-hoico between commod¬
ities , the economist assumes that some consistent ordering
of a marginal unit of x against a marginal unit of y, is
possible. This ordering will depend on cultural factors
(generally labelled "tastes")? but in fact including norms
as well, and in fact it is possible to envisage value
systems which entail that the ordering will be inconsistent
or indeterminate. I. F. Fearee (1964) gives the following
example: someone is on one occasion presented with the
choice of a small and a large apple. He takes the smaller,
to avoid being thought greedy. On a second occasion, he
chooses a large pear in preference to a small apple (knowing
that this choice will be interpreted not as greed but as
indicative a preference for pears). 'On a third occasion,
when presented with a large tipple and a smaller pear, he
takes the large apple. Thus, apparently, a small apple is
preferred to a large apple, and a large pear to a small
apple; yet a large apple is preferred to a small pear. The
consumer's behaviour appears intransitive (inconsistent) yet
really it is quite rational; he is choosing the largest
fruit, subject to the constraint that he must not be thought-
greedy. In order to understand the consumer's actions in
such a way that he could predict what would happen next time,
an economist would have to go behind the actions themselves
and examine the consumer's motives. Motives can only be
properly understood in a sociological framework; in this
case, the economist would need to know something about
British norms of table manners in order to understand the
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consumer's choice. And if he were British, he probably
would do* But s British economist looking at African
consumers' behaviour, might find the rationale of their
actions more difficult to understand, and would need some
sociological data to help him. One must then ask, is our
own culture so homogeneous that social norms relating to
economic actions can be assumed constant?
The more ■•She seas the economic actor as a member of
a household, the more important this point becomes. In
the field: of industrial sociology, the motivation of
the individual worker has been explained in terms of his
4
membership of a work group. But economists have yet to
relate the behaviour of consumer's and individual workers
to patterns of social interaction within the family. T-h«
worker's or consumer's perception of the alternatives open
to him in economic situations may be influenced by his
relationships with other household members. As a
relatively trivial example take a man choosing between a
red shirt and a blue shirt. He really likes the red one
better, but knows that if his wife thinks it garish and
persuades him not to wear it often, he will get less
utility from it than from the blue one. But he does not
really know what she would think. So he chooses on the
basis of guesswork. His ordering of the blue shirt
and the red shirt is indeterminate. There is no
reason to suppose he would necessarily make the seme
4
See, for example, F. <J« Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson,
"Management and the Worker", Cambridge, Mass., Harvard
University Press, 1959» or T. Lupton: "On the shop floor";
Oxford, The Pergamon Press, 1965.
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choice again. (This situation violates an assumption which
appears to be obvious - that the consumer must know what
his preferences are,, Yet such situations must be common,
in so far as purchases of many kinds are often made with
reference to the interests of other people besides the
purchaser.
These two examples, the first of intransitive choice
and the second of indeterminate preference, underline the
point that ends cannot be taken as "given" in the building
of theoriesj they are the proper subject of investigation,
just as are the actions which result from these ends or
goals. Robbins makes but little concession to this point.
He says (i-^age 26) that "we ... need to know ... the
ultimate valuations of the producers and consumers connected
with the productive apparatus", but then (page 83) be
attacks frith some vehemence the notion that the assumption
of economic rationality is not capable of a simple inter¬
pretation valid for all cultural situations
"The boundaries of Economics are the happy hunting
ground of minds averse to the effort of exact thought, and,
in these ambiguous regions, in recent years, endless time
has been devoted to attacks on the alleged psychological
assumptions of Economic Science."
There is obviously a practical need to define the
boundaries of an academic discipline somewhere, since no
one person nor set of scholars can hope to deal with the
entire field of the social sciences. Nor can any model en¬
compass all possibly relevant variables: if it did, it would
be cumbersome by virtue of its complexity. However, it seems
to me that it is necessary to make some effort to define the
boundaries of a discipline or a research project in a way
which accords with its ultimate objectives. In practice*
this entails that boundaries have to be fluid* and it is
distinctly unconstructive to define them so rigidly as
Robbins seams to do.
Attempts to define economics have really failed to
answer the question: "How far into the nature and causes
of the actor's motivation should we go?" To assume that
people maximise their economic advantage from a given
situation is an over-sirnplication. The motivation for
economic actions (that is* those directed towards material
goals) must contain elements of altruism, adherence to
custom and manners and so on, ss Pearcs's example shows.
In other words, such actions are :y.oi entirely oriented to
individual material goals, and therefore they are not en¬
tirely governed by the principle of conscious maximisation
Moreover, when we consider a multi-person consumer unit,
the questmen must always be, whose economic advantage is
being maximised? It is necessary for economists to realis
that economic action cannot necessarily be explained Just
in terms of other economic cctions or other economic cir-
cumstancGs. In order to understand economic actions, it i
necessary to see them in the context of the household's
overall value system. Real people do not divide off the
economic dimension from ether spheres of human activity.
Their economic actions, working, spending and saving, must
be seen as threads in the large cobweb which is social
action in general. Consequently, variables outside what
has come to be accepted as the economic dimension, may hav
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to be incorporated into models which are designed to predict
behaviour in the economic dimension. It is thus not a con¬
dition of academic objectivity that the economist should
treat variables outside the economic dimension as con¬
stants. By doing so, theory can only fail to attain its
maximum potential in credibility and predictive capacity.
For, the greater the number of assumptions attached to
a model, the more frequent must be the instances in which
users and critics of the model will find themselves doubt¬
ful as to whether some assumptions are vslid, for some data
5
to which the model is being epplxedto
For every new variable which can be incorporated into
a model, an assumption which holds that variable constant
may be abandoned. Let us examine the implications cf this
in more ddtsil. Suppose we have a demand function for a
commodity g, of the form:
Cg = (cixi * c2x2* "" + cnxn^ + ^klzl + ^2Z2'"° + knZn^
where »$.x ore "economic" variables of the conventional
1 n
kind, such as income, own price, price of substitutes, etc.,
and s^...zn are "cultural" or demographic variables in dummy
form (e.g. occupation, area of residence, type of dwelling,
etc.)consider the occupational variables above. If the beta-
coefficients for* occupational groups are substantial and
5
A simple example of how sucb doubts nay arise comes from
OTIorlihy, Gwilliam and Bay's forecast of cax* sales
(national Institute Economic Review, May 1937)• In the
forecast they made in 1961 they needed to make some
assumption about the frequency of replacement of existing
cars, and in the absence of any evidence that the current
rate of replacement would change, they assumed that this
would be the rate of replacement for the whole of the fore-
case period. 3y 1937 it was evident that the rate of re¬
placement had changed, and that this was responsible for some
part of an eight per cent error in their forecast of car sales
for 1966. Some consumer survey evidence about the factors
affecting how frequently people buy new cars, and how these
.were likely to change, would have been useful hero.
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significant, a demand function which includes them will be
better than one including only economic variables in pre¬
dicting the expenditure of groups of consumers whose
occupational composition is biased, for example rural areas,
mining villages and areas of high unemployment. In using
(for such communities) a function which had no occupational,
coefficients one would, consciously or unconsciously, be
making ore of two assumptions, either that their occupational
composition was the same as that of the sample from which
the demand function had been derived, (which would be untrue)
or that occupation hod no substantial effect on the demand
for g ( which would not have been tested).
The first implication of this arrgiment, therefore, is
that one cannot knov: whether the predictive power of a model
is capable of significant improvement by substituting extra
variables in place of assumptions concerning them, unless one
has tried. It it"always worth trying? This will depend on
e number of factors
(1) the estimation which may be made from existing . .
knowledge of the increase in predictive power
which might result;
(2) the difficulties involved in collecting and
using the necessary data;
(5) the degree of permanence which may be expected
of the relationships specified in the enlarged
model;
(4-) the accuracy of prediction required, the law
of diminishing marginal utility must, after all,
epply to successive increases in predictive
accuracy;
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(5) the existing degree of complexity of the
model. The more complex a model becomes, the
more difficult it is to use, from the point
of view of data collection and processing,
as well as computation. Most specifically,
models to be used in short-term forecasting
need to be used quickly. If it takes so long
to collect and process the data that the
events to be predicted are about to happen by
the time researchers have made their pre-
diction, there is clearly not much point in
making the prediction. There is, therfore, a
trade-off between accuracy and simplicity or
c; 7s- /n4j w v.- vi. e
The inclusion of cultural variables is therefore most
likely to be of use in long term forecasting, where
accuracy has greater importance relative to simplicity and
speed than in short-term work. But the inclusion of cul¬
tural variables into short-term models may be of value
where this does not make data collection too cumbersome.
However, another perhaps even more important reason for the
investigation of cultural influences on economic behaviour,
is that without adequate knowledge cf these influences the
economist cannot know for what range of circumstances his
models are valid. Ee cannot really know, in fact, what
assumptions he is making. For if one does not know that 'a
particular variable or complex of variables is relevant, or
even that it exists, one does not specify any assumptions
concerning it. An extensive body of literature has pointed
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out the difficulties of applying conventional models
developed with reference to western societies, to under¬
developed societies (see Dalton, 1967» end Fifth, 3.956).
But it is loos comraon3.y suggested that social change and
cultural differences in our own society may generate a
need to continually check the validity of the assumptions
of economic analysis.• Galbroith's attack on the current
relevance of the notion of consumer sovereignty (Galbraith,
1967)? and the work of Harris, (1964), Burnham (19-12) and
others on managerial motivation, Hall and Hitch's work on
average cost pricing (1939); all these strands of thought
have demonstrated the importance of keeping an open mind
about the most basic doctrines of economic theory. These
doctrines are now seen to arise not, as was assumed in the
early days of the discipline, from common-sense obser¬
vations of "human nature" and immutable "laws of the market",
but from observations of particular societies; and one must
be aware that social structure and custom change.
This is not to say that present economic models do not
work, nor that non-economic variables have been entirely
kept out of the picture. Clearly the power of economists
working with theory in its present form, to predict macro-
economic trends, is considerable. However, this does not
mean that it might not be substantially improved by ex¬
tending the models back into the area of general social
theory, so that the number of sociological variables to be
held constant for any particular prediction might be reduced,
and the points of application of particular models clearly
defined.
Models for some purposes have incorporated variables on
the fringe of the economic dimension. In the field of the
laboux* force participation of married women, several studies
have introduced as explanatory factors the woman's education,
race, social class, and area of residence, end even the
attitude of husbands. , . ) In the case of savings be¬
haviour, economists have toyed with the "relative income
hypothesis" the notion that an individual's reference jgroup,
as sociologists would coll it, determines the standard of
living he would like to achieve, and hence the proportion of
his income that he saves. (See Duesenberry, 19^2 and Tobin,
1951)• Age has also been introduced as a factor which helps
to explain savings behaviour. (See Fisher, 1952).
Moreover, in introducing variables which lie outside
the scope of the traditional core, of economic theory on
individual behaviour, economists hove been to some extent
constrained by the modern pre-occupation with quantitative
analysis as distinct from qualitative analysis. This means
that only those variables which can easily be measured, are
thought suitable for incoporotion into a model. The intro¬
duction of "dummy" variables into regression analysis has
made it possible for models to include a few nominal-scale
variables, provided that the categories are not too many.
Cain's use of "region" (Cain, 1966) is a case in point; he
treats it as a dichotoraous variable "north" or'feouth". But
it has been insufficiently realised that many such variables
should not be treated in isolation. To the sociologist the
notion of a cultural pattern is elementary. To take s simpl
example, three dichotomous cultural variables produce eight
25
possible combinations of variable scores. It may bo these
combinations, rather than the individual variable scores,
5
which are real explanatory factors. The recognition of
these cultural patterns may facilitate interpretation of
data.and hypothesis construction. Moreover, they may
facilitate summarisation of nominal scale variables: it
may be possible to handle s cultural pattern as a dummy
variable whilst its components would be too numerous.
Of course, if the recognition of cultural patterns is
to be of practical value in predictive models, one must
find certain indicators of these patterns which can be
easily observed and measured. Survey research, too, is
obviously time-consuming and costly. Unless it reveals
relationships which can be expected to have some degree o V
permanence, it many not be worth the cost end effort. More¬
over, there is a large category of sociological variables
which, although some of them rasy be measurable in an
ordinal sense, do not have a measurable connection with
economic behaviour. For example, one can say that a
favourable attitude to work will increase wives' propensity
For an extensive discussion of the use of variable patterns
in social research, see Galtung (1967) especially page 240
et.seq. As a very simple example of how such patterns may
ho relevant in economic analysis, consider the demand for
vegetables. A small group of households will buy very few
vegetables because they grow their own. Sise of garden
alone will not identify this group, for not all persons
with large gardens grow vegetables in them. Low income
will pre-iisposa people with large gardens to grow vege¬
tables in them; but the low income group includes a sub¬
stantial proportion of old or s|.ck people incapable of
gardening. Thus, unusually low market demand for vege¬
tables may be associated with a variable pattern con¬
sisting of three elements; having a large garden; having
a low income; and being physically able to garden.
This is a fairly trivial example, but in Chapter 5 1
attempt to show how cultural patterns of considerable
complexity which have been identified by sociologists, may
be associated with particular forms of economic behaviour*.
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to work, but one would not expect any long-tenia consistent
difference between the labour force participation rates of
women who agree with some particular statement about the
desirability of mothers going out to work, end the
participation rates of women who disagree with it. The
amount by which attitudes influence behaviour may be highly
variable over time. However, where individual variables or
cultural patterns do not have a measurable relationship with
economic behaviour, theories which incorporate something of
them may at least facilitate the explanation of errors - and
hence facilitate prediction ox the sise and direction of
error which e forecast is likely to have. At the very least,
a "sociologisation" of economic models could define their
practical limitations.
This is, in fact, what the "sociologisation" of the
theory of the firm has done. This is an unusual area of
economics, in so far as economists have accepted and
developed theories arising from the sociology of organisation
and the traditional theory ox the profit-maximising entre¬
preneur has been very much circumspected by the absorption of
such.theories into the conventional wisdom regarding managers
7
motivation. Burnham's theory of the separation, in the
joint-stock company, of executive power from capital owner¬
ship, has induced the development of a large range of theorio
of managers' motivation, all of which have different impli¬
cations for the policies which a company may be expected to
pursue«
As stated earlier-, economists frequently ignore cultural




under the heading of "tastes", sn imeginery variable which
is held constant. There is en obvious objection to this:
that if you do not define a variable you cannot tell
whether it remains constant over the range of data being
investigated. This kind of self-limitation of an economic
model obviously means that the model can only make "short-
run" predictions; it is only useful for prediction over
that period of time during which one may reasonably expect
"tastes" to remain constant. It is important, however, to
find out over what period of prediction may be madeJ
Consequently it is necessary to find out what "tastes" are,
what the variable comprises and what causes it to change.
It is important to overcome this limitation in an age when
technological and social change which influences people's
values and preferences, is very rapid. To quote Leontief
(1971>p-^)
"On the relatively shallow level where empirically
implemented economic analysis now operates, even the more
"invariant of the structural relationships, in terms of
which the system is described, change rapidly. Without a
constant inflow of new data, the existing state of factual
information becomes obsolete very soon."
Economics is not without its attempts to relate
specific changes in values and customs to changes in
economic behaviour. Clarence Long (1953) for example, tri.es
to explain the rise in the labour force participation rate
of women in the last few decades by reference to the in¬
creasing mechanisation of the home. There are several major
objections to his theory, which are spelt out in Chapter 6,
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but at least this sort of attempt is a step in a potentially
useful direction. Without a proper consideration of the
cultural processes involved, there is e strong risk in this
sort of theory-building, of committing the ecological
P
fallacy.;:, v/ith respect to changes over time. Indeed, this is
e frequent problem with sophisticated economic models in
general, depending as they do so much on multiple regression
analysis of time series. What the economist obtains, in
such esses, is not a direct observation of human behaviour,
but a set of statistical tnsriiiTestations of this behaviour.
Even if he tests coefficients for statistics! significance,
he may not interpret these manifestations correctly, in the
absence of supplementary evidence from direct observation
about the behaviour of individuals. The necessity for such
supplementary evidence is realised by some, but the subject
9
is often approached with suspicion, -except in the surveys
of consumer behaviour of individuals conducted by the
Brookings Institution (Barlow et oly1968) and the Michigan
Research Centre (in. particular "Contribution of Survey Methods
O
The term "ecological fallacy" Was originally used to
criticise errors of the type committed when a particular
characteristic or behaviour which is found more fre¬
quently in place A than in place 3, is attributed to
general differences between the local cultures of A and
3. A similar fallacy is committed if time is substituted
for place. Fox* example, if all increase in the incidence
of cancer in any pjeriod or country is corals ted with an
increase in the import of bananas, there is no reason to
suppose bananas cause cancer. Both might be due, say, to
dietary changes which arise from an increase in the
standard of living.
q
' For example, Cain (op.cit. page 2y):- who says that the
taste factors believed to be washed out by aggregation
are doubtless of great importance amongst individuals" but
doubts whether surveys really can identify "tastes" and
their correlates.
to Economicsj1 Katona et al, 1954-) and other studies of in¬
dividuals' responses to tax rates and changes.^
Some of the most important work on the labour force
participation rates of married women has in fact run the
risk of committing the ecological fallacy in its original
form. Cain (1966) uses ss date, observations of average
income, racial composition, average participation rate of
women in the labour force, for cities, and so do Bowen and
Einegsn (1965)« The real test of whether the relationships
thus discovered are true, is whether they hold at the
level of the individual.
J. K. Gifford (1968) has identified,the problems of
the ecological fallacy and of spurious correlation in
general, under the heading of the "disease of correlationism"
and gives this example
"Studies of single or partial correlation of the move¬
ment of wages, prices and unemployment in a complex situation
would not justify a writer in claiming that part of a rise in
wage rates was caused by demand null and part by cost push,"
( p. 1013)
With macro-economic problems, there are considerable
difficulties in detecting spurious correlations. But by
making investigations at the level of the individual or
family, spurious correlations can more easily be avoided.
The ecological fallacy itself is but one sort of spurious
correlation. It is avoided by making sure, through direct
observation of individuals, that characteristic or action x
is associated with characteristic or action y et the in¬
dividual level. Whether characteristic or action x causes
10
For a summary of these see Brown and Dawson, 1969®
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characteristic or action y is e "bit more difficult to dis¬
cover, To find out this, one must find out why individuals
act as they do, or at least understand how x end y fit into
an overall cultural pattern. For example, both Mincer and
Cain think that the increasing wage rates paid to women have
had an influence on their participation rates which has out¬
weighed the influence of increasing husband's income. But
one could equally well attribute this change over time to
other factors, such as the reduction in average family sine,
or changes in attitudes of women and their husbands towards
the ides of a married woman going to work. Given data com¬
posed of observations on individuals, one could control for
each independent variable in turn, to check whether any of
the relationships then disappeared, and evaluate their re¬
lative effects. But the interpretation might still not be
entirely clear, unless women were asked why they worked. For
example, Mincer also finds that, at the level of the in¬
dividual, participation rates are higher for well-educated
women. Is this because such women earn higher wages and
salaries, as he thinks, or because their attitudes to their
role of motherhood are different, or because their ro¬
tative evaluation of the interest of paid work versus house¬
work is more favourable to paid work then is the evaluation
of less well educated women? Or do professional women have
better access to nursery facilities? It is clear that to got
to the bottom of the matter one need to understand the
motivations and life stylo of the individuals involved. This
can only bo done by survey work which collects data for
individuals„
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I would agree with Gifford that models based on
possibly-spurious correlations may hove considerable pre¬
dictive value. But their ability to predict would be more
specific and sore reliable, if they had been adequately
tested for spurn osity. Moreover, economics is constantly
be&et by the problem that relationships between variables
which appear in cross-section data, may turn out to be
different over time. If one knows the underlying rationales
of these relationships, instead of merely their statistical
manifestations, it may be possible to predict whether future
time series will beer out relationships observed in cross-
section. Cohort analysis, such as that used by liossett
(1953), may help with this problem. By dividing women into
cohorts according to age, and ex-mining the v/ay in which
the age-profile of labour force participation has changed,
he is able to predict this variable better than a previous
attempt which did not use the cohort method.
Another way in which "sociologised" models could help
to clarify structural relationships, would be to specify
the way in which economic variables ere perceived by actors.
People's perceptions may be rather different from the truth.
C. V. Brown (1968) has pointed out the importance of this
for the investigation of the incentive and disincentive
effects of taxation - many people ere not sure what the
marginal rate of income tax is, or have an incorrect idea of
it. Several studies on Bonsuner behaviour have attempted to
assess how people's expectations of their future income in¬
fluence their savings and purchasing behaviour. (E.g. Katone
and Mueller, 1968).
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V/liet about the individual's concept of his present income,
or, to be exact, the utility which it represents to him?
This may not be a linear function of measured income - not
11
just for Keyres!on reasons, ' but for reasons which have to
do with the allocation of income within the family, which I
discuss in Chapter 2. The individual's concept of what his
income is, arid how adequate it is in relation to his desired
standard of living (itself a valuable subject of enquiry)
must have en effect on his willingness to offer marginal
labour to the market. As Duesenberry has pointed out, it may
also have an effect on his savings behaviour. The in¬
dividual's perception of his income and its significance in
a complex social situation seems, therefore, to be worthy of
study.
I pointed out at the beginning of this chapter that
the economic dimension of behaviour has been split up into
smeller areas for the purpose of model construction. Thus,
the theory of commodity choice is to a largo extent
divorced from that of the individual's supply of labour;
the theory of savings from that of choice between indi-
12
vidusl commodities. * But the classification of variables
into their existing boxes seems to need some empirical
justification. Connections need to be made between the
three fields of theory amongst which statements about the
economic behaviour of individuals and households is un-
11
i.e. that the marginal propensity to consume declines as
income rises so that the function could bo curvilinear.
] 2
This segregation of fields may be justified for the
.initial development of simple models. But the discipline
of economics should by now have reached the stage where
multi-field theories can be developed for application to
forecasting, which is where they ere useful.
happily divided. In the area of commodity choice, end the
ares of the consumption function, it is generally assumed
for convenience that the individual makes choices within
an income fixed by factors beyond his control. But the
theory of the individual's supply of labour has it3 raison
d'etre in the fact that individuals may in many circum¬
stances vary their incomes. What are the implications of
thfe proposition for savings and consumption behaviour?
For example, Friedman (1957) postulates that occupational
groups with a widely fluctuating income, such as entre¬
preneurial groups, will save more than people with a steady
income, because of the need to hove a large contingency
fund. What, then, of the manual worker whose income
fluctuates either because hi is a casual labourer, or be¬
cause a large proportion of his income comes from overtime
work? V/ill he save more than others' of the some average
income level? Or will he take a second 30b? Or will his
wife work? One car. postulate that the use of secondary
labour power is the poor family's way of obtaining a con¬
tingency fund. Certainly this fits in with Mincer's
finding (1962) that the wide is more likely to work where
the transitory component of family income is high. The
question then arises, for which occupational groups, and
under what conditions, is either solution to the problem of
insecurity employed?
In the analysis of savings behaviour, consumption, the
alternative use of income, has been treated by and large as
a continuous mass, not differentiated into particular
commodities. Yet in everyday life, one is aware that peopl
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"save up" to buy particular things; savings, then, may have
to be related to planned future consumption. Lawrence Klein
(see Ketone et el, 19.31) went so fer as to say that the amon&t
of money which a family spends on durable goods in any one
year is inversely related to the amount the family saves,
but be did not draw the full conclusion from this, that there
is a deliberate connection on the part of the spending unit.
In so far as saving may be deliberate, one may ask: what
sorts of people save for what, and for what period do they
set their money aside? This will influence the level and
nature of liquid assets, and the significance which con¬
sumers attach to them. It has other implications which are
discussed in Chapter 6.
The connections between different areas of spending
unit behaviour have been, made most thoroughly by G. 8.
Becker (19&5). He has been able to make significant in¬
sights into secular trends in working hours, by considering
time as s consumption good} which may be complementary to
some material goods and a substitute for others.
To sum up, there seems to be a need for studies cf the
family's economic behaviour which satisfy the following
conditions
(1) no artificial barriers between academic disci¬
plines should, if possible, be imposed, since
it is important to leave as little as possible
under the heading of "ceteris paribus";
(?) for the same reason, such studies must not
restrict themselves to specific aspects of
economic behaviour which have been conceptualised
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by the Arbitrary division of economics into
conventional "fields". Work is required which
tries to draw the connections between these
fields.
(5) such studies must attempt to identify culture!
patterns which influence economic behaviour —
in fact economic behaviour must be seen as
part of a cultural pattern. If such patterns
ore found, one must, in order to incorporate
them into macro-economic models, find in¬
dicators by which those patterns can be easily
identified.
It may appear that these conditions could only be met
by models of quite impractical complexity - and, as I pointed
out earlier, there must be a point beyond which the dis¬
advantages arising from increased complexity outweigh the
advantages of any consequent increase in predictive power.
The same principle of diminishing marginal utility of model-
sophistication may, it could be argued, apply to the pro¬
cess of getting rid of "ceteris paribus" assumptions in
order to moke the model applicable to a wider range of cir¬
cumstances. As 1 pointed out earlier, model-sophistication
is really a process of putting in extra variables into the
model and removing corresponding assumptions about those
variables. But for any model, there will be some
assumptions which are valid for most applications of the
model, and which will only be problematic for unusual sets
of data. There may be little point in complicating the
model for all applications, for the sake of greater pre¬
dictive power in a few. The counter-part to this second
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point, however, is that one cannot knew for what
I
applications (i.e. sets of data or cultural circumstances)
assumptions ore valid, until one has tried to find out.
The value of checking assumptions is well illustrated by
the changes in the field' of the theory of the firm to
which I referred earlier.
A further counter-argument is that the economist is
notr always aware of what assumptions he is making. That
is to say, empirical investigation of the behaviour to
which a model relates, perhaps taking into account variables
and concepts from other fields of economic theory or other
disciplines, may throw up circumstances for which the model
may need modification, or may' even suggest new concepts al¬
together. Becker's work on the allocation of time (1965)
is a good example of this sort of process. Becker throws
new light on the theory of the individual's supply of labour
by considering the worker primarily as a consumer. Whereas
most theories of labour supply have treated leisure time as
a residual left over from working time, Becker considers it
as a consumption good, which is complementery to all other
commodities, some consumption activities being more time-
intensive than others. This leads to an interesting inter-
3 5
pretotion of trends in working hours. -
Thus, model-sophistication beyond the point which is
.justified for normal forecasting purposes, may be justified
as a method of developing now theories. Moreover - and 'this
3 3
Becker attempts to explain the feet that the negative in¬
come effect for male workers is generally stronger over
time than in cross-section, by the hypothesis that over
time, the productivity of consumption or leisure time
(in utility terms) is increasing.
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is my major argument - the "break-even" point beyond which
further sophistication loses more by way of making a model
cumbersome than it gains by way of general.!ty and pre¬
dictive power, con only be found by experiment. A model
of high complexity, once constructed, can be simplified
for particular uses, to meet the demands of a particular
research problem and the constraints of the resources
available to solve it.
In this thesis, I have examined the economic behaviour
of working class families in Edinburgh as part of an over¬
all life style. I chose working class families, because it
is manual workers who have the greatest opportunities to
vary their income through overtime working and piece rates.
(Though opportunities for individual variation of effort
under the latter heading may be considerably limited by
group norms). Since this is only on exploratory study con¬
fined by the time and resources available to a research
student, it cannot hope to cover more than a fraction of
the ground which its objectives imply. Hopefully, it may
indicate the need for, end the potential of, a greater
flexibility in the scope of enquiry of economics; end in
particular, it may illustrate some ways in which the social
factors effecting the supply of labour and consumer ex¬
penditure might be integrated with the body of economic
theory. In summary, the working propositions which I in¬
tend to consider are as follows:-
1. That the household can, and does, vary its income
according to its consumption requirements or
goals.
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(a) by variations in the amount of overtime work
taken on by the husband;
(b) by varying the utilisation of the wife's
earning power.
2. That the different ways in which the family's
financial resources are divided between members,
the responsibilities and the degree of freedom
accorded to each, member will affect the in¬
dividual's labour market participation.
3. That the different ways in which the family's
income is divided between, members, and is com¬
posed of different individuals' earnings, affect
on the elasticity of substitution between different
commodities.
Families' savings behaviour will also be considered,
in so far as it relates to:
(1) the utilisation of the family's earning power;
(2) the division of income within the family;
(3) the pattern of expenditure and its origins in
a life style.
From this work it should be possible to go some way
towards constructing an integrated model of the family's
economic behaviour. Such a model would cut across the
usual boundaries of labour economics, demand theory end
savings theory. It would therefore reduce the number of
variables which hove to be held constant in the use of any
one model. If, moreover, such an integrated model can be
related to those aspects of family life which ere normally
the province of sociology - norms, attitudes, aspirations,
and adherence to wider social groups - the model would hove
some further advantages over narrower* conventional economic
laodels. It would be able to specify its own limitations*
that is* in what cultural circumstances it would or would
not be applicable. It might also be able to say* to some
extent* how relationships in the model would be lively to
change as a result of changes in the underlying culture.
In this chapter* I have suggested two directions of
development by which economic theory could improve the pre~
dictive power and generality of its models. The first of
these directions is the incorporation into models of cul¬
tural variables; the process reduces the number of initial
assumptions which restrict the range of circumstances* ox*
range of data sets, to which the model can be applied. ■ -
process itself entails a thorough investigation, of the
cultural background of economic behaviour* which serves to
<feheck the validity of indispensible assumptions and to
establish more cloarly the limitations of the model - in
other words* it serves to establish the boundaries of the
range of data sets to which the model can be applied, and to
reveal implicit assumptions of the model which may not be
true for all date sots. Much of this thesis is concerned
with this direction of development of the economic theory
of household behaviour. In Chapter 2* I attempt to analyse
the assumptions underlying theories of the individual's
supply of labour to the market* and propose a number of
hypotheses as to how knowledge of the distribution of in¬
come within the family might modify and extend, these theorie
Chapters 3 and 3 then attempt to construct a typology of the
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way in which the distribution of income within the family
affects the incentive to work, both from survey data and
previous literature. (Chapter 4- is concerned with research
methodology). Chapter 6 completes this analysis and assesses
the relative importance of the internal income distri¬
bution factor in the context of other influences on the
incentive to work arising form the economic and social
characteristics of particular households.
A second theme of the work, also directed towards o
"sociologisation" of economic theory, concerns the
structure of the set of consumers' purchases considered as
a network of substitutes. This begins with an investigation
in Chapters 3 end 5 of the type of purchases for which
husband and wife are respectively responsible. The theme
is developed in Chapter 8, where the data about this
division of expenditure between husband and wife is used to
formulate a hypothesis about the structure of a utility
tree. Making use of Pesrce's work on utility trees and the
computation of cross-elasticities of substitution, this
hypothesis is tested and found to be nearly correct. The
sociological part of the investigation is therefore shown
to be of use in computing cross-elasticities by Pearce's
methods, and, furthermore, it is shown that knowledge of
the social correlates of the division of expenditures
between the spouses may help to determine the range of data
sets dor which a set of cross-elasticities found by this
method is likely to be correct.
Chapter 7? concerning the nature of saving by working-
class households and its theoritical consequences, shows
how en empiricsi investigation of economic behaviour in its
social context may throw up new concepts which are useful
in building new theories. Chapter 7 also illustrates the
second direction of development of economic theory which I
have advocated in this introductory chapter, the inte¬
gration of different fields of economics. In Chapter 7,
saving is considered as an extension of the set of com¬
modity purchases, and I attempt to show how changes in one
important component of saving can be predicted by the use
of ordinary commodity-demand functions. Chapter 7 thus
attempts to integrate theories of saving with the theory
of demand for individual commodities.
The integrstion-of-fields theme is also prominent in
Chapters 2 end 9» where reference is made to the necessity
of linking the micro-economic theory of labour supply with
the theory of demand by considering how the individual or
household may vary income according to needs or desires.
In Chapter 6 I show how the nature of the housekeeping
system may affect the husband's propensity to work.
Finally, in Chapter 9, I outline the nature and con¬
sider the potentialities of on integrated model of house¬
hold behaviour v^hich would treat consumption, saving and
labour supply as one continuous fi&ld of behaviour by taking
time (as Becker does) as the household's primary resource,
end treating all its economic activities as expenditures of




THE FAMILY'S SUPPLY OF LABOUR
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the current
state of economic end sociological theory on the indivi¬
dual's, and family's, supply of labour, to employers, end
to examine the way in which theories about family members
as workers can be related to, and synthesised with, theories
about family members as consumers. In conventional theories
of consumer demand income is taken as given. This
assumption is used in indifference durve analysis; and be¬
cause this is considered the most basic form of demand •
analysis it pervades economic thinking about consumer demand
and its prediction. Clearly the assumption cannot be
challenged in the sense that purchases cannot exceed income
for any length of time. But it is necessary to discuss tne
ways in which the main consumer unit, that is the nuclear
family, manipulates the level of its income according to its
needs and desires.
This discussion has already been opened by Becker's
work (19&5)^in which time rather, than income, is considered
to be the consumer-worker's primary resource, and the
amount of labour-time available, rather then actual earnings^
the primary resource constraint. In order to uso this
theoretical framework it is necessary first to establish
what determines the maximum number of hours a worker can
work.
This chapter will also examine the implications of the
fact that the consumer worker unit is not one individual,
but a group of several individuals - the family. This
<u
raises the issue of how the family allocates the duty of
work between different workers: end how the distribution
of income within the family affects the propensity to
work.
The nature of the individuals labour supply decisions
How much choice doos the individual worker have about
how many hours per week he works? Theoretically, the
individual has three kinds of decision to make about his
or her supply of labour to the market; whether to work at
all; for how many hours s week to x^ork; and at whet speed
to work. In practice the first decision is only relevant
to teenagers and students, the elderly, and most impor¬
tant ly to married women; men of working age have not much
option. The second decision operates in two ways; the in¬
dividual can choose whether or not to accept particular
"packages" of overtime offered to him by his employer, and
he can seek a job which is likely to offer the kind of
package be wants. The "marginal" hour depicted in labour
supply curve diagrams is strictly speaking an over¬
simplification, because in only a very few jobs is it
likely that the individual can decide to work any number
of hours between, say, forty and sixty. Usually the fore¬
man will offer him half a shift here and a Sunday there.
This second kind of decision - how many hours per week to
work - may be made by men end by married women. For con¬
venience of reference, I shall class men's overtime work
and the work of married women together under the term "the
family's discretionary labour power" - discretionary, be¬
cause there is no injunction of law or custom that this
labour power must generally be used.
How far, then, can the individual worker choose how
many hours he works? He cannot work more than the number
of hours his employer can offer him, although he can work
less than this, unless overtime is compulsory. The whole
question of how much work an individual offers to the
labour market may be considered under two headings:
firstly the supply of work available to the worker, and
secondly his demand for it."*" This is, I think, a more
useful approach than the conventional one of the firm's
or the economy's demand for, and workers' supply of,
labour. Several writers (Peldstein, 1963, Hunter end
Robertson, 1969) have pointed out that these two variables
are interdependent in such a way that empirical obser¬
vations of how many hours people work con only be regarded
as evidence of points of equilibrium between supply and
demand in the labour market; they cannot be used to build
up separate supply and demand curves. The concepts of the
supply cf and demand for work, on the other hand, do not
present this problem. Every employer will offer a "normal"
working week (most commonly, at the present time, forty
hours for manual workers) plus, very frequently, a variety
of overtime packages end sometimes opportunities for extra
earnings according to results * This range of work
opportunities, then, is the employer's supply of work to
the worker, which con easily be ascertained in survey work.
Given a certain range of working hours available (which will
obviously depend very much on conditions in particular
establishments, industries and places) the work-package
*
This approach was first developed by Lionel Robbins ("Not'
on the'Blast deity of Demand for Income"; Economica, June
1950).
chosen by the worker will depend upon tho wage rate offered*
working conditions, family considerations and possibly some
other factors, The set of chosen packages et various wage
rates, holding the other influences on the worker's choice
constant, con be legitimately regarded as the worker's
2
demand for work - or to return to the conventional
terminology, his supply of labour.
Given the wage rate, experience of the range of
packages which workers in en establishment are prepared to
accept will, at least partly, determine the range of
packages which management actually offers. Thus, the de¬
mand for labour may be influenced by employees' willingness
to work overtime. If this is so, the willingness to work
overtime, and the way in which that willingness changes in
response to wage increases, could be an important in¬
fluence on the level of employment. This is both en
important social fact, and, as others have pointed out, a
problem for the theory of labour economics. But, using the
concepts of the supply of and demand for work at the level
of the individual, it should be possible to identify social
and economic factors which influence the demand for work.
d
The reader may find it odd to think of work as a commodity;
that is really, however, no more odd than it is to think
of money as a commodity, as in the commonly used term "the
demand for money", or indeed, in the terms used to describe
the labour market from the employer's point of view, the
supply of and demand for labour. The notions of the demand
for money end the demand for work ere in fact closely re¬
lated; for the demand for work is derived from the demand
for money. From this follows naturally the idea of working
capacity - the maximum number of hours a man can work •- as
potential income (or "full income", as it has been called
by Becker (1955)). If potential, instead of actual income i
used as the income-concept, in a theoretical model of con¬
sumer demand, and leisure is treated as a commodity, it is
possible to incorporate into such a model the idea that con¬
sumers con vary their income according to their needs and
desires. I attempt to do this et the aid of Chapter 8 and in
Chapter 9.
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The idea of potential income (usually greater than
actual income) as the use of maximum working capacity,
gives rise to a term which I shell use frequently both
here and in Chapter 6, to refer to the extent to which the
family or its individual members use their total working
capacity or labour power. This term is "lcshour power
utilisation"«
Determinants of the supply of work
What ore the determinants of the supply of work to the
worker? In other words, what ere the aspects of the em¬
ployer's demand for labour which determined the range of
overtime packages available to the individual employee? To
obtain more labour, an employer may recruit new workers or
ask (occasionally require) existing workers to work longer
hours. There are, then, two elements in the firm's demand
for labour; the demand for new workers and the demand for
overtime labour. Unless there is an acute labour shortage
(in which case, lengthening the working hours of existing
staff may be the only 'way in which an employer can obtain
more labour) the demand for overtime labour will depend to
a very large extent on its price to the employer x'elative
to the ordinary-rate labour of newly recruited staff.
Taking on new staff entails costs of recruiting (advertising,
personnel manager's time, training costs) end several kinds
of labour overheads (national insurance, selective employment
tax where applicable, overalls, tools, training and canteen
3
The employer, however, may be influenced by other con¬
siderations too, such as the effect of employment policies
on labour relations and the traditions of the firm or in¬
dustry. There is no reason to suppose that the employer,
any more than his workers, is an "economic man", having en¬
tirely pecuniary motives.
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facilities). The Prices and Incomes Board (1970) found that
such labour overheads represented about eleven per cent of
labour costs, assuming a net refund of S.3.T.; and that re¬
cruiting costs constituted a further eleven per cent of
labour costs. There are, in addition, indirect costs of
employing labour (like managers' time) and costs which may
be difficult to measure, such ss the initial lower pro¬
ductivity of new workers. The Board came to the conclusion
that in some circumstances, particularly where S.B.T. is
payable, overtime labour is cheaper than recruiting new
staff. One such circumstance would probably be where an
increase in the firm's demand for labour is expected to be
short-lived, so that it is not worth incurring the initial
investment in recruiting and training costs.
It is clear then, that when the recruitment of new
staff is thought expensive, relatively to paying existing
staff overtime rates, the willingness of o firm's workers
to do overtime will affect the demand for their own labour.
This factor is not relevant only in times of rising demand;
even in periods of stagnant demand, there will be s con¬
tinuous trickle of people leaving the firm for various
reasons; and if it is possible and cheaper to share out the
work of the leavers amongst remaining staff, this will be
done.
If demand for their product is erratic or unpre¬
dictable, employers may prefer to rely on it even where- over¬
time is dearer than recruiting now staff. Labour overheads
S.E.T., of course, is payable for each employee, whereas
value added tax, payable on the total wages bill, plus
profits would not have this "overhead" aspect.
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in the form of training costs will be high, and workers'
morale will be badly affected, if the firm takes on new
workers and mokes them redundant again in a short time.
The higher the recruitment end training costs, the more
likely a firm is to offer overtime instead of recruitingo
The Prices end Incomes Board suggest that high levels
of overtime working, particularly where total hours exceed
55 Pe** week, may reduce productivity* This could mean that
if overtime goes up a little, it may tend to go up further
because the increase in production resulting from it going
up will sometimes fall short of managers' expectations;
overtime could thus be self-increasing (or self-per¬
petuating when demand for the product falls off again) by
a sort of "ratchet effect"* A further factor is that
union representatives have a good deal of control over the
extent of overtime working in a firm (see op.cit,,
pp.$9-40). All these things suggest that workers can to
some extent determine the amount of overtime they do, end
that moreover en increase in overtime worked may lead to a
further increase in overtime offered*
The interdependence of the supply of and demand for
work is therefore quite complex; but it can be analysed
clearly as a series of feedback loops* I do not think,
therefore, that this interdependence renders futile an5r
systematic attempt to analyse the determinants of workers'
demand for work.
Whet factors govern the availability of work for
married women? Like the availability of overtime work for
men, this will be to some extent independent of the general
level of economic activity, but for different reasons.
There is a very high turnover of the female labour force
because women stop work to have children, so that in
general wombn wanting work are not likely to have much
difficulty, except in some northern towns where industry
of the "heavy" type prevails and vacancies in the service
industries ere not large enough to compensate for this.
There is also a hidden demand for cheap female labour to
replacensn, which may be reported to Employment Exchanges
(unlike many vacancies for' women which will be in small
establishments such as shops and cafes) but which is not
likely to be closely related to the level of demand in the
economy as a whole. These factors in themselves make it
difficult to prove that it is easy for women to find work
irrespective of the general level of economic activity,
but these same factors suggest that it is so.
Influence of the family economy and personal preferences
on the propensity to work
The foregoing argument has suggested that the ex¬
ternal constraints on the family's use of its potential
labour power, are less important than the internal con¬
straints. Hours of work are constrained on the one hand by
the amount of work employers are prepared to offer, but
more significantly by family members' health and commit¬
ments to child care and household management. These
internal constraints may be regarded as distinct factors
which affect family members' propensity to work, or, to use
the less effective conventional terminology, their "leisure
preference". The commitment to child care is e particularly
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important commitment of this kind. Where there are young
children in the family, someone has to be present in the
house all the time they are not at school.
It is almost always the wide who withdraws from the
labour market to take on this task. Why? The main
reason is custom - the way in which western culture sees
the role of mother lays normative constraints on her
participation in the labour market. But one may
speculate that even if it were culturally acceptable for
either parent to take up the role of mother/housewife,
this role would still be taken largely by women, as long
as, in most ^jobs, men earn more than women. And indeed,
the fact that many women who have young children to care
for remain housewives at the same time as many of their
husbands x*egularly work overtime, could possible be re¬
garded as evidence that the family 'lets income be earned
by the member v;ho can earn it fastest. On the other hand,
there are also many working-class women who do work, at
least part-time, for an hourly wage x*ate which is very
low compared to what their husbands could obtain in over¬
time work. And many of these husbands may be doing less
overtime work than their employers could offex* them. This
qould be regarded as evidence that the family does not
seek to earn its desired income through the sole efforts of
the person who con earn most per hour. This point raises
a very important question: should economic analysis take,
as its utility-maximising consumer-worker unit, the in¬
dividual or the household? When one examines the social
reality of family behaviour, it becomes clear that no simple
answers can be given. The household uses its money end
time resources to obtain some utilities which ere
collectively consumed (e.g. housing, heat, light,
furniture, meals) and some which are enjoyed by in¬
dividuals (e.g. clothing, cosmetics). Individual workers
put some of their earnings into a communal housekeeping
fund, which purchases collectively consumed commodities,
and covers the needs of non-e'arners, but they keep some of
their earnings to meet their own meeds as individuals. Thus
each wage-earner may be considered to perform so many hours'
work for the benefit of the family unit as a whole (which I
will designate collective-work), and so many hours to supply
his or her individual needs (which I will designate in-
dividual-work). The individual's market supply of
collective work will be interdependent with other house¬
hold members' collective work; so that if one member obtains
a rise in hourly earnings, all may work less; and if the
wife has to stay at home to core for children, the husband
may work raore than he otherwise would.
A person's market supply of individual-work will be
relatively unaffected by the activity and needs of the rest
of the family. However, one cannot assume that, as regards
this part of his supply of labour, the individual can be
considered as completely independent of the family unit.
This is because the size of the individual worker's contri¬
bution to the housekeeping fund may not be fixed inde¬
pendently of his total wage or hourly earnings; so that, in
5̂
On the other hand, the extent to which a person dis¬
tinguishes collective from individual wants is itself a
cultural variable, and one which will be made the subject
of empirical investigation in Chapter D.
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other words, the boundary between individual-work and
collective work is a shifting one# The number of hours
which can be considered as "individual-work" may depend
on the total number of hours worked.
Some empirical studi.es of teenage workers show that
girls' v;ork effort varies according to whether their con¬
tribution to the housekeeping fund is fixed or dependent
on their earnings. Neil Millward (1968) and Sylvia
Shimmin (1962) both find that younger teenage girls tend
to hand over all their earnings to their mothers, and the
mothers then return them pocket-money. Older teenage
girls change to a system whereby they pay their mothers
a fixed sum for board and lodging and keep the rest of
their earnings to spend as they wish. Girls under the
second system work harder under payraent-by-results schemes
than girls under the first system.
The division of the individual's supply If labour
into two ports, individual-work and collcctivo-vjork, and
the recognition that the boundary between them may be
dependent on work effort, leads to a vefy iraxx>rtant con¬
clusion. This is that for some workers there may be no
port of the working day in which, as economists are prone
to think, the individual sees his entire post-tax wage as
a reward for his labour.
Willingness to work will of course be determined not
only by the effective financial reward, but by a number of
other considerations (intrinsic utilities and disutilities
of work and leisure) which are unrelated to the wage rate.
But it must be emphasised that the wage rate is not even a
51
complete indicator of the economic benefits of work, A
better indicator would rather be the sum total of the
economic benefits which the worker receives out of the
family's economic system as e result of a particular work
pattern, compared to the corresponding benefits of some
other work pattern. Thus the individual's "wage" for
paid woi'k performed appears as a total of the following
items
(1) actual pay after tax end national insurance;
(2) that proportion put into a family pool for
purposes in which the individual is not
particularly interested, or of which the
disapproves;
(3) that amount which the other sj>ouse will not
put into the family pool as a result of the
individual's earnings;
(4) that amount given to other family members
for their personal spending (money for
wife's clothes, children's pocket money).
As en example of how this formula, in an extreme ess
works out in relation to a chenge in earnings, let us
suppose that Mr. Jones' pay goes up by two pounds a week.
Of this, he puts £1.75 into the family pool, of which his
wife will insist on spending 25p on the hire purchase pay
ments for a new gas cooker which he thinks is no better
than the old one. Item 3 in this example is zero, but •
under item 4 the two children went 5p extra pocket money
each end the wife buys a new dress which costs five pound







Neither the pocket money nor the now dress come out of the
family kitty money - the "housekeeping"* no in the long
run he will keep 15p for himself end have another £1.50
spent by his wife on things for the family which ho him¬
self want^ hut for the first five weeks his personal
spending shows a negative change of 90p. Item 5 of the
formula also applies to the case where the wife starts to
work and her husband gives her less.
* This apparently trivial and obscure point becomes of
importance when one considers that system of family
financial management are not idiosyncratic but almost
certainly related to social class and, as we shall show in
a later chapter describing in detail the literature on
this subject, also to local occupational cultures. This
means what family financial arrangements may be able to
help explain the differences in labour power utilisation
between clearly defined groups of families.
In the light of the foregoing arguments, even the
statements of those economists who recognise the family
unit, rather than the individual, as the generator of
needs which necessitate work, seem rather simplistic.
Such statements appear to postulate that all labour supply
°
See, for example, Fleischer (1970):- "We assume that
individual family members make their labour force
decisions in consideration of the decisions made by
other family members; thus labour supply decisions are
the result of simultaneous processes which work towards
achieving s maximum of satisfaction for the family, given
its limited resources".
and Hunter and Robertson (1969):- "The decision whether
or not individual family members will participate in
labour market activity will be made in the context of
the family and in the light of all its income end con¬
sumption plans end requirements".
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decisions will be made in such a way as to maximise a
joint family utility function. But, as stated earlier,
the individual works partly to supply the collective
wants of the family to which he belongs, and partly to
supply his own individual consumption needs. Moreover,
another major issue is raised by these statementsj how
does the family unit arrive at a definition of its
collective needs? and how is the duty of providing for
these needs allocated between different members?
There are in fact three possible hypothesis as to
how the family makes labour supply decisions
(1) that a target income is agreed on, and that
the task of earning it is allocated according
to a mutual understanding of members1 leisure
needs and preferences.
(2) that a target income is agreed on, and the
task of earning it is allocated by a bar¬
gaining procedure.
(5) that there is no jointly held notion of what
income level the family wants, so that each
spouse has complete freedom to decide how
much to work, subject to the constraint that
there must be enough money for collectively
consumed necessities, such as food and
housing.
A number of sociological studies have suggested that
family members are extremely individualistic in their
labour supply decisions, and would almost support the
third hypothesis given above; that individuals may make
their own decisions on how much paid work they do without
discussing it with their spouse, and that this is accepted
os normal and legitimate behaviour. Michael Young (1952)
says that very often the working class wife does not hove
any say in how much of his wages the husband gives her;
so the idea that she would influence his work decisions
is out of the question. Dennis, Henriques end Slaughter
would support this view (1962); the wife in the mining
community has a fixed "wage" and does not usually know
what her husband earns; provided he has paid her the
usual "wage" he misses a shift when he feels like it.
Tunstall, in his study of fishermen and their families
(1962), says that fishermen usually keep overtime money
entirely for their own spending, so that presumably their
wives have no interest in the matter of how much overtime
the men do.
Brennen (1959) says (with inference to working class
families in Glasgow in the 1950's) that husbands with
large families have a lack of incentive to do
overtime because all the extra money disappears into the
family kitty. By contrast, reference is made in another
study (Goldthorpe and Loekwood (1969) to the importance
of joint planning of purchases over a considerable time
period, in both middle-class and a substantial minority of
"affluent" working-class couples. (I shall deal with this
evidence at greater length in the next chapter). It is
difficult to imagine this sort of joint planning taking
place in a situation where the husband's attitude to the
family economy is so individualistic as Brennan suggests.
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It thus appears that there may be a variety of
normative systems governing the appropriation of family
members' resources for collective or private purposes,
some of which encourage an individualistic approach to
decisions about labour power utilisation, and some of
which do not. I intend to examine the effects of
different housekeeping systems on these decisions\ the
housekeeping systems discovered in previous literature
are described in Chapter 3, those which can be
identified in my own survey work in Chapter 5 ond their
implications for family members' propensity to work in
Chapter 6.
The studies referred to here show that not all family
income is pooled. Whet they do not show, however, is
whether any incentive or disincentive effects for the wife
arise out of some housekeeping systems. If the wife
works, does her husband give her less? Or are her
earnings considered to be "pin money* for her oxm
personal use? Clearly, in most cases the greater part of
family expenditure is under the heading of collective
purposes with which the main wage earner concurs. If It
were otherwise, marital discord would result. In- general,
the relative size of collective expenditures which the
main wage erner approves of end those of which he does not
approve will fluctuate on a short term basis and will be
the subject of family discussion and compromise. The
amount given to others for their personal spending, and
the way in which such amounts ore allocated, may vary
greatly with the system of income allocation within the
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family. The most important indicator of the "net bene¬
fits" of extra earnings, as for as one can say without
more empirical evidence, may be the amount which the
wage earner actuall;/ keeps for himself. The notion of
the "net benefits" of extra earnings is an important
concept, and If shall refer to it as RMS (reward of
marginal earnings) for short.
The reward for marginal earnings may then, diverge
considerably from the actual v.rage paid for a marginal
unit of work, by reason of the distribution of marginal
income within the family. One must also consider the
possibility of variations in the utility of marginal
earnings which may arise from the differences between
individuals' relative valuation of leisure and goods.
Some such differences may derive from the type of leisure
pursuits people pursue: the Prices and Incomes Board (op.
cit., 1970) find, for example, that men with an interest
in sport work less overtime than men with no interest in
sport. Other differences in the relative valuation of
leisure and goods may come from the goods side; some
people have a stronger desire to increase their standard
of living than others, and some have heavier expenses than
others: the Prices end Incomes Board find, for example,
that men with hire purchase commitments tend to work more
overtime than men who have none.
All these types of variations in the marginal utility
of earnings may effect not only the individual's "average"
propensity to work, that is, the amount of work he does at
any particular time, but also, they may affect the in-
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dividual's reaction to changes in earnings opportunities.
They are highly relevant to the question, what is likely
to he the shape of the short-run supply curve of labour
to the individual firm?
The elasticity of supply of labour to the firm
and the question of the nep;ativc income effect"
Economists have engaged in extensive debate as to
whether changes in real income give rise to an incentive
effect or to whet is known as a negative income effect.
The former means that if the hourly real wage rises,
n
people are willing to work longer hours. (This rise in
real wages per hour may come about through an increase in
money wages or a reduction in prices - or even through en
increased range of goods being available for sale after a
period cf shox'tege or rationing). The alternative to a
substitution or incentive effect is a "negative income
effect". When pay per hour goes up, a negative income
effect takes place when people take advantage of the rise
by working less hours.
Opinions as to the frequency of the negative income
effect derive from three sources; a priori reasoning,
coupled with some expiricel evidence of a rather non-
systematic kind; evidence concerning responses to tax rate
7
Applied to the question of the effects of piece rates
and incentive schemes, an incentive effect, often termed
a substitution effect (see Hunter end Robertson (1909)
pp. 213 to 214) means that people will work harder be¬
cause the incentive payment scheme or piece rate scheme
enables them to gain extra income for every unit of work
done. This definition is not quite the came as an in¬
centive effect resulting from a pay rise, because where¬
as on incentive effect resulting from a pay rise means
obviously that people are reacting to getting more money
for the same amount of work, in the esse of a change from
time rates of payment to some form of piece rates, the rate
of psy for the some number of pieces may be higher, lower
or the some for a particular worker as it. was on the time
rate system.
changes; and evidence about statistical relationships be¬
tween wage rates and working hours. . Amongst those who have
argued from a priori principles, Knight (1921) and Pigou
(1932) claimed that one would expect a negative income
effect as a consequence of the law of diminishing marginal
utility, as applied to income. Bobbins, (1930) using the
notion of the elasticity of demand for income, showed that
this was not necessarily the case. Going to the other
extreme from Knight and Pigou, some writers have referred
to the negative income effect (or lack of positive reaction
to incentives, as it may be interpreted) ss a perversity
peculiar to underdeveloped countries where the "native" has
little material ambition. In fact, traces of this attitude
8
may still be found in development economics.'
Statistical evidence concerning the relationship betv-cn
wage rates and hours 3hows that negative income effects
commonly exist amongst workers in industrialised countries.
(Hunter, 1970). There is generally a tendency for working
hours, to fall as wage rotes increase over time - although
this tendency has been virtually absent in Britain during
the post-war period.
Studies on workers' responses to income tax changes have
sometimes found a negative income effect and sometimes a
positive substitution effect.
®
See, for example, Jacob Viner (19S4) referring to the
negative income effect, Vinor ssys:-
"There is no reason why such behaviour should be
preculiar to agricultural labour, but it may be that
it is more likely to be prevalent for habit-ridden rural
populations", (p.82)
He also points out that the eighteenth century economists
believed the negative income effect to oe general.
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(This research is summarised in Brown and Dawson's
j
Personal Taxation Incentives end Tax Reform (1969)). What
is perhaps the most important study of manual workers (Rolfe
and Furness, 1957) found that some workers reacted positively
to a tax reduction (i.e. worked harder) and others reacted
negatively (worked less hard). Is there, then, some specific
sub-cultural difference between those individuals who react
positively and those who react negatively to a real wage
increase, end can one identify such a difference empirically?
This question will be considered in Chapter 6.
There is, of course, one sense in which the supply of
labour generally resets positively to wage increases. The
higher the wage rate which the firm offers, the greater the
number of workers who will apply for its ^obs. To this
extent, there will be a tendency for the short-run supply
curve of labour to slope upwards. But the firm may be faced
with a situation where the higher the wage rate paid to ex¬
isting workers, the smaller the number of hours they will he
willing to work. Whether a wage increase results in a greater
or smaller total number of man-hours being offered to a company
will depend on the balance of these two effects; the
attraction of new recruits and the tendency of existing workers
to reduce their take-up of overtime opportunities. It is
theoretically poooiblo for the combined effect of these two
tendencies to reduce the overall supply of labour, as an
example will now show.
A firm, by raising the wage rate, would gain the use of
(say) on extra 4-,500 hours per week by attracting 100 extra
workers. But if this means that the number of hours which
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the 500 men already ernploj'ed, are willing to work, falls
from 27,500 to 22,500 (i.e. each man works 45 hours instead
of 55) then the firn will altogether be offered 500 less man-
hours per wafek than before the wage increase - the supply
curve of labour even including the labour of new employees
will be beckword-sloping. One can see that this sort of
situation might quite well happen in periods of labour
shortage, when now recruits are difficult to find, and
existing employees, already working a very large amount of
overtime, are unlikely to offer more.
It is, then, of some importance to know what determines
the elasticity of supply of labour from individual workers.
Let us nowr consider this problem in the light of the fore¬
going arguments about the nature of the reward of marginal
earnings. According to the formula fen the RMS which was
postulated earlier, it would be theoretically possible, though
admittedly unusual, for RKE to be zero. If this were the
case, no wage increase could provide the worker with an in¬
centive to increase his working hours - even though his
family's standard of living were low, and even though ether
workers at the same income level reacted positively to the
same wage increase. .Millward's teenage girls who handed over
all their marginal earnings to their mothers are examples of
workers whose RMS was, according to the formula , perhaps as
low as zero. The way in which marginal earnings are utilised
in the family economy may thus influence workers' reactions to
wage increases. An investigation of the determinants of the
RMS may therefore help to explain why some workers increase
and some reduce their working hours after a wage increase; and
61
it may be able to show that groups of workers defined by
certain cultural characteristics are particularly likely to
exhibit a negative income effect. This theme will occupy o
major part of chapters 5 and 5.
Summary and Conclusions
In the first section of this chapter* I have shown that
the amount of overtime which groups of workers are willing to
work may have an important effect on the amount of work
offered to them by their employers. Hence, the demand for
labour is not determined independently of workers' pre¬
ferences. But for this reason, end in order to predict when
the elasticity of supply of labour to an enterprise will be
negative (a possibility demonstrated in the third section) it
is important to find determinants of the elasticity of the
individual's supply of labour and determinants of his pro¬
pensity to work.
In the second section, -I have suggested that the dis¬
tribution of income within the family may give rdse to sub¬
stantial variations between households and between wage-
earners of different family status, as to the effective •
financial incentive a worker receives from marginal earnings.
I have also suggested that a change in the.wage rote of one
family member may have substitution: effects end income effects
on the v/ork offer of another member; dm other words, th$t_
there is some part of the family's supply of labour to the
market which may be considered as a joint effort to supply
collective needs. Both of these hypotheses will be examined
in the empirical work of Chapters 5 and 6.
CHAPTER 3 I
THE DISTRIBUTION 0? INCO>!E_¥ITHIT-T THE PAKTLY:
A Oj PRCtflOUS LiT^RATJRE
This chapter will be mainly descriptive; its purpose
is to summarise the evidence on the internal financial
arrangements of working class families, to develop an
analytical! framework for understanding and assessing this
evidence, and, to see what issues end guidelines it suggests
for further investigation.
Some of the literature to be considered here has al¬
ready been mentioned in Chapter 2; the possibility that the
division of income within the family has incentive and dis¬
incentive effeces on husbands' propensity to work is again
raised here as one of the most important issues to be con¬
sidered.
The housekeeping system has two sets of implications
for the economist. The first, as I pointed out in the last
chap>ter, is the possibility that the system of allocating
income within the family may have an effect on work in¬
centives. The second set of implications concerns the way
in which the distribution of consumers' expenditure between
different commodities may change as a result of price and in¬
come changes. The system of distribution of income within th
family effects the distribution of marginal earnings between
different commodities. In other words, it may affect the in¬
come elasticity of demand for commodities. Moreover, the-
division of commodities into two sets, some purchased by the
wife, some by the husband, has implications for the cross-
elasticities of demand with respect to price changes. A
change in the price of, say, women's clothing, may have on
effect not merely on the demand for that set of commodities
|
but possibly also on a number of others \ the housewife may
spend less raon-fy cn some other goods in order to maintain
her expenditure on clothing. Clearly, the other ex¬
penditures affected are much more likely to be expenditures
encompassed by the housekeeping allowance then expenditures
made by the husband. The nature of the two main commodity
sets, and how rigid are their boundaries, are therefore
matters of some interest for the forecasting of consumers'
demands. This issue is dealt with at length in- Chapter 8.
A third point of interest about the housekeeping system
is one quite unrelated to economic theory. This is the
question of how the system of allocation of money affects
the standard of living of the family unit, and, more
particularly, of the individuals in it who are not wage
earners. Young (1952), the writer who has made the most
systematic.study of housekeeping systems, considers this en
important issue with regard to the definition of poverty.
He points out that a family may have en "adequate" income
according to some definition of its physical or social needs,
but if s larger proportion of this income is allocated to
the husband's personal spending than the person drawing up
the "needs" scale anticipated, this income may in practice
be. inadequate to sustain the wife and children at the defined
standard. This is en issue of some importance for social
workers and others, and it seems to be a waste to make a •
thorough empirical investigation of the housekeeping system
without considering it. I have, therefore, paid some
attention both here end in Chapter 5 to the question of how
large is the husband's personal expenditure, in relation to
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the total family income, and what determines this proportion.
Since this lest issue is central for several of the writers
who have described the distribution of income within the
family, I shell deal with their evidence about this point
first, since it is clearest to describe most of the data on
housekeeping system in the context of the arguments in which
it is presented. I shall then return to the construction of
a model of the housekeeping system which will facilitate the
investigation of its economic implications.
1. A Flow-diagram Model of the Family Economy
I begin by defining some terms which will be used both
in this chapter and in later chapters Hstere reference is mode
to this topic. In most of this chapter, I shall bo working
with a simple model in which the husband earns all of the
3
household income, apart from family allowances.
The first stage of construction of the model is to con¬
sider the way in which the family income is divided up for
different purposes. The incoming husband's earnings may be
treated as a flow, analogous perhaps to the flow conceits used
in national income accounting. The flow is immediately di¬
vided into two streams; the housekeeping allowance given to
the wife, and the residual, which I shall call "husband's
retentions". (See Diagram 1) On the whole it appears that
^
On the whole, this study is not concerned with the
financial contributions of working children as a sub¬
ject of investigation, either in this chapter or else¬
where. That aspect of family financial organisation is
the ono perhaps most thoroughly covered by previous








the first stream represents money reserved for commodities
required for collective family consumption (food, housing
and fuel) together with commodities consumed by the wife
end children as individuals (clothing, cosmetics, sweets,
toys, cigarettes etc.); and that the husband's retentions
represent money reserved for the husband's personal ex¬
penditure. Husband's retentions may however, be partly
used for collectively consumed commodities and services,
particularly things which are purchased at irregular inter¬
vals, such as furniture, crockery and linen, household re¬
pairs or holidays, The sum of the housekeeping allowance
and the amount which the husband spends on items for
collective consumption or items for individuals other than
himself, will be referred to as .."expenditure for collective
purposes". This of course is not entirely expenditure for
collectively consumed commodities or services (such as food,
fuel and housing); it includes both these commodities and'
the individual consumption of wife and children. The reason
for this anomaly in the definition is that it is difficult
to distinguish, either in the literature or in any new in¬
vestigation, amounts regularly used for the individual con¬
sumption needs of these persons. In the working class family
the wife's "personal" allowance and hex' "housekeeping"
allowance are not separate. One fund is given to cover both
kinds of need with the exception that the husband may give
the wife extra money for her clothing just as he may do for
other "irregular" purchases. The needs of the children, both
for pocket money and entertainment, and for clothes, may be
met out of this same housekeeping fund or they may be supplie
by the husband additionally to the hcusekpeMgg allowance.
Shis division of the family income into various streams
of money has two aspects* Firstly, the different streams
ere directed to different sets of commodities. This is quite
clear from the many sociological studies which have collected
evidence on the housekeeping system. Secondly, the different
streams are under the control of different people - there is
s division into husband's expenditure and wife's expenditure.
It is less clear from the literature to what extent the
expenditure of a sum of money is synonymous in the domestic
financial system with control over the purpose for which that
money is spent. This is an issue which needs to be considered
carefully.
The relationship between the allocation of expenditure
and control over expenditure
One of the most important works on the distribution ci
income within the family (Young, 1952) assumes that the hus¬
band's area of expenditure and the wife's area (the "house¬
keeping allowance") do represent separate sphex^es of control.
The wife has no say over what her husband does with his
pocket money. But the wife, on the other hand, is assumed
to have complete control over what she may do with her house¬
keeping allowance; if this were not so, the standard of living
of the wife and children could not be measured by its size.
Whilst Young himself does not present any direct evidence for
this assumption, it may be a valid interpretation of the
general picture of traditional working class cultures pre^-
srnited both by Young and by other writers to whom I have re-
ferred. In "Ashton", for example, the housekeeping allowance
is regarded as the wife's "wage"; surely the implication of
this is that it is entirely under her control, while the hus~
band's pocket money is not. Mays (1954) and Hoggart (1971)
emphasise the wife's complete control over the management
of household expenditures, as a central aspect of her role
in a traditional working class culture. Townsend refers to
"the personal responsibility for each share of income and
the uncertainty or ignorance of the other's exact income and
spending habits" and "the underlying competition between man
and wife when the wage is small" (Townsend, 1957* P»91 of
Penguin edition)•
Bott's picture of the Newbolts (which 1 shall consider
in more detail later) confirms all of these features of a
traditional working-class family role structure. In her
picture of middle class families, however, she sayst
"Financial affairs were managed jointly, and .joint con¬
sultation was taken for granted in ail major decisions" -
although she does not say anything about the mechanical de¬
tails of the allocation system of such families. Assuming
that there must be some degree of division of purchasing
responsibilities between husband end wife in the middle class
Bott's statement may mean that in this class the allocation o
responsibility for a certain set of purchases to one or other
spouse, does not necessarily imply an allocation of. executive
contr-ol over such purchases. What, then, of the "affluent"
or "non-traditional" working-class? Are control and res¬
ponsibility contiguous there? Goldthorpe end Loekwood (19-59)
see the activity of husband-wife discussion of financial '
matters as essentially a planning activity - a theme which I
shall take up in Chapter 5. They say (pp.124-125) that where
as nearly half the white-collar workers in their study made
joint plans' about saving and expenditure covering a number of
purchases, and. with a time-span of more than three or four
months, only a small minority of the working-class couples
did this* More then half the manual couples, on the other
hand, made no plans other then to provide for payment of
bills or holidays. (The questions asked referred entirely
to "joint" plans mado by husband and wife together). This
evidence suggests that the housekeeping practices of
"affluent" workers lie somewhere between the traditional
pattern, where "his money" and "her money" do signify areas
of control as well as executive responsibility for specific
sets of purchases, and a middle-class pattern where point
decisions are the rule at least for major purchases.
Goldthorpe and Lockwood (op.eit., 1969) cay (p.125).:-
in general, our white-collar couples appeared
to manage their financial affairs on a "joint"
basis to.an appreciably greater extent than did
our manual couples....At the same time, though, it
is evident that only a minority of our alllue-nt
workers and their wives managed their family fin¬
ances on the extremely segregated basis that has
been regularly described in studies of traditional
working-class life".
On the basis of the foregoing evidence, I have made
the assumption that, at least in those working-class cul¬
tural patterns which con be identified as "traditional",
the division of income within the family does represent &
division into areas of control; and that furthermore, there
is a high degree of correlation between areas of control en
areas of responsibility oven in other working-class culture
But one must bear in mind the possibility of a progressive
separation of control from responsibility, end/or a pro¬
gressive blurring of areas of responsibility, towards that
end of the "traditional"/"affluent" continuum where a middle-
class life style is most nearly approached by the family in
its role as a consumer unit.
I think it moreover reasonable to assume that even in
"affluent" cultures the wife is, at least fox* everyday ex¬
penditures, like food, the manager as well as the spender.
It would be ludicrous to assume that she consulted her hus¬
band at every turn as to whether to buy cabbage or sprouts
for dinner, There is a further category of expenses, like
housing expenses, insurance, fuel bills, and the S7 licence,
which families accept as essential and inevitable, and about
which there is rarely any need for consultation between hus¬
band and wife - except in the unusual event that such ex¬
penses cannot be met, or when they are thinking of moving
house or changing the type of heating they use. The question
as to whether spending and deciding go together, relates to
what might be caused discretionary expenditures. Under this
heading I would include most durable goods, clothing, holi¬
days, and perhaps toys fox^ children and other small things
2
which are bought as present or as luxuries. These are all
categories of expenditure concerning which the question: "how
much should be spent on this?" or even "should it be bought?"
ore important for a family. (These are the budgeting question
to which I address myself in this study; there is another as-
2
Most of the things included, in fact, under the heading
of "other goods" in the family Expenditure Survey, ex¬
cept for medicines, toilet requisites, and matches,
soap, etc.
pect of consumer choice which I do not think has a piece in
a study of the housekeeping system,, that is, what colour or
style of product to buy)* It seems to rne that tho person
in whose set of purchasing responsibilities a commodity
falls, must have a large degree of independence in
answering these budgeting questions. If the wife is given
her housekeeping allowance to provide food and children's
clothes, then within lirrafcs set by the social norms to which
the couple subscribe, she will decide how the money shall be
divided between these two things. Similiarly, .if the hus¬
band gives his wife extra money to buy the children's
clothes, then it is in his hands to decide how much she can
have. I think, therefore, that I am justified in
identifying spending with control over most second-level
budgeting decisions. This is an rruportant assumption from
an economic point of view, because it confirms the notion
that substitution between "husband's goods" and "wife's
goods" is less likely to occur than substitution between
commodities within a set*
The evidence on housekeeping systems from
previous literature
Previous sociological literature, mainly in the field
of community studies, provides a mass of scattered and
piecemeal evidence on housekeeping systems. Few writers
have investigated this topic at all systematically apart
from Michael Young (1952) and Griselda Hovmtroe (1954)*
Their objectives in dealing with the subject are rather
different from the objectives of this thesis; they examine
the distribution of income within tho family to.see how it
affects the standard of living of individual members. This
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question is of course of considerable interest to social
workers and others concerned with the study of poverty, end
I have therefore devoted a section of Chapter 9 to it al¬
though it is not relevant to the main concern of this work.
Most of the community studies have also dealt with the
subject of housekeeping systems from this point of view, so
that it is convenient initially to follow their perspective.
Young (1952) asks himself: how much of the family's
income is devoted to supplying these needs which we think
of in defining a subsistence standard or poverty line? Is
income unequally distributed between family members in such
e way that some members are in poverty whereas others are
not? lie citos several pre-war studies which show that when
food is scarce, the husband gets priority over the children,
end possibly the children over the wife. He provides
evidence to show that the working class men keeps a sub¬
stantial proportion of his earnings to himself, end that
families who. ore above some subsistence standard if their
total income is taken into account, ere below it if only the
housekeeping allowance is taken into account. Young
assumes on the basis of previous studies (Soutar, 1942,
l|owntree, 1941) that the husband's retentions are spent
mainly on tobacco and beer. But neither he, nor the writers
he refers to, consider if the assumption is correct. Hus¬
bands may pay for some important family items out of money
theyfcep; post war studies show that the husband may be .
asked for money additional to the normal housekeeping
allowance for clothes, furniture and replacements of house¬
hold equipment. Land says some husbands pay fuel bills;
Dennis et al (1962) that they pay for clothes and furniture;
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Hoggart that they give the wife extra for replacements of
household articles} things like crockery. Bott says that
the working class husband gives the wife a pound or two
extra if she says she needs it, regardless of the purpose
for which it is required. Shaw gives some detail on this
pointi-
MThere seemed to be little attempt to adjust the
allowance as family expenses increased, though in some
cases certain outgoings were taken over by the husband, as
the children grew older, for example, major items of
clothing for schoolchildren... Custom allotted to the
wife the payment of the rent, and to the husband the pay¬
ments for holidays (when they were taken) and for certain
items of clothing for the wife as well as for himself;
household repairs and renewals were either paid fox* out of
joint savings or by the husband; they did not as s xmle
come out of housekeeping money, except for the smell amount
put aside as savings ..."
Griselda Kowntree (195^0 gives some figures for the
average housekeeping allowance and average income of
working-class families in Aberdeen, of different
occupational groups and family sizes. She also gives their
average expenditure, during a fortnights accounting period,
on the main groups of consumer goods and services. There
is a gap of several shillings between the amounts spent on
drink, tobacco and entertainment, and the amount of pocket-
money husbands are alleged to have kept. She mentions that
some husbands take on the responsibility of saving, and con¬
sequently of paying for some irregular purchases; this would
account for a good deal of the discrepancy. Some would also
be accounted for by the men's expenditure on clothing end
feres to work (cer ownership would presumably have been un¬
common at this period). It seems likely, however, that un¬
less wives drastically under-state the amount their husbands
spend on drink and tobacco, the author under-estimated the
extent to which husbands use some of the money they keep for
household purchases made et irregular intervals. Such under¬
statement about expenditure on smoking and drinking is a
well-known feature of budget enquiries, but it seems un¬
likely to be large in her study, since a high proportion of
wives sew the whole wage packet and gave their husbands
pocket-money back.
Young takes several authors' evidence that housekeeping
allowances do not change much in the course of a marriage, as
showing that they are related neither to needs nor earnings.
Griselda Rowntree does this too, despite these incon¬
sistencies in her data which lead one to be suspicious of
this conclusion. The importance of Shaw's findings is that
they really attest the irrelevance of the face value house¬
keeping allowance. Zi-/eig, too, shows that the husband is
frequently responsible fox1 saving - and often, too, for
specific irregular payments like bills and furniture, to
which short-term saving is likely to be directed.
What Youngi really should be attacking is not the con¬
ventional way of measuring the family income, for in
attacking this he comes near- to implying that for a working
class husband to spend anything on beer and cigarettes is
immoral; but those concepts of a "subsistence standard" which
make no allowance for this kind of item. In any case, al¬
though smoking and drinking have come to be regarded as the-
prime sort of extravsgence amongst poor families; one could
just as easily count it as extravagent to give children
pocket money for sweets , comics and the cinemay or for the
wife to buy lipstick or magazines. And of course, since the
mid-fifties the prime sort of alleged "extravagenee" has
changed. The marginal commodities, except amongst the very
poor.', have now become durable goods, especially cars.
Household goods are a source of pride end enjoyment as much,
if not more, to the wife than the husband; and the car, even
if its main purpose is to take the husband to work, at least
facilitates leisure pursuits involving the whole family.
Thus it is no longer so easy to identify the housekeeping
allowance with expenditure on "essentials" and the husband's
personal expenditure with "luxury" purchases, even if this
ever was valid. The question of what proportion of income is
devoted to collective purposes is still en important one; but
not because expenditure on beer and tobacco, or any other
commodity demanded by only one person in the family group,
necessarily fails to contribute to tbe standard of living of
the whole, unit. Rather this issue is important because it
affects the incentive to work derived from a person's
earnings. One of the writers Young refers to illustrate
this point well when she (Soutsr, 19^2) quotes a working
class woman as saying "you can't expect them to work for
nothing". This implies, says Young, that working class women
do not resent a division of income which gives the husband a
larger amount for purely personal use than they themselves
have. Young does not seen to realise the importance of this,
when he says that in the post war inflation families may have
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a greater tendency to adjust the housekeeping allowance to
rising prices. Rising prices affect the husband too.
Young (op.cit., 1952) quotes one study of housekeeping
systems (Madge, 194-3) which shows a substantial proportion
of husbands, nearly half in one northern town, giving their
3
wives all their money.^ Yet ha does not consider what
arrangement is made for the husband's personal spending
under such a system; whether it is really different from an
allowance system in which the husband gives the wife an
allowance which is only part of the wage. Several writers
(Zweig, (1964), Land, (1969)* Kerr, (1958), Humphreys, (1966),
Rowntree, (1954-) and Townsend, (I957))sgree that in this sort
of system husbands receive an agreed amount of picket money
beck from their wives. There is, a priori, no reason to say
that the amount devoted to collective expenditure in the
whole wage packet system is different from that in the
allowance system. The "handing over" may simply be a ritual
to reassure the wife that nothing is being concealed from
her. This needs to be investigated.
Many writers (Young, Bott, Dennis, Shaw, Kays, Townsend)
say that unless a whole wage system is used, the wife does
not know her husband's earnings. This is frequently cited as
evidence that the husband maintains control by keeping his
earnings a secret (cf. Mays, 1954). Yet V/illnott and Young
(1969), whilst agreeing with this view quote examples of
joint financial decisions; both husband and wife may jointly
agree upon buying a television set. Since such joint
decisions exist, the husband's exclusive control may not
cover all major purchases even though the primary structure
3 This syten, which is referred to by several writers, may
be given the name "whole wage system" for convenience of
reference.
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of expenditure is determined by his decision what to give
the wife for housekeeping, Tovnsend's informants attest
that the wife does not resent the "secret"; .is it really a
case of deliberate concealment, or a ritual to avoid
financial quarrels? Whilst one of Townsend!a informants
"was most anxious that this information should be treated
as private" and "told rae when his wife was not in the room",
a woman says "Some men are greedy ... and some are jealous,
A woman should know near enough, but some women get them¬
selves into debt". Townsend says that housekeeping arrange¬
ments are subtly competitive; there is "his money" and "her
money". In this sort of situation, is it not likely that
customs will grow up to circumvent this competitive element,
so that in some families the husband shows what he has got-
end receives pocket money back, although it would make no
difference to the final expenditure pattern if he kept it in
the first place, and in other families the wife refrains
from trying to find out how much the men earns?
Young is not at all specific about the sise of the
housekeeping allowance or what its customary relationship ?s
to the husband's earnings. Land points out that it may be
based on tbe husband's basic wage, or on total earnings.
There see various opinions as to whether men give their wives
any of their overtime earnings; Tunstall (1962), says that
fishermen do not give them any; Bremen (1959) says that they
do and that at least in large families, the need to put most
overtime money into the family kitty con act as a disincentive
to work overtime. Mays (1954)* writing of Manchester dockers,
says that not giving the wife overtime money is associated
with a system of family roles in which the husband is a "lodger"
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end takes little part in family decision making;-
"While the mother is the comforter, caterer, planner,
the role of the father in most homes is that of wage-earner
and disciplinarian. He is the economic master who decides
how much of his income will go to housekeeping and how much ho
will keep for his own personal use. It is x*ere for the hus¬
band to take a hand in planning the weekly budget; few tell
their wives whet they earn. He may keep bock as much 3s half
his income for himself. Overtime end bonus are thought of as
on addition to his personal spending money rather than as an
addition to the common pool".
(quoted in Josephine Klein, (1965) page 45)
Dennis, Henriques and Slaughter say that the house¬
keeping allowance is based on the minimum amount a man is
ever likely to earn, allowing for the possibility that some¬
times he is too tired to work a shift and earns less than the
4
basic wage. A similar system may be implied in Kerr's
statemen chat in a Liverpool sample (which may contain mainly
docker husbands) some men give as little as half their earnings
to their wives; possibly because dockers' employment is
essentially casual, and much'more so at her time of writing
than it is today. Woodward too, (1954) says of Liverpool
dockers that they do not often give their wives s regular
amount, because their earnings fluctuate so much. But in
Kerr's "Ship Street" (Kerr, 1958) there is no question of such
an allowance being the result of male dominance, as is assumed
to be the case in Ashton. Wives want to know their husband's
earnings and argue if they think they are not getting enough.
(But this comment does not apply to the whole of Kerr's sample;
^
op.cit., pages 107, 197 (new edition, 1969)
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"good dads" hand over oil their wages * although this system
is becoming less common amongst younger couples).
Zweig (1964) has an extensive typology of housekeeping
systems, not a good one because the types are not mutually
exclusive, but worth quoting for variety of arrangements
which informants say they use. The systems are; a fixed
allowance, with possibly extra if necessary (as with Bott's
"Newbolts"); anlallowance variable with shift earnings; a§
fixed allowance with the husband paying "bills" out of
retentions; the whole wage system; giving the whole wage
less a fixed amount of pocket money; a percentage of earning
and two different xrarionts on the whole wage system ("kitty"
and "pooling") the meaning of which is unclear. Griselda
Rowntrce (1954) confirms that in a sample of Aberdeen young
couples husband's retentions may consist of a fixed "pocket
money" albwance. She adds that many couples change to this
system from a whole 'wage packet system on the birth of the
first child - possibly because the husband felt his personal
expenditure threatened by the expense of the baby? Hilary
Land (196-9) also shows several different ways of determining
the housekeeping allowance; sometimes it is based on total
earnings and sometimes on the basic wage only. She says
that the lower the household income, the more likely is it
that the whole wage system will be employed. Like Griselda
Rowntree, she finds that this sytem is particularly common
where the family live on social security benefits. Townsend
(1957) writing of old people in the Bast End, says that very
often a couple switch to a whole wage system when they bee0m
dependent on pensions, while before retirement they had a
system much the seme as that described by Bott (1968) or She
(1954).
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A finding common to three writers (Land, Townsend, end
Griselda Howntree) is that amongst low-income families de¬
pending on pensions and social security benefits, the
system prevails of leaving the disposition of the husband's
income entirely to the wife. In Land's sample, this sytem
is carried over to low-income, families whose heads are in
work} it is possible that this is because these families
have from time to time been dependent on social security
benefits.
Having given this descriptive account of the existing
literature on housekeeping systems, which presents a mass
of rather piecemeal evidence, I come now to examine
specifically those aspects of housekeeping systems which
are relevant to the construction of an integrated model of
the family's economic behaviour. In order to work out the
two sets of economic implications of the family's internal
allocation system, which I set out earlier, it is necessary
to develop a typology of the way in which commodities are
divided into husband's expenditures and wife's expenditures.
It is also necessary to examine further the question of how
the housekeeping allowance is determined, which entails
first considering the relation of the housekeeping-system
to the couple's role relationships.
The method of allocation of family .resources
to different purchases
Oeser and Hammond's conceptual framework is one of the
most useful here. They analyse family decisions in terms
of husband's and wife's exclusive areas of decision making,
areas of joint decision, and areas where either spouse may
decide alone. (See Diagram 2) Blood and Wolfe (1965) have a
similar typology of decisions, but consider the areas of" do-
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cisiorx making to bo areas of power, I would rather consider
them in a neutral way as Oeser and Hammond do. But the con¬
cept of decision making areas is not enough; one must also
think of a hierarchy of decisions.
Bo decisions in one area determine any decisions in an¬
other area? And if the husband's decisions conflict with
the wishes of the wife or vice versa, who has the final say?
A hierarchy of decisions may easily be identified in
the picture of the housekeeping system presented in Section
1. That is, it may be identified in the division of the
family income into funds or streams of money which are then
directed each towards particular groups of purchases a The
notion of a hierarchy of decisions is combined with that of
C*
a flow diagram in Diagram 3.^
The husband makes the primary decision as to how much
work; this determines the size of the family The
division into housekeeping money and the husband's retentions
then places a resource constraint on the total expenditure
which can be mode on each set of commodities. This con¬
straint is mitigated, in the case of collective expenditure,
by the possibility of third-level reallocation between hus¬
band and wife. But such reallocations are in the gift of the
husband. Thus, the husband appears to have control over all
of the three major decisions; how much to work, how much to
keep for himself in the first place, and whether to give any
of this money to his wife if she asks for it. Young lays
groat emphasis on this power of the husband to determine the
standard of living of his wife and children. On the other
hand, there are presumably social norms governing these da-
5
Assuming, as before, for the sake of simplicity, that he
is the only wage-earner.
8$
cisions. The probability of serious conflict in the family
concerning them will depend on the vjej in which those norms
ore generated end enforced.
Here , the literature on this subject presents two con¬
trasting types of life-style. On the one hand, wo have
the picture of en "affluent" working-class culture such as
that described by Goldthorpe and Lockwood, and, more clearly
in this respect, by Zweig, in which marriage is seen, in its
economic aspect, as a partnership.
Husbands end wives devdop consumer ambitions concerning
the equipment and improvement of the home, and other major
expenditures. The wife's earnings may be regarded ss
helping to fulfil these ambitions (for this view see also
Jephcott. 1952). For home-centred families like these, the
emphasis is on joint decisions and purchases for collective
use; so that norms regarding earning and spending will have
reference to this partnership pattern and will probably be
generated by family units rather than inter-family units.
On the other hand, the literature presents us with a com¬
pletely different picture cf the family in a traditional
working-class community, such as of Bott's "liewoo lbs" or
the "Ashton" community. In the Ashton community, norms about
men's behaviour arise as much if not more from the work-place
group., to which the men ore strongly attached, as from the
marital setting. Similarly, the women in both these des¬
criptions of traditional working-class life are strongly
attached to neighbourhood and family-of-origin groupings, so
that norms about women's behaviour will arise from that
setting at least as much as in the family-of-msrriag© setting.
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Thus, the two partners of a marriage in such communities
may have norms about earning and spending derived from
different settings, and hence these norms may conflict*
Bott's "Mrs* Newbolt" refers to the frequency of such con¬
flict in her circle.
The segregation of the social milieu of the sexes
seems to be accompanied by greater segregation of husband's
end wife's areas of economic decision-making. In Ashton,
the wife receives a "wage"; she never questions her hus¬
band's decision to miss a shift. Thus the husband's de¬
cision about how many hours to v/ork is effectively insu¬
lated fx%om week-to-week variations in family needs. Both
the Ashton women and Mrs. Newbolt make all the budgeting
decisions on behalf of the family; neither know how much
their husbands earn. This theme of greater individualism
in the traditional culture is one which I shell take up
again in Chapter 5*
It would seem in general, from the studies cited, that
despite the possibility of conflict concerning the distri¬
bution of the family's resources, the allocative system is
a normative system rather than a bargaining process.
I make this point because I want, in a later chapter,
to examine the notion of commodity sets in consumers' ex¬
penditure with substitution barriers between them - the two
principal sets being husband's expenditure and wife's ex¬
penditure. If the allocation of income within the family
is regarded as being determined by a bargaining process,
price increases could be used by either party to support
claims for a larger share of family income, or a reduction
of purchasing responsibilities. If, on the other hand, the
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allocation system is normatively based, it is likely to be
stable over considerable periods, and the barriers to sub¬
stitution between husband's goods and wife's goods will
therefore be stronger than if a bargaining procedure does
exist. - .
The concept of a hierarchy of decisions about the
family budget can be illustrated by the modification of
Oeser and Hammond's model, shown in diagram 3 . The flows
in this diagram, and the terms used to describe them, form
the basis of the model of the housekeeping system, with
reference to which I shall analyse the empirical dots on
such systems in Chapter 5«
The flow diagram poses two sets of questions the first
group related to the commodity-set problem, and the second
group related to work incentives. Questions related to the
commodity-set problem are:-
(1) ho\f rigid is the division between husband's
retentions and housekeeping allowance?
(2) at the second level, how rdgid is the di¬
vision of expenditure responsibilities be¬
tween husband and wife; ere there any com¬
modities not strictly allocated to the hus¬
band's set or the wife's set of purchases?
(3) on what basis are third-level reallocations
made?
Questions related to the work incentives problem are, again,
the first question posed above ( this affects the de¬
gree of certainty surrounding the disposition of marginal
earnings), and more importantly, how are marginal earnings
allocated?'
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The literature presents a little evidence on the latter
point. Tunstall ("The Fishermen"; 1982) finds that fisher¬
men do not give their wives any of their overtime earnings,
Brennan (1959) points out an interesting effect of family
size: where a man has a large number of children, he will be
discouraged from working overtime, because o large pro¬
portion of any increment in income has to go towards the
housekeeping money. In"Ashton" (and this would be so where-
ever the housekeeping allowance is regarded as the wife's
"wage") overtime money is entirely the husband's own, since
the housekeeping allowance is fired.
Another important problem is, why is it customary for
the breadwinner to make the primary allocation of money be¬
tween collective expenditures and his personal expenditure?
The answer is because, clearly, x'c affects the use he makes
of his labour power, which is regarded as an entirely and
6
necessarily personal decidion.
I have already touched on an important point which
arises in "Coal is Cur life" and also in Kerr's book, namely
that a high degree of husbands control over the distribution
of income in the family entails a high degree of freedom for
the husband regarding the amount of work he does. The
Ashton husband keeps the wife'a allowance at a low level
precisely because he wants to be free to skip a shift when
he wants to. The lower the proportion of income given to the
6
This, again, could be an additional factor in the be¬
haviour of retired couples and families living on social
security: with this type of income there is nothing to
decide about: hence the fact already referred to, that in
such families the husband's entire income is often handed
to the wife to be shared cut.
wife as a regular allowance, the more free the husband is
to do this* This is so even if he is responsible for some
family expenses out of the money he keeps (such as clothes'
or fuel). He can always earn more money for these needs as
they arise, and this allows him some flexibility in his work
effort from week to week;whereas if he gives his wife an
extra pound a woek for clothes, instead of ten pounds every
ten weeks, he is tied to earning that one pound regularly®
When opportunities to work overtime, or to work at all, are
erratic and unpredictable, the housekeeping allowance will
tend to be depressed to the level of minimum expected
earnings, and though this does not necessarily mean that the
husband will have more for his own personal expenditure
these circumstances (as in "Ashtcn") will present him with
estrong temptation to spend what he retains on the needs of
the moment rather than long-term family purposes® One
would expect that husbands particularly prone to fatigue or
illness will rely less upon overtime earnings for the wife's
regular allowance, but keep it to a level they know they can
guarantee. (This may even entail that older men, inde¬
pendently of changes in custom from one generation to an¬
other may retain more control of family expenditure than
young men who can guarantee to work as much overtime as is
necessary). Maintaining the payment of the regular allowance
is a point of pride, and husbands feel embarrassed or have a
sense of failure if they cannot keep up the usual allowance
7
when they have to rely on social security benefits. This
may possibly account for the fact that a couple can change
7
Personal, communrcatbn from Mike Scott, based on his ex¬
perience while working for the National Assistance
Board.
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over to a whole wage packet system on retirement when the
breadwinner comes to depend on s fixed pension. His role
as the earner who has a right to make the primary decisions
about the allocation of his income, breaks down; and the
wife, the manager, whose skill in eking out a small income
is now all-important, takes ovor the task of allocating
money between private and collective uses.
Returning to the questions posed earlier, concerning
the commodity-set division, the concepts of joint and
segregated role-relationships developed by Elizabeth
Botot may be very relevant to the issue of how flexible is
the first-level allocation of income, and how rigid are the
commodity sets for which husband end wife take responsibility.
In discussing the connection between purchasing responsibilities
and control over expenditure, I have already touched on the
possibility that there is an inverse association between the
degree of flexibility in the housekeeping system and the
extent of division of labour between the sexes. This
association is shown clearly by Bott's work on role-
relationships .
The separate decision making areas of each spouse ore
aspects of what Bott cells a role relationship. This she
defines as "those aspects of a relationship that consist of
reciprocal role expectations of each persons concerning the
other" (op.cit., page 3). That the husband controls area A
end the wife area B. of the total set of decisions to be' made
in the household, does not imply that the husband has power-
over the wife; it merely implies a division of labour. Bott
examines the structure of decision making in relation to the
family's connections with a network of external acquaintances.
89
She distinguishes extremes of the division of labour in
the family; the segregated role relationship * where
division of labour is marked, and the joint role relation¬
ship, where division of labour is minimal. Couples 'with
segregated role relationships do not have joint friends;
they do little visiting or entertaining together. The
husband has his friends and the wife has hers. Relations
and neighbours, and for the man, workmates to some extent,
constitute the greatest number amongst these friends; con¬
tacts made in other ways are few. Couples with joint role
relationships, on the other hand, have joint friendships
and leisure pursuits, with contacts drawn from a wider
range of sources, such as clubs, organisations, evening
classes, churches, and more frequently from work then the
contacts of the segregated-role couples. Amongst couples
with segregated role relationships, the acquaintances of
each spouse are quite likely to know one another, because
many of them belong to the same extended family or live in
the same area. This set of acquaintances form what Bott
colls a "connected network". The husband and wife who have
this sort of relationship are likely to live in the seme
district and keep the sane friends all their lives, without
their marriage effecting their individual social contacts
very much. Couples with joint relationships, on the other
hand, are much more likely to be geographically mobile, and
make or maintain friendships through their marriage instead
of outside it. The segregated relationship is associated
with the working class and the joint relationship with the
middle class; but the association is not so consistent that,
class can be taken as an indicator of the type of relation¬
ship.
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Bott illustrates the connection between role relation¬
ship and housekeeping system in her description of the family
organisation of the "Newbolts", e family with highly segre¬
gated roles. Mrs. Nev/bolt had a fixed housekeeping
allowance, the amount of which was determined by the custom
of their acquaintances rather than by her husband's earnings,
8
the size of which she did not know.' If this allowance was
not enough to cover the needs in a particular week, she
would ask Kim for more. She felt that he was amongst the
more generous of husbands because he never denied her this;
and thought that most couples quarrelled about money.
The arrangements governing family expenditure in
v couples v/ith a joint role relationship are much less
thoroughdescribed. Of them, Bott says only that joint
decisions predominate in the financial as in other spheres.
Thus although her analysis with regard to segregated role
relationships is useful, her analysis with regard to joint
role relationships is not clear in the terms of the flow
diagram presented above. However, it presents two very
important ideas which will be examined in Chapter 5; firstly
that the housekeeping system is an aspect of the division of
labour between the sexes (in the areas of decision-making
and of economic functions), which is itself an important di¬
mension of the continuum between a "traditional" "working
class type of family life style at the one extreme, and a
middle class life style at the other. Secondly, Bott's
analysis shows that the degree of this division of labour is
associated with patterns of relationships which both spouses




Jephcott et el (1962) provide some evidence that the
breakdown of the rigid division of labour between the sexes
characteristic of ''traditional" working-class cultures leads
to corresponding changes in the housekeeping system. This
is associated, in their sample, with en increase in the
proportion of married women going out to work; this factor
perhaps breaks down the traditional role structure in which
the husband's economic role is one of "breadwinner" and the
wife's that of "manager".
Jephcott et al (op.cit., 1962) find, in their sample
of Berraonisey women, that whilst "the mums used to be the
bosses round here" (i.e. the "power" of women in the family
has declined) family financial organisation and family
economic decisions have become the subject of more frequent
husband-wife discussion; and the housekeeping system is more
flexible than in the last generation. The allocation of
responsibility for paying for this item or that item varies
from week to week, depending on the fluctuation of the hus¬
band's earnings. The women attribute this greater flexi¬
bility to the fact that most of their generation of wives
work, whereas those of the previous generation di.d not.
They say that when the wife has earnings of her own, the
husband can keep more of his income for himself; the effect
of the wife's earnings is to ease the pressure of collective
needs on personal expenditure. But at the same tim$$ a very
frequent economic reason for the wife working is to buy •
furniture and domestic equipment. We can see, therefore,
that her earnings ere to some extent "earmarked" for things
that the family would not have otherwise; and expenditure on
large items of this kind is likely to he very uneven from
week to week. Hence the husband's responsibility to provide
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for ell the family's needs can be lifted in some weeks but
not in others. When he has earned less than usual, he can
leen on his wife's earnings; but when she has put down the
deposit on a new washing machine, he has to pay for every¬
thing that week. This presents a picture of shifting areas
of financial responsibility, in the short and medium run
determined by the family's economic circumstances, in
particular the week to week composition of total household
income, but in the longer run influenced by cultural norms
affecting family organisation. The degree of flexibility
itself is determined by this long-run. cultural change,
which in turn takes place together with changes in the
structure and magnitude of family income,
d. Summary and conclusions
There is a general lock of pattern in the literature
which refers to housekeeping systems; whilst the connection
between role-relationship, "traditionality" of life style,
and the housekeeping system is plausibly made by Bott and
by Goldthorpe and Lockwood, this aspect of family organi¬
sation does not seem to be related to other socio-economic
factors in a way which is immediately discernible# More¬
over, in setting out the variants apparent in the literature,
one can see that they are capable of a good deal of mis¬
interpretation. Since many of the writers did not intend to
investigate this aspect of family behaviour systematically,
it is easy to read into their statements and their informants'
statements implications which are perhaps not intended or
justified.
However, for what it is worth, one can attempt to list
the main systems found in the studies referred to, and place
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them in order from the extreme of wife's control to the
extreme of husband's control:-
(1) the husband hands over his whole
Maximum wife's
control wage packet, and trie wife gives
him pocket money back.
(Kerr, Land, Humphreys)
(2) the husband hands over his en¬
tire income after first taking
out his pocket money, end the
"allowance" given to the wife is
thus determined on the basis of
total income minus pocket money.
(G. Rowntree, Land, Brennan).
Some small collective expenses
may be paid for out of the hus¬
band's retentions, such as pre¬
sents, children's pocket nioney
or saving.
(3) the husband's retentions are
larger than in (2), because they
include at least some of his
overtime and bonus earnings; thu
the housekeeping allowance is
more related to the husband's
basic wage than to his total in¬
come. (Lend, Tunstall).
(4) the husband decides on a sum
which he considers his minimum e
pected earnings, and the x^ife is
given an allowance based on this
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amount loss husband's personal
|
needs (c.f. Kerr, Dennis et el).
'The minimum expected earnings
figure may include some overtime
or bonus earnings, or it may be
less than the basic wage (in the
case where work is heavy and a
certain amount of absenteeism is
a work-group custom, as in "Ashton"
or where short time is a high risk,
as in winter construction work).
Hence where employment is casual
or the basic wage very low, hus¬
band's retentions could be a very
high proportion of the total wage,
as in Kerr's sample,
the husband gives tbe wife a
housekeeping allowance corres¬
ponding to the community norm but
this may be extended if she runs
out of money during the week,
(c.f. Bott, Townsend) •
As in J, 4 or 5> but the husband
retains responsibility for speci¬
fic items of expenditure, e.g.
fuel bills, clothing or furniture,
which are important items in the
family budget. This feature could
occur in system 2 as well, but is
more frequently mentioned when hus¬
band's retentions are high, (c.f,
Dennis et al,, Townsend)
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It is easy to see that system 1 represents the largest
degree of wife's control, and that 6 is the largest degree .
of husband's control. But there are big problems of
definition. The most clearly distinct system recorded in
the literature is (1). Other systems (2 to 6) are more
difficult to define and distinguish\ 2, 3 and 5 could be
identical; system 4 can only be distinguished as something
different from system 2, 3 or 5 where the occupational
situation of the husband entails that basic income con vary
sharply from week to week.
Therefore, the only clearly defined systems are the
extremes, the whole wage packet system, and system 6» But
the critical feature of system 3 can be combined with any of
systems 2 to 5» so that the categories are not mutually ex¬
clusive «, Although the minimum amount of money which may be
regularly given to the wife decreases as we go down the
scale, the maximum amount given may not decrease in this
way. Since system 6 can be combined with other categories,
the proportion of the husband's income devoted to collective
purposes is not scaled by this typology. There ere really
two separate variables here; the proportion of "collective"
items of expenditure which the.wife controls, and the money
value of expenditure on collective items in relation to the
husband's total take-home pay. This must be considered in
relation to our "formula" for the individual's net advantages
gained from his earnings through the family economy, which
was sot out in Chapter 2. Both the proportion of his income
devoted to collective purposes, end the control he has over
bollective items of expenditure, affect the husband's net
gain from his earnings. If he has the kind of discretionary
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control envisaged in system 6, he is less likely to find
t
money appropriated for collective purposes spent in ways
he does not want, Whilst the total proportion of income
devoted to collective purposes is interesting in itself,
what is needed is an "index" of husband's control which will
incorporate both these variables. The "net advantages"
formula applies to wives as well as husbands, and in a
separata chapter I shall examine the literature relating to
the role of the wife in expenditure and other decisions, to
her choice whether or not to work.
The difficulties of constructing a typology of house¬
keeping systems -from the data already available are
aggravated by the fact that we have little information about
the kind of responsibility for individual items which the
husband:s retentions are used to pay for - such as saving,
or paying fuel bills. No clear description of husband's end
•wife's areas of control at the second level of decision
making emerges. This deficiency affects particularly the
commodity-set issue. In fact there is very little from
previous literature that will answer the major questions
posed in this chapter. There is insufficient clarity of
concepts, and the cultural correlates of different budgeting
practices remain for the most part obscure. Young's question
as to how much of the family income is devoted to collective
purposes, is not adequately answered even by Young himself,
because he pays little attention to collective payments .out
of the husband's retentions.
It is, therefore, the questions posed here, rather than
the answers which previous studies offer, which provide the




HfTTTODS 01? UShDV.'ORK AI7D DATA ANALYSIS
Objectives of the Saivoy
In the first chapter, I laid down the general ob¬
jectives of a study of the economic behaviour of working-
class families. These objectives have, I hope, beon
clarified by the two intervening chapters. In this
chapter, I consider what sort of data are required for
such a study, and what sort of sample it was desirable and
necessary to use, and describe the actual methods of sample
selection and data analysis.
The researcher is nearly always faced with a conflict
between the type of project which theoretical considerations
v/ould ideally require, in terms of sample 3ise and coverage,
and what sort of project resources will permit. This con¬
flict was particularly acute in ray case.
Within their limited resources, the choices open to
research students are few. They may undertake a large
number of interviews, using a relatively small number of
variables. Or they may forego fieldwork altogether. Or
they may, as I have done, undertake a small study covering
a very large number of variables, and set up models of some
complexity which, one hopes, will provide pointers for
further research, and may eventually be tested on larger
samples. Such studies, as it were, fulfil the function of
a large-scale pilot study. It seeros to me that this method
of approach is really the only one appropriate for a field
of study such as I have chosen, for the following reasons
(1) a non-empirical study, that is one which con¬
fines itself to bringing together and commenting
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upon other people's work, is ruled out in this
case because there is a dearth of systematically
collected evidence on the allocation of income
within the family and the effects that this has
on family members' willingness to work,
since this is so, one is led towards some kind
of survey work; the question is whether this
should more appropriately be a study with a
large number of cases and a relatively small
number of variables, or a study with a large
number of variables and a small number of cases.
The latter seems to me to be what is most re¬
quired, because the main deficiency of the
literature, both sociological and economic, on
the economic behaviour of families is a lack of
connection between findings on various aspects
of behaviour. Economists know a lot about de¬
mand functions, and about savings behaviour; they
do not know as much about the offeet of in¬
centives and disincentives to work or about in¬
dividuals' propensities to work, as they would
like to. Knowledge in each of these fields has
been built up to a largo extent independently of
the other fields, as I pointed out in the first
chapter. Where new insights and evidence are mos
required is in the connections between different
aspects of family behaviour. Again, sociologists
have built up a body of knowledge about family
role structures and community norms of economic b
hsviour, which, owing to unhelpful boundaries be-
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tween disciplines, hove not been "fed beck" into
the economists' models. There ore, therefore, a
large number of potential connections to be made
between discrete academic fields. This of course
points to the many-variable, few-ease typo of
study, rather than to the many-case, few-variable
type, which is more suitable for concentrating on
a particular field.
I therefore decided, to analyse e large array of
variables from a relatively small number of interviews.
Method of sample selection
In deciding upon the method of selecting the sample, I
was guided by a number of criteria arising from the nature
of the information required from the survey. Firstly, since
one of the central issues to be investigated was the men's
take-up of overtime work offered, it was essential that I
should have some knowledge of the amounts of work available
and the conditions of work in the establishments where the
men ware employed. This suggested selection of informants
via their employers, rather than via the electoral register,
the obvious alternative. Another major argument for this
method of selection w,as that it would enable me to check
informants' statements about their income. If, as several
previous writers on the allocation of income within the
family have suggested, the wife may not know the husband's
wage, or the husband may not wish to reveal his earnings
when his wife is present, it would be difficult to obtain
an estimate of the husband's income independently of the
housekeeping allowance - and such an estimate is quite
essential to the enquiry. If the sample wore selected from
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a few firms, whose co-operation could be enlisted, it would
be possible to obtain information about the sample's wage
rotes. This would enable mo to calculate what the
informants' income was, independently of the men's own
statements, provided that people were willing to soy how
much overtime they worked. If the company's wage rotes for
different grades end occupations are known5 it is simple to
work out what a man working so much overtime would have
, 1
eerned.
The method of doing this is given in Appendix A of
Chapter 5® I did not feel it ethical to ask employers
about individuals' incomes, end I am sure this information
would not have been given in most cases.
It was desirable that the number of firms from which
the sample was taken should not be too large, so that there
was, for each firm, a substantial group of informants for
whoa common features of their work situation cculd be
identified. This point is particularly important in re¬
lation to overtime working, for example: one wants to know
to what extent individual variations in overtime hours are
the consequence of variations in overtime opportunities
provided by employers-. Consequently, 1 excluded from the
sampling frame certain industries which employ only a very
^
A few errors may arise in such estimates, mainly because
of ambiguities in men's descriptions of their occupations
or working hours. However*, on the whole it seems a. use¬
ful way of checking income statements, and it turns cut *
that a majority of income statements corresponded to
estimates made in this way (see Chapter .5, Appendix A,
where the question of errors in the estimates is further
considered).
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email proportion of the Edinburgh manual male labour force,
such as textiles and retail distribution* To include
these as substantial groups in the sample, would have
meant that they were over-represented by comparison with
their small size in the population as a whole, and to in¬
clude only one or two individuals from each of these
smaller industry groups would have made it difficult to
obtain enough information about their work situation, I
therefore felt it best to exclude these small groups from
the sample.
At the same time, it was necessary that the working
conditions and overtime oimportunities of the sample should
be various. It was difficult to think of an industry which
was likely to contain a sufficient variety of conditions in
one or two firms. Consequently, it was desirable to take
firms from a election of different industries, .end so that
this selection should not be arbitrary, I decided to sample
one firm from each of the major industrial groupings repre¬
sented in Edinburgh (excluding services, since service
industries do not employ many male manual workers).
The foregoing considerations lay down some require¬
ments for the nature of the sample which conflict with the
r
more general constraint • that any sample used in a research
project should, if possible, be random.
To select a sample through employers runs o high risk
of departure from randomness, because there are two stages,
in the process at which refusals may be made; the firms may
refuse th: help, or the individual employees may refuse to be
interviewed, I decided to run this risk, because of the very
strong arguments given above in favour of this method of
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selection. In fact, since the refusal rate of firms was
over half of those asked, the sample probably is non-
random.^
In asking the co-operation of companies, the person
approached in the first place was the personnel manager,
works manager, or managing director, or in the case of
very small firms, the letter was addressed simply to the
company. A few approaches were made by telephone only, but
most were by letter, followed up by telephone calls when
there was no reply after two weeks. In every case except
for the very small firms, it v/as suggested to the company
that it would bo desirable to got union agreement before a
2
It was noticeable that snaller firms were particularly
likely to refuse, but, apart from this, it is difficult
to see what particular kinds of bios may have resulted
from the refusals of firms to participate, The reasons
for non-response or refusal of firms were as follows:-
Refusals " No.
Firms about to move, close or be taken over ... 5
Did not want company to be responsible for
handing names and addresses over ...»..«»«•• h-
Thought firm doing too many surveys for the
government already ......................... 2
Refusal from trade union ....................... 1
1 inn coo bus j1 ............ X
Reason for refusal unclear .................... 2
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Unsuitable firms:
Firm too small for sampling ................... 4
Firm did not employ many male workers ......... 1
Firm used services of sub-contractors ......... 1
Non-response
Employer did not reply to letter, and repeated
phone calls were unsuccessful .............. 15
Trade union did not reply to letter ........... 1
No production establishment in Edinburgh
(i.e. office or shop only) ................. 5
Total unsuitable or not replying 25
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sample of employees' names and addresses was given to me,
although in some cases this requist was brushed aside, I
believe that in all but three of the firms whose men were
finally interviewed, union representatives wore consulted.
The reason for my request was mainly ethical, although I
did also expect that whether the unions v/ere consulted
would have an effect upon the refusal rate of the in¬
dividuals approached. Of the three firms in which I.sus¬
pect unions were not consulted, one had the highest re¬
fusal rate in the sample, and one had the lowest. It
appears, therefore, that this expected effect was over¬
shadowed by other influences on the refusal rate. It is,
of course, impossible to know what sort of consultation
there was between the company's representative and the
union officials| in only one case was I actually present.
It is possible that some companies informed the unions
rather than asked for their consent; though in one of the
printing firms, the Father of the Chapel asked each em¬
ployee if he was prepared to take part. In most cases,
managers said that they thought it would be bast if they
spoke to the union representatives rather than me, but in
one case I was asked to contact the union myself, and they
did not reply to ny letter.
The sampling frame originally used for companies (apart
from transport undertakings) was the list drawn up by the
Department of Employment and Productivity for Census of
Production purposes, in November, 1965, This list gave the
size band, by number employed, for each firm, so that it was
possible to see which was the' model size band (i.e, the one
employing, altogether, the greatest number ox people) in each
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industry, I decided to try to obtain firms in or near to
the mocigJ. siae bend as far as possible (on the grounds that
these would be most typical of work organisation and pro¬
duction methods) though in the construction industry the .
model sise was so snail (less than 10 men) that it was
obvious severil firms would have to be sampled, in order to
end up with a sufficient sample of informants from this in¬
dustry (particularly since employers tended to object to a
very large sampling fraction being used).
The industry groups from which it was originally in¬
tended to take the sample were: food, drink and tobacco;
chemicals and allied industries; engineering and allied in¬
dustries; timber, furniture, etc.; printing, paper and
publishing; textiles end clothing; miscellaneous manu¬
facturing industries; transport, construction; and public
utilities. Only three firms in Edinburgh can be identified
which belong to the "chemicals" group; one of these agreed
to co-operate, but withdrew the offer at the last moment
because of an immanent take-over by another company. Of
the remaining two chemical firms, one had refused and an¬
other was very small. In the textile group, no firm could
be found which would co-operate and which bad a substantial
1
number of male employees. Thus only eight of the ten in¬
dustrial groups ere pepresented in the sample. To make up
the deficiency in numbers arising from the chemical -firm
backing out, I took a second transport undertaking, s bus _
company, which seemed to deserve attention because of the
very large opportunities for overtime work available to its
employees.
-' ^
The group of firms from which informants were eventually
taken was made up as follows:-
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1« a brewery, in the nodal size band of over
500 men.
2. en engineering firm. The modal size of
engineering establishment in the city was
less than 50 men; this firm had about 70
employees. It made printing machinery.
5. two firms in the timber industry* One was
in the modal size band of 11-50; and it was
therefore necessary to take another, which
employed about 50 men at its Edinburgh
establishment and many more outside the city.
Both were saw-mills, so that mainly unskilled
men were employed. Their work consisted of
moving imported timber from the docks and
cutting it into lengths and sections locally
required.
two printing firms, one in the modal size
band of 101-200 employees, the other em¬
ploying only 6 people. The first agreed to
provide a sample of 20 employees, so to make
up the numbers in this industry, I took also
a paper firm which employed about 100 peoj>le,
of whom most Were women. It made envelopes.
5* a rubber factory, somewhat larger than the model
size for the "miscellaneous manufacturing"
group, which was 200-500.
0. the Gas Board.
7. British Roil.
8. a bus company.
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9. two building firms, one in the modal size
band of 11-50 men; one with several hundred
men, not all of whom worked in Edinburgh.
This firm was however just as representative
of the industry as the first, it and another
very large firm together employed almost as
many men as did all the firms togethex1 in the
modal size band.
To control the family composition variable, I decided
to interview only couples with children of 18 years or-
x
under apart from e small control group." It could not be
discovorod from the firm's basic records whether employees
had children; this would hove meant someone looking through
the tax codings for me, and I felt that in most cases this
was too much to ask. (Thus, assuming on the basis of cen-
of
sus data that about half/married men have children living
at home, it v/as necessary to double the number of men
finally required, and add a further number to allow for
refusals and non-contacts, in order to obtain the number of
names to be sampled. My target sample size was 200 (this
being the maximum number that interviewing resources per-
h
mitted) so, assuming,, as I did in the first place, that
there would be 10 industry groups represented in the sample,
x
_
" It seemed desirable to include some couples without
children, for comparison, to see particularly if their
housekeeping systems were very different from those of
couples with children. In order not•to devote ex¬
cessive effort to this, however, since interviewing
resources were restricted, I limited the size of this
group to 10, of whom seven were eventually available
for interview.
The textile firms were amongst the last to be approached,
-and the chemicals firm did not back out until the ten of
the sample had been selected.
10?
it was necessary to obtain 50 names from the firm or firms
representing each industry, I expected this would givo 25
men who were eligible to be interviewed, out of each 50,
and that perhaps 5 of these would not wish to be interviewed
or would be unavailable* However, many of the smaller firms
were reluctant to use a large sampling fraction of their
payroll, oust in case the employees resented their names
being passed on. This meant that for the smaller firms
which I approached, I was offered maximum numbers of 20 or
even a dozen names. The problem was then, should I:
(1) ask for more names from the largest and
most co-operative firms,
or (2) seek the co-operation of more firms
or (5) make do with a smaller sample than the
intended 200.
I thought the first solution unlikely to succeed, since it
was so much trouble to persuade firms to give me even 50
names (only one gave as many as 50, though three gave over
4-0). In the case of the nationalised undertakings, each
employee had been informed individually by the management
that his name had been put down. This meant the procedure
took considerable time and money for the company, and I
therefore did not expect that they v/ould be willing to ex¬
tend it. Solution 2 hod rather low chances of success, in
viev; of my earlier experience. Moreover, by the time this
choice had to bo made, selecting the sample had taken
nearly two months and the work was running behind schedule}
interviewers were ready to start and I was afraid they would
take alternative work if they could not start soon, I there¬
fore decided to make do with a total of 526 names instead of
the original target of 500.
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Sampling within the firms was, with four exceptions,
from an alphabetical list of employees (or a list in orcLei*
of clock number, or however the firm had the list arranged),
taking a name at a fixed interval, the size of which de-
ponded on the length of the list* One firm, on the per¬
sonnel manager's initiative, used random number tables in¬
stead* In the smaller of the printing firms, all married
men living in Edinburgh v/era interviewed (there ware only
three of them). In the larger printing firm, the firm
selected a set of people, and the Father of the Chapel then
went to ask then whether they wore willing to participate»
He achieved a success rate of over 60;*, although since I
had not been told in advance that this was to be done, I
had not met bin and he knew little about the proposed sur¬
vey. In the paper works, the only method of approach
acceptable to the works manager was for me to go round the
factory during the working hours and ask people if they were
willing to be interviewed. (Ehe interviews took place later
in their homes, so that their wives could be interviewed
too). Despite the problems of talking above machine noise,
which were considerable, I felt.that this method saved a
lot of trouble and wished I had used it more extensively;
»
but clearly with some production processes it would not have
been possible (and it would have been arduous where some men
could only be found on the night shift).
It was difficult to be sure that the procedure for
periodic sampling was closely followed; I suspect that some
unofficial screening took place to eliminate those who were
thought to be hostile to the survey. It was often difficult
to explain to managers end their secretaries that this sort
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could they understand why one wanted to include in the
sample people who worked so much overtime that they were
rarely at home.
The final response numbers are shown in the table on
the next page. The categories "refused" and "ineligible"
may each contain some of the other, since if people said
they did not want to be interviewed, it was frequently not
practical to ask thera whether they hod any children living
at home. Or, if the criterion of "eligibility" was first
made clear by the interviewer, "I hove no children" may
have been a polite excuse for not being interviewed. Un¬
fortunately there is no information about the refusersj the
interviewers had an impression that they were, on average,
older than those who were interviewed, but the reasons
given for non-participation were rarely specific. Ex¬
perienced interviewers who had worked previously for the
Government Social Survey or for market research companies
were more successful then students, though to what extent
the students were unsuccessful because of their age as well
as their lack of experience, cannot be assessed. A marked
drop in success was experienced by students the week after
i
the "gates" incident at. L.S.E., suggesting that the public
image of students had something to do with refusals; two
refusals during this period were explicitly on the grounds
that; "I don't want anything to do with students", end •"!
don't want anything to do with the university". Men
students were considerably less successful than women students,
All the non-student interviewers were women, so one cannot
assess the set factor there.
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About half the informants had letters beforehand warning
them that the interviewer would call, and explaining the
research; but since this produced a response rate no
larger than calls not preceded by letters, it was dropped.
(The experienced interviewers said that in any c.ase they
preferred to do the explaining themselves. A few inter¬
views were done before Christmas of 1968; the rest in
January to early March, 1969•











Rail x' 2 10 8 22 57
Brewery 17 8 8 2 8 43
Rubber
Factory 3
4 7 12 41
limber
Merchant A 1 0 2 2 4 9
limber
Kerchant B 1 0 1 3 7 12
Gas Board 13 1 11 7 8 40
Bus Company 11 2 7 7 17 44
Builder A 4 2 3 6 4 21
Builder B 3 0 0 0 2 5
Engineering
Firm 3 2 12 0 9 21
Paper Works 3 0 3 2 3 11
Printer A 8 , 0 2 2 7 19
Printer B 3 0 0 0 0 3
TOTAL 97 20 63 46 99 326
* excluding the control group of 7, who are in¬
cluded amongst those interviewed.
Out of 326 couples, only 97 were eventually interviewed.
Of these, 90 had children under 19, three had no children yet,
and four had children over 18, It is difficult to calculate
the refusal rate, because so many people were written dorro. as
"refused, but possibly ineligible". If it is assumed that all
the couples who refused, were "eligible", i.e. had children
under 19* then the refusal rate is 2'Y.^c/>. But if it is assumed
that the proportion of couples with no children is the same
amongst those who refused as it is amongst the rest of the
sample, then the refusal rate is 12.6$. The truth probably
lies between these two figures.- The percentage of people not
contacted is 20.25/J, of which the greater part (14^) is
accounted for by the person named not being found at the
address given. This rather high number of wrong addresses
must not be attributed entirely to lack of accuracy in
companies' records. In several cases the names were dictated
to me, since I was never allowed to look at the original
records myself. (They probably contained confidential matter).
In other cases, typing or dictating errors could have arisen
within the firm before a list was passed to me. Bearing in
mind this reason for the unusually large number of people who
could not be found, the proportion of refusals and non-con¬
tacted people is comparable with the 30?a of households who
foiled to co-operate fully in the Family Expenditure Survey
in 1967.
The question arises, who were the non-respondents, and
what bias in the results may arise from non-response? One
very important factor which must be considered is that some
people may have refused because of the particular nature of
the survey. Many people ore reluctant to talk about their
budgeting habits and financial circumstances, and this pre¬
sumably accounts for the fact that surveys about such topics
generally have a higher refusal rate than surveys about less
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those who are more than usually reluctant to talk about their
budgeting practices are couples for whom these practices are
a matter of dispute or tension between husband and wife.. It
is very likely, therefore, that this survey under-estimated
the proportion of husbands who conceal their earnings from
their wives. Of the several community studies referred to in
Chapter 3 which touch upon this issue, those which did not take
the housekeeping system as a central issue for investigation
may be less biased in this particular respect than mine.
Moreover, most of the surveys which have specifically investi¬
gated budgeting, to which Michael Young (1952) refers, took
the wofe along as the informant, whereas I interviewed husband
1 f i
and wife together. Compared to these studies, therefore, mine I {■
may have under-estimated the number of husbands who concealed
their earnings from their wives.
Turning now to a slightly different sort of bias, husbands"
may be reluctant to talk to an interviewer if they realise that
the amount of pocket money they keep for themselves is un¬
usually high. In this respect, the Edinburgh survey may be
more biased than those surveys on housekeeping systems which
have taken the wife alone as the informant. It may also be
more biased than the data provided by community studies which
have collected information on the housekeeping system without
presenting the issue to potential informants as 'one of the
principal matters for investigation.
These two forms of bias - towards an under-estimate of the
number of husbands who do not tell their wives their earnings
and towards an over-estimate of the average amount of house¬
keeping money - must be borne in mind in interpreting the




correct, however, to attribute all refusals to.husbands'
guilty feelings. As I have pointed out, dislike of students
was one reason for refusal; inexperience on the part of some
interviewers (including myself) and the sheer length of the
questionnaire may also have been contributory factors towards
a high refusal rate in comparison to surveys not concerning
financial matters."*"
If it is assumed that the refusal rate arising from
causes other than the subject matter of the survey was only
10# of those approached, the range of the refusal rate
attributable to people's reluctance to talk about budgeting
is between 2.6# and 15# (in accordance with the assumptions
* "Lr *
made on page 111 above). This, then, may be a rough in¬
dicator of the maximum number of non-responding "stingy"
husbands. On this basis, out of 65 couples who refused to
answer the questionnaire, about 26 (10# of all those con¬
tacted) may have refused for Reasons unconnected with the
survey's subject matter. Up to 38.1# of the other 59 who
refused may have been ineligible anyway (this being the
proportion of all those contacted who said they had no
children). This could account for up to 15 of the 39,
though possibly for none of them. Consequently, if I had
been able to interview all the households with children who
See for example C. A. Moser (1958), 1967 edition pp.130
et seq., where it is suggested that refusal rates are
usually less than 10#, but that this may be exceeded by
inexperienced interviewers. This figure may be
optimistic, however, for example, the "affluent worker"
study met with a refusal rate of 19.6# for an initial
interview (see Goldthorpe et al., 1969, page 4-9). An
Edinburgh survey of small shopkeepers had a response rate
of only 64# (see Bechhofer and Elliott, 1973).
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refused because of their reluctance to talk about bud¬
geting, as well as those who actually were interviewed,
the "reluctant" households (those where the husband con¬
cealed his earnings or kept a very large amount of pocket
money) might have numbered, at most, between 19«8/o and
28.7/0 of the total. The question of concealment of
earnings by husbands is further discussed in Chapter
especially in Appendix A.
The Questionnaire
Three versions of the questionnaire were used, bne for
the pilot study (10 cases, selected from the electoral
register), and two versions for the main survey. The first
version, given in the appendix of this chapter, was printed
cheaply and did not leave the interviewer enough space for
recording. The answer codes were also poorly laid out, and
there were quite a few misprints. (The copy of this version
given in the appendix is shown with these corrected)* It
was therefore replaced in mid-February by a revised,
duplicated version which left much more space for recording
and laid out pop-coded answers in columns. At the same
time, I took the opportunity to remove a few questions
which v/ere not producing useful data, end inserted a new
section on the couple's friends and leisure activities, in
order to obtain extra information about this for a sub¬
group of the sample. The last twenty interviews done used
this revised version. Alterations and the reasons for
them are .given in the appendix to this chapter; the
questionnaires are in a pocket in the inside of the back
cover.
In analysing the data, I screened it carefully for
differences between interviews arising from the differences
between questionnaires, end found only one, concerning the
question on the husband's and wife's attitudes to the wife's
employment, which 1 refer to in Chapter 6. I think, there¬
fore, that I was justified in changing the questionnaire.
The reasons for doing so were largely to do with inter¬
viewer morale; interviewers felt that the whole thing was
too long, too difficult to read and fill up; end that puttin
t
questions of the same kind more closely together in sections
would assist rapport. They also thought that the order of
the sections in the second version assisted rapport, because
it got to the major points of the enquiry at the beginning.
and, so to speak, justified the interview to tho informants.
I had, in any case, made it clear to interviewers from the
beginning of the survey that they were free to word question
as they wanted provided the essential meaning was preserved;
this, if nothing else, was a necessary concession to the fee
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that the dialects in which they were accustomed to speck
were different (some being English end some Scots) and
their natural mannerisms consequently different. I also
told them that the order of the sections did not really
matter; this had to be varied sometimes in any case, be¬
cause the interviewer could not guarantee that both spouses
would be theto for a whole hour or more. In a questionnaire
w
of this sort, which covers a large range of topics, the
relationship of which it is quite difficult to explain to
the informant, and which deals with somewhat personal
topics, it seems to roe that the interviewer should bo
allowed considerable scope to vary the wording and order of
the questions according to the particular reactions of each
informant. Structuring of the questionnaire is, in fact,
only desirable to the extent the matter to be covered is so
diverse that it would be rather difficult for the inter-
viewer to keep in.her. head, or in e brief set of notes, all
•" >- ' ■;
. v
the things she had to ask.
ĝ
(There is, of course, a body of opinion which would criticise
varying the wording and order of questions on the grounds,
firstly, that this is likely to produce variations in the
answers, end secondly, that studies carried out under such
conditions cannot easily be replicated (see IT* Hyman: Sur¬
vey Design and Analysis, 1955)« To defend myself against
the first objection, I would point to the fact that if no
differences of any substance arose between the interviews
conducted with the original and those conducted with the
revised questionnaire; it is unlikely that major differences
arose from interviewers' variation of the questions or their
order. Against the second objection, I would argue that in
so far as the most basic factual questions of the survey had
to bo replicated in order to confirm the findings, re¬
wording was very rarely necessary for such questions. Where
rewording sometimes proved necessary was in the questions
about friends end leisure activities, which are deficient
more for their lack of detail than anything olse, and I have
taken account of this deficiency in the data analysis. One
would, I think, want to improve rather than replicate these
questions. Moreover, there is a sense in which replication
is impossiblej- each interviewer/informant confrontation,
represents a unique situation, upon which the effect of the
interviewer's dialect (particularly important in this case)
personality end mannerisms nay have at least as much effect
as the precise wording of questions.
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In the pilot stud;/, I started off with a structured
questionnaire and after three interviews abandoned this in
favour of a simple list of topics to be covered, because I
wanted to experiment with different ways of asking the same
thing. The unstructured method was much better as regards
rapport, since one could take up lines of conversation
suggested by the informants; thus they were able to take a
popic to what was, for them, its natural conclusion, end
gave information in greater depth and detail then in many
of the main survey interviews. It was, however, very
difficult to get through all the things I had put dovm in
the structured questionnaire, if I used an unstructured
method and let the informants determine the order of topics
in the conversation to a large extent. It would probably
have been still more difficult to anyone who had not
designed the research in the first place.
Methods of Analysing the Data
In order adequately to examine the relationships be¬
tween the many variables dealt with in this study, it is
necessary to test relationships between pairs of variables
within sub-groups of the sample, controlling for third
variables, and perhaps even controlling for patterns in-
volving several variables. In.a sample so small as the one
I have used (97 cases), some sub-groups which have to bo
examined are so small that relationships can be fairly .strong
without being statistically significant. I have, therefore,
emphasised throughout that the study must be treated as ex¬
ploratory rather than conclusive, and have included a number
of results which are not statistically significant. The
justification for this is partly a theoretical position which
lis
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I argue in appendix 3. But first of all, it must bo con¬
sidered how far the sample is random; if it is not,
significance tests are invalid anyway.
There are three 'reasons why the sample may not be
random with respect to the working-class population of
Edinburgh. Firstly, there was a high refusal rate from
companies. Consequently, the companies eventually selected
to represent each industry in the sampling frame may not be
fully representative of that industry. Secondly, there is
s less important source of non-randomness in the fact that
not all industries employing male manual workers were repre¬
sented. Thirdly, there is a bias resulting from the re¬
fusal rate of individuals. There is therefore some doubt as
to whether the cample is random. This means that significance
tests should be treated with caution throughout the data
analysis. Even if valid, they are of limited usefulness, in
so far as the population of working-class people in
Edinburgh may differ in important ways from the working-class
population in other parts of Britain. (For example, Chapter
3 raised the possibility of regional differences in house¬
keeping practices). One could, of course, treat the sample
as random with respect to the population of the employees
#
of the companies from which informants were selected.
Significance tests are then technically valid (provided the
refusals of individuals selected to bo interviewed are not
regarded as an important source of non-randomness) but less
meaningful than if the population is assumed to be that of
the Edinburgh working-class in general; the important point
here is that if the selection of companies is biased (because
of the high refusal rate of companies), the work Environment•fW'
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of the individuals interviewed may not be representative of
the work environment of the Edinburgh population as a whole.
Given these problems regarding the use of significance
tests, nayy of the findings presented in this study cannot
be regarded as conclusive. Quite a lot of the data con
really only be used to formulate more complex and specific
hypotheses than those available from theoretical work. I
present this study, therefore, as an exploratory investi¬
gation, the purpose of which is to formulate such
hypotheses where it is not possible to establish conclusions
for which there is definite proof.
As a measure of strength of association in the analysis
of my data, I have used the Q-test (c.f. Blalock, I960, page
2J1), (This test is 0 measure of strength of relationship
restricted to 2 x 2 tables, (which, however, is all the data
can take in 0 good many cases, because of small numbers, and
anyway quite obviously appropriate in many others). Unlike
the chi-square test, it is designed as a tost of strength of
relationship, rather than a test of significance, and unlike
chi-square, it gives the same result whatever the size of N.
It however shares with the chi-square test the drawback
that when one cell of the table is zero, the coefficient
t
reaches its maximum (1 'for Q, N for chi-square) whatever the
number in the other cells. But this does not really present
a problem because one can easily see what the association
would be if one case were transferred into the empty coll
4
frora the other independent-variable category.
As a way of testing for spurious associations, and
presenting variables with reference to their relative ex¬
planatory power within different sub-groups, I have adapted a
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simplified version of the method of analysis known as the
"Automatic Interaction Detector". Ms is used by the
Prices end Incomes Board in their report on overtime and
shift-working (1970, pp. 222 et seq.) by the Brookings
Institution (1955) and by George Katona and Eve Mueller
(1958). The procedure seeks to explain the scoring of
cases on a dependent variable by their scoring on a series
of independent variables which are arranged to classify
the cases taxcnomically. Thus the sample is first divided
into sub-groups on the basis of their score on the variable
most strongly associated with y, the dependent variable.
Let us coll this most strongly associated variable x^, and
denote those cases having score 1 on x-^ as coses
Similarly, cases having score 2 on x^ will be denoted
Then these groups, and sre each sub-divided on the
basis of whatever variable is most strongly associated with







X51 x32 X21 x22
*
Each of the four groups then obtained is sub-divided again
according to the variable which is most strongly associated





X51 X32 X21 x22
i l i
I- ) I '' ' ) J 1 —1 1 1 '' ' ' I
X71 >:72 Xol x62 >:51 x52 XA1 X'l2
121
*
Each branch of the tree is re—divided until the number
resulting is too small for the test to bo sensibly used (i.e.
where any further sub-division gives a table in which the
size of the association could be drastically reduced by
transferring one case from one cell to another) or until no
further explanatory variables can be found. How large must
a Q—value be, to be regarded as interesting or meaningful?
There is no formal criterion, since Q is not a significance
test. What one is really asking, in looking at a four-cell
contingency table, such as the one below, is whether cases
in category 1 of variable y ere distributed between cats-
gories land 2 of variable x differently from cases in cate¬
gory 2 of variable y. General answers to this question must
bo one of three varieties
(1) all, or c majority, of y^'s are in x^, and all,
or a majority, of y^'s are in Xp, for example,






(2) both y^'s and y^'s are about equally distri¬






(3) y^'3 erQ about equally distributed between





The strongest relationships ere obviously in situ¬
ations of type 1 rather than type 3; end situations of
type 2 would deserve the verdict "no relationship". The
example given of a type 3 situation may be regarded as a
marginal case. As it stands, there are twice as many
y0's in as there ai'e in - and this would, in many
cases, be a point of interest in the data being examined.
But if y-g*2 were distributed any mere equally between x^
and x~, one would think the association minimal. So it seems
cL
reasonable to say that the example given of type 3 is about
the weakest sort of relationship one would take any notice
of. The Q-value for this table is 0.35. Should this, then,
be a criterion value? If one case of y^ were transferred
from :<2 "bo x^ (making the j0 column read 6;9) the statement
that y2fs are much more concentrated in than in x.^,
whereas ere not would have less force than in the
original example. However, it is clear that the difference
between a 3;10 case and a 5;9 case could be very largely a
matter of coincidence. For this reason it seems necessary to
take a criterion value of Q somewhat larger then 0.33*
(There is however no reason for making any hard and fast
rule; the minimum value which can b-e regarded as interesting
#
must depend to some extent on the matter in the table). I
have, therefore, rarely token notice of Q-vslues less than
0.4, and this only once in constructing the variable trees.
All sub-divisions at the some level of the tree need not lie
by the same variable - they will be by whatever variable best
explains the characteristics of cases in each sub-group. Thus,
in the example above, each of the four sub-groups arising at
the third level (x,, , x-,0, x01 , x^) is divided by a different'j) J- ^)cL dx tXd
variable.
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The method is similar in some respects to cluster
analysis, because the ends of the branches will consist of
pairs of groups with at least one of each pair more nearly
puro in yx or y2, then are groups at the top or in the
middle of branchesThus the proportions of y, and y0
cases might be as follows
whole sample (40 y^, ^'0 Ih)
1 1 "4
X11 X12
(307,, 10yp) (10y,, 30yp)
11_ _ I
iy x"i c 1 urn
31 32 21 22
(25y1, 5y2) (5y1# 5y2) (5ylt 20y2) (5y1, lOy2)
i —JI
f ^ I l
X51 X52 X41 x42
(18y2) (5yx , 2y2) (4y]? ly2) (ly^, 9y2l
Thus, group is mora nearly a pure y^ group than either
X11 or v/k°^e scrapie, but x^2 has the seme proportions
of y^ and y2 as the whole sample, is completely pure,
and the other end-of-branch groups somewhat less so. Un¬
like cluster analysis, however, this method sets out to
create groups of cases according to their score on a
particular variable, and not according to their general
differences and similarities. This means that the ex¬
planatory power of the results is, so to speak, "guaranteed",
provided any variables in the set x, are stronglyx « •«tu n
associated with y. Cluster analysis, on the other hand., may
produce groups which have no very general bearing on the de¬
pendent variable(s). The Prices and Incomes Board report on
overtime and shiftworking (op.cit.) shows this problem quite
clearly. Their cluster analysis does not distinguish any
group- notable for a lower proportion of overtime workers then
the sample as a whole, (op.cit., supplement, pp.229 et
seq.) - end there is no reason why it should have done
even if there is an explanation why some people do no
overtimeSince cluster analysis groups cases which ere
similar, not cases which have a particular score on a
variable specified in advance.
In my analysis, I used the Q test, as e measure of
strength of association, This, of course, requires
dichotomisotion of all variables, but the majority of
variables in the analysis either are naturally dichotomous,
or need to be turned into dichotomous variables, because
the cell sisss get very small otherwise. In common with
other users of this method end of cluster analysis, I have
very often treated particular scores of a variable as
individual characteristics - for example, the informant's
employer can be thus treated, and employers l,.,.n instead
of being scores of the variable "employer" then become n
variables of a dichotomous type (works for the ith em¬
ployer or does not work fox* the employer).
For the interval scale variables, I drew up a
correlation matrix of everything to soa what associations
turned up, but the coefficients were mostly very low,
(Subsequent analysis with regard to nominal-scale variables
finds reasons for this in many cases), I therefore felt
justified in dichotomising even some of the interval scale
variables, for example, the amount of.overtime worked,
which is treated as the dependent variable in the use of
this procedure in chapter 6).
The same procedure is used for the explanation of
housekeeping systems in chapter ;>•
This matrix will be found in the flap inside the back cover.
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The method described above hes the following
functions:-
(1) it points cut interference between variables.
For example, the association between house¬
keeping system and overtime which my
theoretical model predicted, did not appear
in the samples as a whole, but it did appear
in the group of skilled workers. It v/os
apparent that the skill-level factor and the
association between housekeeping system and
overtime cancelled each other out,
(2) it points out the relative strength of ex¬
planatory power of a variable in different
sub-groups•
(5) it shows within which sub-groups a variable
is important.
It is thus s good way of summarising the set of cor¬
relates of a dependent variable, in a more informative way
than is a string of Q-values or chi-squere values for the
sample as a whole. It seems to me the most efficient way
of analysing data which consists mainly of nominal scales,
end a method of analysis appropriate to an exploratory
9
study, since it enables the construction of relatively
complex models of relationships between variables which are
then suitable for further testing.
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APPITIOIX A
The original printed version gave a suggested form
of v;ords by which the interviewer should introduce here
self and the survey, which, the interviewers disliked;
they preferred to devise their own methods of persuasion.
It was therefore never used. Questions 22 and 57 were
also deleted after the first 8 interviews. These were
added on the advice of one of my supervisors after the
pilot study. It was apparent that they lengthened the
interview considerably, yet several of the answers were
frivolous or vague, and interviewers felt that these
questions were detrimental to rapport, because informants
could not see the purpose of them.
Questions deleted from the questionnaire when it
was revised were:-
15 and 14-, if couple had no children over 11
15 (because it applied to very few couples)
IS first part
17 (because it was a follow-up to question IS)
18 (because the answers were nearly all the same - uni¬
form expenses or sports equipment v/ere cited, but-
very little else)
25 (because the answers were often difficult to inter¬
pret, and ther£ was a good deal of husband/wife
disagreement which did not follow any pattern,
suggesting that people may have been saying the
first thing that come into their heads)
25c and 25c (because they applied to hardly anyone)
52 (because more specific questions about acquaintances .
were asked)
55-57 (because more specific questions about acquaintance
were asked, and because the answers to these four
questions had been very vague)
51c was deleted because there was little variation in the
answers
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51d was simplified so that the name of tho item, and the
length of the outstanding contract, were omitted -
since less than half the informants seemed to have
any IIP expenses, this seemed to be unnecessax^y de¬
tail
51e and 51f were replaced by more specific questions
about leisure activities
53; the last two columns were dropped because informants
showed little interest in answering them
52; cut out because the answers were similar to 51gj and
very few people said that saving up for something
affected the amount of overtime they did
5'!- was replaced by more specific questions about friends
55 end 55; cut out because of the same problems as
question 23
60; cut out because the replies were very rarely
different from the way in which overtime was actually
divided between days of the week
63 cut out because most people did some overtime
71 cut out because no-one found their hours too long
72 first part cut out because several men said an extra
hour in sn evening made no difference, so that the
second part of the question was more efficient with¬
out it. The question was intended to distinguish
between marginal and general leisure pursuits, but
informants obviously found this pedantic
73; the second and third parts were cut out because this
information had already been picked up in the
earlier questions about saving, with which it was
generally consistent. This consistency check
therefore seemed unnecessary
77; cut out because hardly anyone said yes
79; cut out because answers were too vague to be useful,
generally rounded to the nearest five pounds
In addition to these deletions, the section on the wife's
employment was considerably simplified, because the student
interviewers found it difficult to fellow, and the order of
the sections was shuffled. Also, some questions were re¬




Galtung's caveats about the use of significance
tests (1967, 1989 edition, pp.358-989) seen to justify
a flexible approach to the use of such tests in small
samples. He points out that whereas significance tests
consider findings independently, results us a whole con¬
stitute a pattern of findings, and the truth or untruth
of whatever conclusions one nay draw rests on the
pattern, rather than its individual components. This is
particularly important in view of the high probability
of making a Type II error (as well as the type I error
to which raethodologists have traditionally, I think,
attached more importance) where the number of cases in¬
cluded in the test is vary small (Bladock, I960, pp.188-
193). To put this in another way, the probability of a
Type II error (i.e. of accepting the null hypothesis when
it should be rejected) is greater, the smaller the sample.
The smaller is the sample, the greater the probability
that a finding will be found not statistically significant
in circumstances where is really is true of the population
as a whole. If a finding seems theoretically and
logically consistent with other findings from the same
»
sample, but is not significant, one may suspect a Type SI
error, although of course one cannot define the probability
that a finding is generalizable to the population, without
the aid of a significance test. Moreover, to pick out
those elements in the data which are statistically signi¬
ficant, and ignore the rest, may distort the conclusions
arrived at or models built from the findings, for example,
if the presence of characteristic >: is "significantly"
associated with characteristic y, and is insignificantly
associated with characteristic z, two kinds of error are
possible. One is to "find* a difference between the group
having characteristic y and the group having characteristic
2, which nay not really exist in the population from which
the sample was drawn, because of a Type SI error in the
test of the association between x and a. Another is to
under—estimate the possible frequency of in the popu¬
lation as a whole, where this may be of theoretical im¬
portance. That is, the nature of the variables may be such
that if x•were significantly associated with 2, one could
say that 2 predicted x. A situation is then possible in
which the survey method has under-estimated the frequency
of >: by literally not discovering that some cases have x,
and that this is the reason for the association between x
and 2 appearing insignificant. Without considering the
possibility of a Type II error, one would not entertain
this situation at all..
A separate, but also very important point in re¬
lation to the importance generally placed on significance
tests, is that made by Galtung when ho warns against con¬
fusing "the level of significance with the size of
association" (ibid., 1969 edition, page 373)♦ He points
out that significance tests are not designed to measure
the strenth or association between variables. Gonso-.,.
quently, a second test should be applied to find out how.
important, as opposed to how generalisable, a finding is.
It seems to go against common sense to reject associations
between variables which are very strong, but which are not
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significant, provided one's only claim for the finding
is that it may help to construct a model suitable for
further testing on larger samples. If one wer3 to claim
that such findings were universally true, that would be
another matter. I have already pointed out that the
first, rather than the second, is my objective in this
study. Galtung's advice on such, cases, which are fre¬
quent in my data, is to reject the finding only if the
probability of its being generalizable is very low, and
perhaps also if the finding ±3 not part of a general
logical pattern. This procedure I have followed in cases
where an important association has appeared in a very
small sub-group of the sample.
What other implications has the probable departure
of the scrapie from randomness? A departure from ran¬
domness becomes important if the sample represents some
sections of the population from which it is drawn but
not other sections. In this case, the nature of the
sample selection and the refusal rate enables me to say,
to some 3;:tendt what sections of the working-class popu-
lation of Edinburgh are not represented. Certain in¬
dustries (services, except transport, textiles and
chemicals) were omitted, but these employ a relatively
small proportion of the male manual labour force in the
city. The sample does not represent the occupations
predominant in the Edinburgh population in the correct ~
proportions; building and engineering workers are under-
represented, transport workers over-represented. Smaller
firms were prominent amongst those who refused to help in
the survey, and this may have some effect on the types of
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working conditions encountered by sample members. Of
the individuals approached, -older people \-/ere more
likely to refuse to be interviewed. One can suggest
various ways in which those sorts of bias may have
affected the data, and reference will be made to these
in various parts of the analysis.
Even with e random sample, which represented the
whole working-class population of Edinburgh, however,
one would have a number of difficulties in inter¬
preting the results. Galtung (1967, p.355 c.f. 1969
edition) has pointed out that where a sample is random,
and is chosen from a population defined by the sampling
frame, the problem still excises; are the results true of
that sampling frame along, or of a wider range of cases?
If so, what is that wider range? Thus, even if one had
a random sample, of the Edinburgh working-class popu¬
lation, one could only speculate, and can only speculate
with this sample, whether the results are applicable to
the whole of Scotland, the whole of the U.K., or merely
to Edinburgh; and to what extent middle-class families,
in any of these areas, would behove differently. The
problem is particularly acute in view of the possible
regional differences in ways of allocating the family's
income between husband and wife, which I refer to in
Chapter 3. « •-
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CJIAPTER 3
THE ANALYSIS OF ilGUSSKEEPIHG SYSTETJS
(This chapter jjresents the analysis of the data on
the housekeeping system, or the system of allocating
family income to different purposes. The information in
the survey was analysed with four objectives in mind:-
(1) to develop a descriptive typology of house¬
keeping systems;
(2) to examine the cultural reasons for different
allocations of family income to collective
and private expenditure;
(3) to examine the connections between the house¬
keeping system and other aspects of the
family's economic behaviour, such as the pur¬
chase of durable goods and house ownership.
Under this heading fall the connections between
the housekeeping system and the family's supply
of labour to the market, but these issues,
which require extensive analysis and cover a
great deal of data, are dealt with separately
in the next chapter. Sections 2 and 3
necessarily overlap in the subject matter they
cover: but in section 2 I am primarily con¬
cerned to find indicators ox* predictors of
particular housekeeping systems, whereas section
3 examines their implications#
(4-) to find out how the housekeeping system effects
the standard of living of different family
members; what is the relative share of the hus¬
band *s personal expenditure, and whet factors
influence this share. This set of issues is
not really important to the main theme of my
thesis, that is, to the problem of how to
construct an integrated model of the family's
economic behaviour. But it is the focus of
interest in a great deal of the sociological
literature on housekeeping systems, so that
it seems a pity to collect data on these
systems without attempting to answer the
questions which others have posed. So that it
does not interrupt the body of my argument, I
have confined discussion of this area to a
note at the end of the chapter.
In this chapter, I have included a good deal of de¬
tail on cultural variables which may not seem immediately
related to the main problem of constructing a model cf
the family's economic behaviour. I have done this for
two reasons; firstly, that in so far as the housekeeping
system is en important variable in such a model, one
needs to have cultural and demographic indicators of
housekeeping systems. Such indicators may enable one to
say what sort of housekeeping system is likely to be pre¬
dominant in such ond such a group of people, whose
economic behaviour one wonts to predict, without having
to go to the trouble of investigating their family
financial arrangements directly. The second reason why -I
have included so much cultural detail, particularly in
section 3 of this chapter, is that the housekeeping
system seems to be e question of some interest to family
sociologists, yet one which has not been systematically
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exarained with reference to Britain in recant years.
Consequently in this area too it would seen a pity to
collect so much data as I have without trying to relate
it to sociologists' analysis of working-class cultures,
Section 1;
A typology of the housekeeping systems
found in the survey
The housekeeping system, as described in Chapter 3
consists of decisions to allocate income to certain ex¬
penditures, these decisions taking place at three levels.
In Chapter 3 I have introduced certain terras to analyse
the allocation process.
At the first level of decision-making, the husband's
total net income is allocated partly to collective ex¬
penditures - purchases of things which will be consumed
or en,joyed by the whole family unit, such as,,.food, fuel
and furniture - and partly to the husband's personal
"pocket-money". The husband, as the major wage-earner in
the household, gives the wife an amount of money known as
the "housekeeping allowance", which is intended to cover
all, cr a large part of the expenditures corresponding to
the family's collective needs, and also the personal or
*
private-consumption n'eeds of the \<rife and children. Some
husbands give their wives a housekeeping allowance which
is intended to cover only part of these needs, and then
they may make additional payments for collective purposes
out of money they keep. For example, husbands may pay the
mortgage or give children pocket-money. These payments
will be referred to in what follows as "payments from
husband!s retentions", Thus:-
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and husband's retentions are then divided into his per¬
sonal pocket-money and payments which he mokes for
collective purposes or other people's personal needs.
This allocation system is illustrated in Diagram l.(Ch.3,p.65
Whether these collective expenditures from the husband's
retentions ore substantial in value, or not, is one of
the most critical issues in the analysis of housekeeping
systems. For convenience, I have included expenditures
on behalf of the wife or children as individuals, in the
terms "expenditure for collective purposes'1."1" It is,
therefore, possible to think of the family income as being
divided between "collective expenditure" and "husband's
pocket money" - the latter being that susi which the hus¬
band keeps for expenditure which is made on his own per¬
sonal behalf, for such things as fires to work, cigarettes,
his own clothes and beer. The basis of the classi¬
fication of housekeeping systems which will be used in
what follows, is that the proportion of collective ex¬
penditures made out of the husband's retentions will vary.
1
Without having asked the families to keep accounts of
most individual items of expenditure, it is not
possible to distinguish most expenditures to meet the
personal needs of wife and children, from "collective
expenditures". No families in the sample actually
separated funds for collective expenditure from funds
for the wife's personal use ox* the children's
clothing, so that there may be a relatively high
elasticity of substitution between, for example, ex¬
penditure on the wife's clothes and expenditure on
furniture.
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Where collective payments out of husband's retentions are
large, the family is defined as having an "allowance"
system; that is, the husband gives his wife a housekeeping
allowance which does not cover all the major items of
collective expenditure# These major items are defined es:
rent, rates, mortgage, coal, gas, electricity, hire pur¬
chase payments, wife's and children's clothing, and, of
course, food. In the "allowance" system, the husband will
pay at least ono, end more often several, of these major
expenses, excluding food, which the wife, in practice, al¬
ways pays for. These expenses are regarded as "major" bo-
cause they are absolutely essential to the maintenance of
the family's economic functions, or because, in the case of
a good many hire purchase commitments, although the goods
themselves are not absolutely essential payments cannot be
stopped without a considerable material loss. In the
"pocket money only" system, the husband retains, broadly
speaking, only that pert of his wage which is to be used for
his personal expenditure, lie may psy for a few minox* items
of collective expenditure, but not for any major ones. The
operational definition of the "pocket money only" system
used here is in fact that the husband should not be wholly
»
responsible for any major item of collective expenditure, nor
2
should he be responsible for more then three minor items,
(Minor items are those starred in Table 1 below, which shows .
the division of responsibility for various items over the
sample as a whole, including the seven control couples who
2
These are regarded as "minox1" either because they take up
a very small proportion of the household budget, or be¬
cause they are more discretionary in nature that the
"major" items - they represent expenditure the size of
which can be varied fairly easily.
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had no children)* If the husband were partly responsible
for only one major item the couple was classified as having
a pocket money only system; but if the husband shared with
the wife two or more major items, the couple was classified
as having an allowance system,, The pocket money only
systems include three cases where the husband shared the
payment of the rates with the wife but covered no other
household expenditure at all out of his retentions; and they
included, similarly, three who shared responsibility with
their wives for her clothing. These were the only in¬
stances of pocket money only systems in which the husband
paid for "major" items. The purchase and running costs of a
car were counted as the husband's personal expenditure.
This was because cars, particularly in working-class families,
are usually driven by men, and their primary function is
3
therefore to take the husband to work.
For brevity, I shall refer to the pocket money only
housekeeping system as the "P-type" and to the allowance
system as the "A-type". The P-type group contains A5
families in the main sample with children, and two amongst
the controls. There are 39 A-type couples in the main
sample with children, end three amongst the controls. Four
families in the main sample, and one amongst the controls,
refused to answer the questions about the housekeeping system
3 * •
The extent to which they are also used for family outings.
and so on varies from family to family; but this
variation is not associated, in this sample, with the
housekeeping system. The evidence on this point is
lengthy and tedious, and not of much interest in itself,
So I have not included it here.
13&
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11 48 1 29
Wife's clothing 10 67 12 0
Husband's
clothing 35 42 12 0
Children's
clothing 10 68 11 0
Visits to pubs * 57 1 5 20











14 37 11 * 27.
Saving, holidays 19 34 31 5
T.V. sot rental 6 50 4 29
Notes: This table excludes 5 couples who did not want to
answer the relevant questions, and three who had
a "pool" system, so that the responsibility for
individual items of expenditure is not know. The;
is, therefore, a total of 89 of whom 84 are coupl
with children, and five couples with no children.
... notes continued on next
page
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1 One couple shored a house with the wife's
parents, and so paid no housing expenses
or fuel bills but simply "board money".
One couple rented a furnished flat, so
paid no rotes,
* Six replies were unclear about this item.
Table 1 shows that some purchases for the husband's
personal use are made but of housekeeping money or out of
the wife's earnings. Wives are very commonly responsible
for buying their husband's clothest foir of them pay for the
cort two for their husband's cigarettes and one even for
visits to pubs. Consequently, the face value housekeeping
allowance is not necessarily all used for expenditure on
collective items. A complete formula for estimating the
total collective expenditures would therefore be:-
total collective expenditure » housekeeping
allowance,
+ collective payments
out of husband's re¬
tentions ,




Throughout this chapter I shall refer to total collective
expenditure, thus estimated, as the "true housekeeping
allowance" (TICCA for short).
Using the families' own statements about how much they
spend on housing expenses end hire purchase, and imputing to
them expenditure figures derived from the Family Expenditure
Survey fox- other items, I have estimated the size of the TLIXA
and husband's pocket money for each family in the sample
(excluding a few where the information v/as deficient). The
methods used in these calculations are described .in Appendix
3, An analysis of the variation in the ratio of collective
to total expenditure is given in the note at the end of this
chapter.
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There is, then, a "fund" for collective expenditures,
the size and sources of which are determined largely by what
were referred to earlier as "first level" decisions, the
remainder of the husband*s net income then becoming his
pocket money. The second level of decision-making is the
allocation of each fund to various commodities. Either the
husband or the wife may be left with nothing before all the
desired expenditures have been made# If so, the v/ffe may
appeal to the husband for extra money or vice versa. This
final allocation may be colled the third level of decision¬
making in the family budgeting pix>cess. In this sample, it-
does not take place in all families. In some, the house¬
keeping allowance does vary with the wife's needs of the week;
in others, it does not. Appeals by the husband to tho wife
for more money wore mentioned by only three sample families
(though if this is an act which saps the husband's pride,
it may occur in a greater number of cases than peojjlo admit
to; in any case, the questionnaire did not specifically ask
about this, as it was not in fact a possibility which I had
envisaged in designing the schedule).
Before analysing the two main types in more detail, I
should like to mention, two other systems besides the A-type
and p~type which were represented in the sample. Three
couples (two with children, one control) said that they
pooled all their income, and two couples (one with children,
one control) said that the husband handed over all his wages
to the wife, who then returned him pocket-money. In the
analysis which follows, I have regarded the latter system as
a variant of the P-typo 3 and I refer to it as the whole-wage
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system. The "pool" system is mere difficult to classify,
end I have therefore omitted it from the analysis of
differences between the A-type and the P-type. The
justification for this and further information about these
unusual esses is given in Appendix D.
Characteristics of the P-type system and
the A--t,ype system, compared
The P-type system is one in which the first-level
allocation of income is very simple. In the extreme cases,
the. husband makes no payments for collective expenditure out
of his retentions; he retains only his pocket money. More
commonly, thore are some collective expenditures made from
his retentions, although these are small. Third-level re¬
allocations are relatively uncommon in the P-type system, as
shown in Table 2; so that the system of allocation is alto¬
gether very simple, and at the same time fairly rigid.
In the allowance or A-type housekeeping system, not
only is the value of the husband's contribution to collective
expenditures out of his retentions considerable, but it also
happens that adjustments of the housekeeping allowance to
meet the wife's needs a.re more common amongst the A-type
couples than amongst the P-type couples. The housekeeping
i
allowance is flexible according to the needs of the wife in
20 (51$) "he A-type cases, but only in 13 (29?0 of the P-
type cases. (See table below). This difference is signifi¬
cant at the 95/* level of confidence.''
4
In giving significance tests both in this chapter and
the next, I must emphasise that they should be treated,
with caution. This is because the sample may well be
non-random in respect of some of the variables being
examined, as I pointed out in Chapter 4.




• ' A-type P-type Total
|,W dmmwXKOW —WWW ■Mum
Housekeeping ellowence
flexible 20 .1? 33
Housekeeping allowance
not flexible 19 32 51
Total 39 45 84
This table excludes the control couples, and
those with a "pool" system,
Q « 0.44 3(_2 = 4.39
The A-type system, is therefore, a fairly flexible budgeting
system. Because a fairly substantial proportion of
collective expenditures are made by the husband, he is more
involved in financial decision-making than the P-type hus¬
band. Whereas the F-type husband's pocket-money is likely
to be held quite separately from the housekeeping money, the
A~type husband spends, over the course of the week, his
pocket-money and the "collective-expenditure" part of his
retentions together. A third-level decision to re-allocate
money from the husband's pocket-money to collective ex¬
penditures, or vice ve^sa, is possible within the husband's
retentions. Each of the funds reserved for collective ex¬
penditures, that held by the wife and that held by the hus¬






made by husband ^ ^ expenditures
made by wife
In the P-type» on the other hand, the fund for collective
expenditures can only receive extra money from the husband's
pocket money, and, as stated, this type of reallocation is
less common than in the A-type 'system.
This is a suitable point at which to summarise and
comment upon the main characteristics of the two principal
housekeeping systems. The P-type is a system which seems to
give most of the responsibility of budgeting to the wife.
Secondly, it is a rigid one. The husband's pocket money is
reserved as a separate fund; there seems to be a quite
deliberate division of income into a sum for collective
expenditures, and a sura for the husband's personal ex¬
penditure* Thirdly, adjustments of" the housekeeping allowance
to xaeet the wife's needs are relatively uncommon. P-type
informants quite spontaneously referred to the division be¬
tween husband's and wife's shares when asked hov; much was
their housekeeping allowance: wives made such remarks as: "I
get £18 and he keeps £2"; or "he has his bit of pocket money".
How much the husband should get did seem to be something of an
issue, though not necessarily one which created tension. Just
before the survey began, there was en increase in family
allowances, which was couter-balanced by a reduction in the
child allowances whbh are set against income tax. Two of the
couples interviewed commented 011 this: to both of them, it
appeared as a redistribution of income from the husband to
the wife. One men ("Mr. Jamiesen" whose family is described
in more detail in Appendix 0) complained about the fact that
this had meant a cut in wages for him - "they gave her extra
family allowance and took it off me in tax". The other
couple (the "Macdonalds", also described in Appendix c) joked
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about this to the interviewer. Mrs, Hsedonald said with a
laugh: "Since they put up the family allowance he's been
paying mora in tax - so we've been wondering if he should
get a pay rise from me," Her husband laughed too.
By contrast, in the A-type housekeeping system, the
opposite charactex'istics ore found:-
(1) the husband is responsible for paying, out of
his retentions, items of considerable im¬
portance in the family budget, such as the
mortgage or rent, and hire purchase payments.
(2) since this is so, the fund which constitutes
his retentions must be split into payments
made on behalf of the whole family, end the
husband's personal expenditure. Therefore,
if the husband's pay packet falls short of
the expected amount one week, ho has to de¬
cide whether to take less pocket-money or
cut back on the payments he makes on behalf
of the family. The P-type husband on the
other hand, does not have this sort of de¬
cision to make, since nearly all of his re¬
tentions are ,for his -personal expenditure,
and he does not have to decide whether
economies should be made in this or
collective expenditure. '
(5) An A-type husband is relatively likely to
give his wife extra money if she needs it;
the housekeeping allowance is flexible to
meet the demands of irregular expenses. The
pooling system could, in thi3 respect, be re-
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gardod as an extreme sort of A-type, be¬
cause in the "pool"system, there is no
real separation of funds into housekeeping
money end husband's money - "we pool all
our money", "both pays get bunged in to¬
gether" , as two informants said. (In all
three of the couples in the sample who used
this sytera, the wife was working, so that
there were two incomes to bo pooled).'
In the A-type system, therefore, the family's budgeting
activity is shared between the husband and wife, end there
appears to be a less rigid distinction between the hus¬
band's personal pocket-money and funds to be used for
collective purposes, than there is in the P-type system.
This may possibly reflect a less individualistic attitude
towards consumption on the part of the A-type couples then
on the part of the P-type couples, a point which I shall
attempt to substantiate in section 3 of this chapters
Possibly the P-type husband sees a need for his "bit of
pocket money" as a personal reward for his role as bread-
winner, e need for pocket-money to spend on goods which
are for his individual benefit; whereas the A-type husband
is more involved in making budgeting decisions on behalf of
the family as a whole and therefore perhaps derives greater
utility from commodities which are collectively consumed-and'
enjoyed than does the P-type husband. This would explain
why mainly A-type husbands are, as I shall show later, pre¬
pared to work longer hours, since it is much easier for a
CZ





family to formulate what might be called consumer ambitions,
in terms of a houe, a cor, end various other durables, than
it is for an individual to formulate ambitions in terms of
7
better clothes or more frequent visits to the pub.
The ways in which the housekeeping system may affect
the elasticity of the individual's supply of labour are now
becoming clearer.
Section 2
The cultural correletao of house-
keeping systems
The purpose of this section is, firstly, to attempt to
identify some cultural end demographic indicators of the
ma,jor types of housekeeping system, and secondly to relate
the housekeeping types found in the Edinburgh sample to
sociological literature on family roles and typologies of
working-class culture.
In this connection, one should first consider again
some of the studies of working class cultures which refer
to budgeting habits, and which were discussed in Chapter p.
Bott's "Newbolts", the London families described by Shaw,
and the family described by Humphreys in "Hew Bublinors"
provide us with a number of instances of what can now be
identified as the F'-type housekeeping system, together with
the cultures which form its background.
Shaw (op.cit., 1954) lays emphasis on the breadwinner's
need for a personal reward for his labour; on attitude which
7 .
This xs particularly true in a social group in which the
ways in which men dress are circumscribed by social con¬
vention and by their working conditions, and their
leisure activities often squeezed between long hours of
overtime working end their home commitments as family men.
l'+7
is consistent with en age when the working class home
had few collectively enjoyed comforts above a minimum
standard of decency. 'The same could be said of the
Hewbolts; Bott's example of the extreme type of role
segregation in the marital situation. Mr. Newbolt leaves
his wife an extra pound when she needs it, but she con¬
siders this a generous act which could not be expected
by some other wives. She deals with the financial
affairs of the family entirely. This- feature of their
relationshij; is coupled with a segregation of leisure
activities and friends; the wife moves in her own
circle, and the husband in his; when they go out, they
do so more frequently as individuals than as a couple.
In Humphreys1 study, both a segregated role structure,
particularly in domestic tasks, and a low standard of
living, are found in conjunction with the
system (which I have chosen to regard as an extreme
variant of the P-type housekeeping system) - the husband
hands over his whole wage packet to his wife end receives
pocket money back. From these studies, it is possible
to speculate that the P-type system is most commonly a
feature of a highly segregated marital role-relefcion-
ship (to use Bott's term); that is, a separation of hus¬
band's end wife's leisure activities, friends, and do-
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mestic responsibilities."" One may speculate that the A-
type system, on the other hand (since it is a more
flexible system, in which the husband takes a greater
part in the budgeting process) is associated with a less
segx^egsted pattern of marital roles, and of greater con¬
tact between the husband and wife in their leisure
activities, as well as of having more friends in common.
This cultural contrast between the A-type and the P-
type systems constitutes the main hypothesis to he in¬
vestigated in this section. The analysis which follows
will be devoted to examining whether the different house¬
keeping systems can be explained in terms of the families1
standard of living and perceptions of the economic situation,
8 /
Jennifer Piatt (1970) suggests that the relation between
role-relationship (essentially a system of expectations,
as 3ott defines .it) and behaviour is not fully under¬
stood, and that different aspects of the division of
labour between the sexes are not necessarily correlated.
I think, however, that the body of literature on
"traditional" working-class cultures supports the
hypothesis that segregation of economic roles - the wife
as manager, the husband as breadwinner - is associated
with segregation of leisure activities, acquaintances,
end domestic task performance. Possibly Piatt's
finding that sharing of domestic tasks end sharing of
financial decisions are not correlated, arises because
she treats individual tasks and decisions as variables,
rather then each area as a whole as a variable. It may
be necessary to examine task performance end the bud¬
geting system as patterns rather than as sets of in¬
dividual items, since couples with a given type of
budgeting system may he more likely to vary in who does
the washing-up than in the actual number of domestic
tasks shared by the husband. Alternatively, it may be
that the traditional life style with its "segregated"
_ -
role-relationship is associated with o greater rigidity
of social norms and role-relationships that the
"affluent" life style of Piatt's sample. If so, one
might expect correlation between different aspects of
"sogregstedness" in a traditional culture, 'out not
correlation between different aspects of "jointress" in
ail effluent culture.
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in terms of the degree of segregation of husbands' and
wives' leisure activities and friends, and in terms of
9
their pattern of consumption.
The relationship of nstandard^of living and
occuparioE~to~rHi^houseIceeping""sysi;efri
A hypothesis which seems plausible in the light of the
existing literature on housekeeping systems is that the P-
type housekeeping system is the natural result of a low
standard of living, and perhaps a relic of the pre-war
period of high unemployment and more "limited national in¬
surance provision. Such economic circumstances would have
the following implications for the family's attitude to
consumptionj-
(1) that the breadwinner has a specially important
function in the family, which necessitates a
special reward; his function is elevated, be¬
cause there is felt a continual threat that it
may be impaired by illness or unemployment, or
even by the husband's desertion.
(2) "luxury goods", at a low standard of living,
will be of an individually consumed, rather
than a collectively consumed, nature. They
»
will be things -such as beer, tobacco, and
clothing, rather than domestic electrical
appliances or a house of the family's own.
Hence the breadwinner's reward for the per¬
formance of his particularly important function
9
On the other bond, Goldthorpe and Loekwool (1969, p.
12p) say that of their white collar sample have
+- .-.^5 It'SQfrreKarengtiveu.- financial arrangements. They do not,
however, define "segregated", and this may not be the
same thing as the P-type system.
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must be in terms of a fund specially reserved
for bis individual consumption. ^ The family
budget is arranged so that this fund is not
frequently at risk of being broken into by
collective expenditure. If the husband gives
his wife extra housekeeping money, he there¬
fore does it as a favour, not as a collective
obligation which is to be taken for granted.^-*
Several indicators show that the P-type couples display
greater evidence of financial pressure, and ax^e less opti¬
mistic in their perception of the economic situation. The
P-type couples do have e lower income than the A-type
couples; the average take-home pay of the husbands in the
P-type group is £19.20, and in the A-type group £21.40.
When asked: "Do you think people in Edinburgh are better
off than they were two or three years ago?" $9 members of
12
the sample said no, of whom 29 were P-type couples.
(See Table 3 below; this difference between A-type and P-
^
c«f0 also suggestions that the husband, in the 1940's
and earlier, received the lion's share of the family's
good (Young, 3.J.S., 1992).
11
Contrast, in the Edinburgh sample, the following re¬
marks, in response,to the question: "What do you do
if the housekeeping Eiorte.y runs out before the end ox
the week?" The husband of a P-type couple said "she
shouts help". The husband of a couple who had on A-
type system said: "It's very flexible - we v/oxdc it out
together".
12"
At the time of the survey, several large firms in the
city were closing down and moving to the development
area further west. These included one of the firms
whose workers were interviewed, and one firm which
did not take part in the survey for this reason.
There was a good deal of public agitation about the
moves, which posed the threat of considerable local
unemployment.
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type couples is significant at the 99.9$ level of con¬
fidence) « Also, fewer of the P-type couples expected a
pay rise in the next year.
ffable 3
Housekeeping system and opinion
of the economic situation
Thinks standard of
living has risen
Thinks it has not
risen
TOTAL:
Note: This table includes control couples
19 cases where the husband and wife dis¬
agreed are excluded. Only 3 couples said
they did not know, 0^2 = 14.4-3 : Q = 0.75
The A-type couples on the whole had better job pros-
13
pects. More of them were skilled workers, (as shown in
the table below) and the skilled workers in the sample
naturally had higher basic wage rates than the unskilled.
Basic weekly rates for the unskilled men in the sample
ranged from SIP to SI? (excluding shift-working allowances
and rates for the skilled men from £16 to £23. The eernin
capacity of the A-type wives was also higher; fourteen of
»
the A-type wives, or 36#, had at some time had a clerical
or nursing job, either before or since their marriage, but
only 9 (205) ox the P-type wives. (Q a 0.4-5: this
association is not, however, significant).
13
i.e. those who had served apprenticeships or their
equivalent. The gasfitters' training, which takes
two or three years, was counted as an apprentice¬








Housekeeping system and skill
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Occupations of informants' fathers
by housekeeping system oT informants
A-type P-type
(a) Husbands' fathers:

























(b) Wives' fathers; >


























It is possible that the occupational status of the wife's
family or origin may have h3d some influence on couples'
choice or development of a housekeeping system. A much
larger proportion of A-type wives than ox P-type wives
had fathers who were skilled workers, foremen, or ran
their own businesses (see table 5)»
It is interesting, too, that a much larger proportion
of people whose parents were in traditional, primary-
sector occupations, had a P-type system. Seven of the P-
type men in the sample had a father or father-in-law \;ho
was a miner, but only two of the A-type men had. This
finding fits in with Dennis, Henriques and Slaughter's
comments (1962) on the budgeting system amongst mining
families - a rigid system which leaves most of the
responsibility for household purchases to the wife, running
in parallel with a generally rigid division of labour be¬
tween the sexes.
That eight P-type men's fathers or fathers-in-lax-;
were farm workers, crofters or fishermen, but no A-type
men's relatives were, suggests that the P-type may in some
cases be associated with a distinctively traditional vray of
life; that it could go together with a relatively low
standard of living and a* traditional, rigid, pattern of
sex-roles.
The relationship of marital roles_end_1eisure - . v;
ac"HivIties~t6^tha"h6useSeeping"*system
The hypothesis that P-type couples have a more
differentiated marital role pattern in general, as well as
their budgeting system, is neither supported nor contra¬
dicted by the survey data. There may be sex-role differences
159r
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between A—type and F—type which are not reflected in the
answers about leisure activities; but these answers are
the only guide I have to the general role pattern. There
could be differences,' for example, in the division of
domestic tasks, which the questionnaire did not investi¬
gate.
Joint leisure activities such as husband and wife
going to the pictures or to a club or pub together, or
going out in the country, are no more common amongst the
A-type couples than amongst the P-type couples* A-type
husbands do not mention home-centred leisure activities,
such as "do-it-yourself" work, more often than do P-type
14-
husbands. Only seven of the P-type couples, and six of
the A-type couples, could be said to have a pattern of
acquaintances in which the wife's friends were a quite
different set from the husband's friends. Entertaining
friends (as distinct from relations) at home was reported •
by eight A-type couples and nine P-type couples. However,
it is probably true that a much more extensive study of
these issues would bo required, before one could say
definitely whether or not the P-type husbands and wives
have a relatively segregated marital role-x*elationship.
It has been suggested to. me that the questions I asked
about leisure were insufficiently thorough since they did
not ask about the frequency of specified activities*
14-'
For do they mention gardening mora frequently. I do
not think this should be regarded as a home-centred
activity, however, since most of the sample families




Reapxiig"'styite5 " " "*
Several indicators do suggest, however, that the P~
type housekeeping system is associated with the economic
individualism of husbands and wives which the "Ashton"
study and others implicitly attribute to traditional
working-class cultures.
For example, three P-type men, but no A-type ones,
said that if they had a pay rise of £2 per week, they
would keep it for their personal spending. In telling
the interviewer what their wages were, only two out of 59
(5p) of the A-type cases gave their basic wage, but nine
out of 4-5 (20$) of the P-type cases did. Two out of the
59 of the A-type men under-stated their pay without the
amount being exactly equal to their basic wage, but six
out of 4-5 (14$) of the P-type men did this."^ Either type
of under-statement of total pay may suggest a desire to
conceal information from the wife, although those who
gave their basic pay may alternatively have been trying
to point out to the interviewer how low it was, or may
have simply misunderstood the question. (However, the
latter is not very likely, as this question followed a set
of questions to determine how much overtime the men did).
I have already mentioned that the P-type couples
showed less flexibility in the housekeeping allowance.
P-type wives are, perhaps because of this, more likely to
15̂
The men were asked to soy, "how raubh you earn each week,
after tax and national insurance deductions". It was
possible to estimate what their wages actually were
from data about wage rates given by employers, and
compare this estimate with what they said. (The full
results of this comparison are dealt with more fully
in Appendix A).
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work than A-typo wives even if they have the came income.
Taking the income group of £17-20 (husband's take-home
\ 16
pay) so as to control for income, it turns out that
two cut of 11 wives work in the A-type families in this
income group, whereas nine out of 21 of the P-type wives
in this income group work (187 versus A37j Q=0,5'0. If
more P-type than A-type wives work, at the same level
of husband's income, it is possible that P-type wives
feel a greater need to have some money of their own, to
have financial independence.
Variations in the sample's ownership of durable goods
may also be used as an indicator of economic "individualism
It is possible to define goods which represent "collective"
consumption, i.e. those which are enjoyed by all the family
and those which represent labour-saving devices for the
benefit of the housewife. The collective consumption cate¬
gory obviously includes a hoase of the family's own; and
amongst the list of durable goods on which the quostionnain
provides information, it includes fitted carpets, a tele¬
phone, a record player, a tape recorder, and a fridge. It
also includes a television set, a three-piece suite,
electric or gas fires, and a matching bedroom suite j but
since nearly all the households in the sample had these
things, the information is not of analytical value. In
fact, the only goods in the list which are entirely for,the
benefit of the ahasowife are a washing.machine, spin drier,
vacuum cleaner and hair drier; the rest are "collectively"
16
This is the largest income range in which the A-type and
P-type groups overlap extensively, since, as I have al¬
ready pointed out, there are income differences between
the two groups.
15?
enjoyed. Even a sewing machine may perhaps "be regarded
os something for the collective benefit, in so far as it
saves the whole family money on clothing and cur-tains.
In general, therefore, the number of durable goods a
family has, compared to others with the same income, pro-*
vides us with one possible indicator of the family's
valuation of collective as distinct from private con¬
sumption (provided the goods which are merely labour-
17
saving devices ere excluded). '
Salting again the income group in which the husband's
take home pay is at least £17 but under £20 - the only
range in which the A-type and P-type groups overlap to an;
great extent (since, as I have pointed out, there are in¬
come differences between the two groups), it appears that
A-type couples within this income group own more durable
goods than do P-type couples.
The A-type couples in this income group owned an
average of 4.33 "collectively enjoyed" durables, other th
17' Of course, durables are not the only collectively con¬
sumed commodities, but I think one must consider only
those collectively consumed goods which might be
called discretionary purchases. For example, food is
a collectively consumed commodity, but the greater
part of food expenditure is common to all families,
whatever their taste; the total value of food ex¬
penditure does not vary much even with income. (In
fact, the proportion of consumers' expenditure going
on food, at constant prices, has fallen from 25»4?
in 1959 to 21.7m in 1959*. Durable goods, on the other-
hand, can be regarded as consumer ambitions on the
fringe of the budget; the demand for such commodities'
generally has a high income-elasticity, and the per¬
centage of consumers1 expenditure going on durables
excluding houses rose from 11.97' in 1959 to 14.7? in
1969, at constant prices (see National Income and
Expenditure, 1970, table 23).
houses, whilst the P-type couples own en average of only
3.42 such items. Out of the 11 A-type couples in this
group, six have cars, but only four out of the 21 P-type
couples do (Q=G.54). Also in this income group, six out
of the 11 A-type couples have their own dwellings, but
only three out of the 21 P-type couples do (Q=0*7§)«^
Moreover, three of the A-type couples own dwellings of
four rooms, or more, but the P-type owner-occupiers all
20
live in three rooms or less.
The sample ware also asked what durable goods they
would like to own. The same list was used as for the
question about what goods they did own. In the sample
as a whole, the proportion of households expressing a
desire for three or more durables of the "collectively
used" category was considerably larger amongst the A-type
group than amongst the P-type group. Sixteen out of 39
What the English call a "flat" the Scots call a "house"
and by "flat" Scots refer to what the English would call
a "floor". Hence I have used the terra "dwelling" to
avoid ambiguity.
1 Q
In the sample as a whole, 20 out of 39 of the A-type
couples are owner-occupiers, compared to only 12 out of
the A5 P-type couples (Q=0.49).
Counting the kitchen-living room of tenement flats as one
room. (The distinction between dwellings of four or five
rooms, and those ot one, two or three rooms, is an im¬
portant one, since in the Edinburgh tenements nearly all
dwellings of less than four rooms, counting the kitchen-
living room, are occupied by working-class people, whereas
larger tenement dwellings are found in districts of a .
mixed social character, and many of them are occupied, by ,
middle-class people. One one of the couples referred' to
above - en A-type couple - had a two-storey house as
opposed to a tenement dwelling). Owner-occupiers of smaller
tenement flats (2 or 3 rooms) have housing expenses barely
different from those of council tenants. If paying a
mortgage, such owners had overage expenses of 46s; if not,
16s. (All owners of large flats end houses paid mortgages).
Council tenants paid'an average rent of 46s. All the
owner-occupiers of four rooms, or more, on the other hand,
had housing expenses of over £3, ranging up to £6.
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of the A-type couples, but only 9 out of 45 of the P-type
couples in the main sample, listed three or more
"collective" durable goods on the list that they wanted
to have. This difference gives a Q-value of 0.4-7*
Since the question was not directed at thdr intention
or ability to purchase the goods mentioned, this finding
is not likely to be due to the differences of income be¬
tween the A-type and the P-type groups. In fact, on the
assumption that those with least well-equipped homes and
lowest incomes are most likely to express a desire for
things they want, one ivould hove expected the P-type
couples to have the largest lists of wants. So this
finding is the opposite of what income differences between
A-type and P-type couples would lead one to expect.
It seems to reflect a greater degree of what might be
called "consumer ambition" on the part of the A-type
couples, and/or that these couples ere more "collectively
oriented" in their economic behaviour. Could it be that
the P-type couples too have extensive consumer ambitions,
but that these are individualistic ambitions, that is,
they relate to personal rather than collective expenditure?
This seems most unlikely, for the simple reason that the
income-elasticity of demand for commodities that form the
personal expenditure of family members (clothes, elcbhol,
fares to work, lunches at work, and cigarettes) has been.'
found to be much lower, in macro-economic data, than the de¬
mand for durable goods which are generally thought to have a
relatively large income-elasticity of demand.
The association between such consumer ambitions and
collective orientation in the A-type group on the one hand,
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and individualistic orientation with relatively little con¬
sumer ambition in the P-type group on the other hand, will
be seen to have considerable importance in the next
chapter, when I deal with the cultural correlates of the
propensity to work.
The A~type couples appear, in general, to be more
interested in the home than the P-type couples, as an ob¬
ject of expenditure, and as the rationale of work effort.
This implies that the A-type pattern of expenditure is
either more wife-oriented or more oriented towards a joint
pattern of consumer interests and a joint life style based
on the home. This should be contrasted with the individual¬
istic patterns of discretionary expenditure on beer,
tobacco and clothes, which 1 have referred to earlier as
being associated with a lower standard of living and a
"traditional" working-class pattern of life.
Although it is the wife in the P-type system who appears
on the surface of things to have most control over hud-
gating and consumption, it is the A-type system which places
more emphasis on the wife's interests. As Willmott (1965)
has pointed out, a nice home well equipped and furnished,
perhaps means more to.her than to the husband, since she
spends more time at home, and her principal role of house¬
wife is centred around the home. In the Edinburgh sample,
it is noticeable that even where husbands did frequently:
engage in some leisure pursuit outside'the home, the wives"
PI
did not often share these activities.~ Twenty-nine men
pic
However, working wives were more likely to go to the
pub with their husbands: of the 15 wives who did go,
10 were working.
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went to pubs, but only 13 took their- wives. Twenty-four
men went to football matches, or played football, golf
or darts j but only four wives took pax*t in any sporting
activity. Other external activities (church work, bingo,
clubs and organisations of various kinds, and going to
the cinema) were pursued equally by men and women, though
by a very small number of either. This emphasises that
the wife's role, whether she works or not, is a home-
centred one* More emphasis is put upon "home-centred"
consumption by the A~type households, so that the wife's
apparently smaller role in budgeting conceals the true
nature of the family's consumption pattern®
Summary of daago^gghic and social determinants
o?~tHq Eousemeeping^sys^em"' "* —— — -
It is now possible to draw together a number of demo¬
graphic and social correlates or indicators of the two
housekeeping systems. For this purpose, I &ret»r up a
variable tree of the sort described in Chapter 4. This
tx-oe is shown as Fig.6 below. It shows which is the
variable most strongly associated with housekeeping system,
first within the sample as a whole, then within each sub¬
group. All of the variables have already been mentioned
except the age of children. Owing to the fact that the
interviewers objected to a question which would have
determined the date of marriage of informants (on the
grounds that this could reveal illegitimate children, be' ;
embarrassing, and damage rapport) the only available in¬
dicator of the duration of marriage (or in fact of the age
of the parents) is the age of their children. Families
whose oldest child is under 8 ore particularly likely to
1&2.
operate an A-type system. It also appears that families
whose eldest child is over 14-, unless they are ov/ners of
a large flat or a house, are highly likely to have the
P-type system. (The criterion values for ages of
children were chosen because they were the values which
produced the highest Q-values). The association is
larger once the owner-occupiers of four rooms or more
are removed, than it is in the sample as a whole*
(Q=0*75 against Q=0.48) because several of the pre¬
dominantly A-type owner-occupier3 are older couples.
There are, then a number of indicators which, on
the basis of this survey, may be useful to predict the
probable frequency of existence of the P-type syttem in
the British population at large or in particular section
PP
of it:-
(1) the P-type system is associated with tenancy
rather than owner-occupancy;
(2) the older the couple, or the longer the
duration of their marriage (on the basis of
this data I am not sure which) the more
likely they are to employ the P-type system;
22
Bearing in mind that there may be regional variations
in housekeeping systems which could entail that in a
national sample, new systems would be discovered, orN
the cultural correlates of the A-type and P-type
systems might be different from their correlates in
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Excluding control couples and those with a "pool" system
as well as those* whose housekeeping system is not known.
At the end of the branch (f), no further explanatory
variable could be found. At the ends of the branches (a),
(b) and (c), further sub-division would have been im¬
possible, whilst at (d) and (e) the number of "P" cases
remaining is so small that any further sub-division would
have been meaningless.At (g) this applies to the 4"A"'cases
This tree covers all the non-control couples whose house¬
keeping system was known, excluding the two who had a
"pool" system.
Where the Q-value is marked with an asterisk, the differenc
between the two categories is not significant. The chi-
square test was used where all four expected frequencies
wore at least five: otherwise Fisher's exact test was used.
Where there is no asterisk the variable concerned is signi¬
ficantly associated with the type of housekeeping system at
least at the 953 level of confidence.
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(3) the P-type system is associated with traditional
occupations such as mining, fishing and agri-
Ji .
culture. In this sample, taken from an urban
area with no mining industry, these are only
23
identified as occupations of informants® parents.
(4) the P-typc system is associated with low incomes
and unskilled occupations of husbands. (The
skill and income variables are closely related,
since the unskilled men in the sample had lower
basic wage rates than the skilled).
All four of these indicators, together with the phenomenon
of economic individualism within the family, seem to con¬
firm the earlier hypothesis that the P-type system is on
aspect of a traditional working-class life style, and
therefore probably as aspect of a segregated marital role
relationship.
The traditional lifo style is associated with low
standards of living; this is of course why several writers
have chosen the term "affluent worker" to refer to the
opposing ideal type of non-traditional working-class cul¬
ture. The traditional life style tends to be broken down
by removal to new housing estates (c.f. Willmott and Young;
"Family and Kinship in East London", 1957)« by high wages,
end by the consequent expansion of consumer horizons (c.f.
23 % * * •^ One must beware, however, of the possibility of a
spurious association here. Migrants to a cLy from rural
and mining communities are perhaps more likely than
established city-dwellers to take up unskilled jobs, and,
as we have seen, there is a strong association between
having an unskilled job and having a P-type house¬
keeping system. The number of such migrants in this
sample is so small that it is not possible to control
for the skill variable in examining the relationship
between housekeeping system and parents' occupation.
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Zweig; "The Worker in the Affluent Society", 1964-). By
the same token it is not surprising to find that the P-
type system - if indeed on aspect of the traditional life
style - is most common amongst the unskilled occupational
groups which, in this sample, are not particularly well
paid. All the unskilled workers in the sample had basic
wage rates of less than £18 pwr week, and if those brewery
workers who did compulsory overtime are omitted, thdr
basic wages were all less than £15 per week. Only the
rubber factory workers had an incentive scheme, which to¬
gether with shift allowances raised their average earnings
for a forty-hour week to about £19. Thus the unskilled
and semi-skilled workers in this particular sample did not
include any highly jjaid assembly line workers such as
Zweig and Goldthorpe et ol. have studied. For this reason,
it raay be that the association between skill level itself
and housekeeping system is spurious and that the real re¬
lationship is with income rather than type of occupation.
The traditional life style is associated with tenancy
rather than owner-occupancy; owner-occupancy is almost un¬
known in most of the samples associated with studies of
traditional cultures (except the "respectables" of Banbury
%
described by Margaret Stecey (I960), whereas in Goldthorpe
and Lockwood's, and in Zweig's samples it is common. The
"affluent" life style has been identified in these two •
studies in relatively modern industries, using assembly line
techniques, whereas the traditional life style has been
identified mainly amongst workers in long-established in¬
dustries, fox* example dock-work (c.f. Keer, 1950, Willmott
and Young, 1957), the traditional craft industries of the
16:6
East Slid of London (iv'illmott and Young, 1957) and mining
(Dennis et al, 1962). This suggests that the
"traditional" culture is passing as working conditions
change, as well as because of rising living standards so
that it is not surprising to find that the P~type system,
which may be a part of this life style, should be more
common amongst older workers.
The A-type system is associated with. the opposites
of these four characteristics: it goes together with owner-
occupancy, skilled occupations of husbands, younger couples,
and hardly any of the A-type informants1 parents worked in
primary-sector industries. The specific characteristics of
the economic behaviour associated with the A-type system,
what might be called "collectivism" as opposed to "indi¬
vidualism", are defined and examined more thoroughly in the
next section.
The greater frequency of the P-type system amongst
older couples deserves further consideration. It can bo
explained by reference to the fact that the traditional
life style may be a passing phenomenon, which is therefore
less common amongst younger couples. But this explanation
needs to assume that people develop a housekeeping system
early in their marriage and stick to it, so that the date
at which they marry influences the sort of system they
adopt. If this is so, one would expect that the A-type
system may become more common, and the•P-type system less
common, as the traditional life style becomes less common.
On the other hand, there is no evidence from the survey
data for or against the assumption that the housekeeping
system remains broadly the same throughout married life.
16-?
Another possibility is that couples change from one
housekeeping system to another in the coarse of their
marriage. On the basis of a cross-section study one can
only speculate about this. It could be that the A-type
system is a feature of the period early in marriage when
people are accumulating possessions, such as furniture,
and sometimes a house or a car. Such purchases require
joint decisions and joint saving, or at least jointly
planned saving. At this period, husband and wife may feel
that joint consultation is necessary, and their economic
roles may be unstable and relatively undifferentiated.
They may still be at the stage of working out their
budgeting arrangements and a relatively flexible house¬
keeping system may arise. Later, their roles may become
stabilised and more highly differentiated and less con¬
sultation will be required as major purchases or durable
goods become less frequent. The wife may also become
more experienced in dealing with irregular payments, so
that the husband will less frequently be called upon to
"give extra". Moreover, as the children get older, the
wife is very likely to take a job, and then she may have
enough from her own earnings to pay for her clothes, new
household equipment and furnishings, and to keep money in
reserve. Where the wife works, it may be less likely that
the husband will take responsibility for items of ~ \;'
collective expenditure. Thus, it is possible that the P- -
type system could be a feature of later stages of the life
cycle, and that some of the A-type couples in the sample
may change to that system sooner or later. (However, one
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point against this hypothesis is that there is no
association between the wile's employment and the P-type
in the sample as a whole, although there is in the middle
income group where the husband's take-home pay is £17-20
per week, as already stated).
To sum up, I have not been able to establish or dis¬
prove any connection between the housekeeping system and
the marital role relationship, but the hypothesis that
the P-type system is associated with a low standard of
living, and with a way of working-class life which is be¬
coming less common as living standards rise, does seem to
be supported by the survey data. The P-type system, more¬
over, may be associated with a mox^e individualists pattern
of consumption than the A-type system. This particular
contrast between the two systems will now be examined in
greater detail.
Section 3
The""Housekeeping system and other aspects
of the family's economic behaviour
The main hypothesis to be examined in this section is
that the A-type couples have a more "collectivist"
orientation as consumers than the P-type couples, by con¬
trast with the latter's "individualism" about which I
have already presented some evidence in Section 2. I shall
now amplify the evidence that the A-type couples formulate.
ambitions in terms of collective consumption, and show that
they fulfil these ambitions by means of joint saving. To
this end, the A-type husbands work harder, at least amongst
the skilled workers in the sample. They also are more
likely to use their overtime earnings for collective pur¬
poses.
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The use of overtime^earnings
In Chapter 3, I made the point that according to pre¬
vious studies, overtime earnings are treated differently
in the household budgeting system froia basic earnings.
Overtime earnings may be distinguished from the basic
v/age, and all or most of the former kept by the husband
for personal expenditure. Table 7 shows that P-type hus¬
bands are less likely than A-type husbands to put any of
their overtime money to household purposes, that is, to
include anything over their basic wage in the THKA.
(Q=0.53 s 0^ = 4.84, so that this relationship is signi¬




THKA exceeds TIIKA the same
basic wage or smaller than Total
basic wage
A-type 15 10 25
P-type 11 24 55
Total 26 34 60
This table includes all of those men with
children fox1 whom THKA, housekeeping
system, and basic wage are known.
Nearly two-thirds of the P-type husbands do not in-
»
elude any"of their overtime money in their THKA, whilst
over half the A-type husbands do include some of their
overtime money in their contribution to collective expenses.
Does this greater personal reward for overtime work act as
an incentive to the P-type husbands to do more overtime than
the A-type husbands?
24
For a definition of THKA see page 136 of this Chapter.
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Table 8 shows that 5S.5# of the P-type men do at
least as much overtime as the median for the sample, but
62.5%' of the A-type men do so. In fact, when one controls
25
for skill which is the largest single influence on over¬
time, it is found that amongst tho skilled workers, A-




Overtime hours A-type P-type Total
Less than 10 12 17 29
10 or more 20 22 42
Total 32 39 71
Hote: This table excludes control couples
and those men with children who
cannot choose how much overtime they
do. 10.50 hours is the median
amount of overtime for all those men
in the sample who can choose how
much overtime they do.
The P-type husbands, then, do not apparently derive
any personal incentive from the fact that their house¬
keeping system allows them to keep more of their marginal
(i.e. overtime) earnings for themselves. If anything,
they work less overtime than the A-type husbands. There
ore two possible explanations of this; one is that the
concept of personal incentives arising from potential
gains to the fund for purely personal spending, is hot
relevant here; that is, that the breadwinner does not con¬
sider the purely individual benefits which will be his re-
25x The difference is much larger when one controls for
skill; the A-type husbands appear in general tot to
work much more overtime than the P-type husbands
because more of them are skilled and skilled workers
do less overtime than unskilled workers (see next
chapter).
191
ward, when determining his work effort. The other is
that such individual benefits are subject to a strong
negative income effect - that there is an early
satiation point for the commodities and services the
husband buys with his pocket money, like fores to work,
lunches, cigarettes, and even beer, since this last
item is likely to be collectively consumed with his
friends, and the amount consumed may be largely
26
determined by social conventions of the group.
We have seen that P-type men are more likely than
A-type men to keep overtime earnings as personal pocket-
money. Should this retention of overtime earnings be
interpreted as the reservation of a special personal re¬
ward for the breadwinner, as Shaw suggests to be a
feature of the budgeting system in some families? (See
passage quoted from Shaw in Chapter 5)» This is possible
but in view of the data presented earlier about the P-
type couples1 feeling of pessimism about their economic
prospects, it nay well be that the retention of overtime
earnings is simply a way of ensuring that the wife does
not count on overtime money in establishing the level of
her weekly expenditure. This may be necessary if, as I
have suggested, the P-type system emerges from a re¬
latively low standard of living and the relative3.y high
degree of economic insecurity which the older and un¬
skilled members of the sample may have experienced in the
past.
26
One man's remark is particularly interesting in this
context; though it may not illustrate a general




I have already' shov;n that A-type couples own more
durable goods of a "collectively enjoyed" type, and are
also more frequently owner-occupiers than P-type couples
at the same income level. I also stated that, despite
the fact that the A-type couples have more durable
goods already, they ore more likely to express a desire
to possess further durable goods.
These differences in the extent of collectively
oriented consumer ambitions, and, if one can use such a
crude phrase, for want of a better one, consumer
achievement, are reflected in the savings practices of
A-type and P-type couples. Just as the A-type husband
is more likely than the P-type husband to be involved in
major second level budgeting decisions, he is also more







saving 9 2 11
#
Husband has respon¬
sibility for saving 7 7 14
Wife has respon¬
sibility for saving 8 25 33
Couple do not save 7 7 14
Total 51 41 72
Notes:
The Q-value for "joint" saving versus all other cate¬
gories except "no saving" is 0.81 : X2'= 9.15, so
that the association is significant at the 99 • 5# level
of confidence.
This table includes controls
notes continue on next
sheet
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Unfortunately, at the time of revising the
questionnaire, very few of the couples al¬
ready interviewed had bank accounts so the
relevant question was dropped from the re¬
vised schedule. This is why the infor¬
mation is only available for 72 people.
Out of 24- A-type couples who manage to save, 16 (S7/») give
the |iob of saving at least partly to the husband, whereas
out of 34- P-type couples who manage to save, only 9 (26/0
give the husband some part of the task. (Q=*0„70) The
same table shows that joint saving by both husband and
wife together is much more common amongst the A-type
couples (Q=0.81). Moreover, although it is not more
common for A-type couples to have bank accounts, joint
accounts are slightly more frequent amongst A-type
couples, as shown in Table 10. (Q=G.58, but this
n
difference is not significant : 3^ = 3-32).
Table 10
Bonk accounts and the
housekee oing system
A-type P-type Total
Husband and wife have
separate accounts 2 1 3
Joint account 18 7 25
Husband has account 6 9 15
No account 11 18 29
Total ' .' 37 35 72
Mote:
This table includes controls.
See also note to Table 9. - ...
Unfortunately it has not been possible to analyse the
amounts couples saved with reference to possible difference
between housekeeping systems, owing to the fact that many
couples in the sample made no clear distinction between
gross and net saving. (The data on savings behaviour ore
l'Tar
dealt with at greater length in Chapter 7). I aia not,
therefore, able to say whether A-type couples actually
save more than P-typs couples- However, the fact that
more A-type couples were owner-occupiers than P-type
couples at the same income level, suggests that the A-
type couples did save more. Trmement flats in
Edinburgh are sufficiently cheap that most couples in
the sample, even the unskilled, could have raised an
adequate mortgage to buy a four-apartment flat at the
time of the survey (assuming that their building society
had no doubts about the security of their employment).
The problem for working class house-purchasers is rather
the difficulty of saving sufficient money for the de¬
posit - several hundred pounds in the case of tenement
flats, which can generally be mortgaged only for 75# of
their value, owing to their age. To save several
hundred pounds represents a considerable effort for
working-class couples* That so many of the A-type
couples managed to do this, seems tc be evidence of the
strong motivation which they had towards saving for major
collective purchases.
Thus the structure of the A-type budget appears to
favour large purchases involving joint decisions by hus¬
band end wife, for three reasons
(1) allocation of funds to the housekeeping money
and the husband's pocket money is fairly
flexible.
(2) the larger amount retained by the husband,
and his responsibility for collective pur¬
chases, funds for which are not rigidly
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separated from his personal pocket money*
facilitates his saving for, and purchase
of, large items for the family's benefit.
(3) saving by both husband and wife, as a
collective effort, is more common amongst
the A-type than the P-type group, (c.f.
A-type couples• statements such as "we
save together", "we put what's left over
into the bank". Corresponding statements
by P-type wives were: "I keep a bit aside
for bills, each week", or "I like to have
something in hand for emergencies", or "I
save for things in jars". ( 'The sample were
asked: "Who has the job of saving?" and
"What do you do with the money you save up?")
Home ownership and^its relation,to
~rainlly~ll?e~s^yle " "
The implications of the more frequent owner-occupancy
amongst the A-type couples are worth discussing.
The choice of buying their own dwellings was rot
necessarily an obvious thing for the sample couples to do
if they had enough money. Only one couple had, and few
could have afforded, a two-storey house of the English
type. Small two-storey houses and bungalows are rare in
. Edinburgh; the typical form of working class housing is a
nineteenth-century tenement flat or a newer council flat.
The typical council flat has a kitchen sitting room, two
bedrooms and bathroom; so has the four-apartment tenement
flat (the best type of dwelling which the owner-occupiers
on
in the sample generally had). But the tenement flat is
' Borne owned two or three-apartment flats.
17$
older, its rooir.s ere high and draughty, the plumbing often
inefficient and old-fashioned; and, unlike some council
flats, it has no central heating. Thus, in terms of
physical facilities, there is little to choose between the
council flat and the tenement flat; if anything, the
practical advantages are in favour of the former. Yet the
tenement flat is more expensive. The average of weekly
housing expenses paid by owner-occupiers of four rooms or
more was £3.60, and by council tenants £2.15. What, then,
was the attraction of owner-occupjancy to these families?
Partly, perhaps, that they couldcfecide to buy a flat as
soon as they had the money; but the waiting pei*iod to ob¬
tain a council flat was not within a family's control.
But also, surely, it was a matter of taste. • Moreover,
investment in a house as a form of saving should be seen,
perhaps, as an additional aspiect of the emphasis which the
A-type couples place on joint saving.
Tile tenement districts offered a city-centre life
style, with shops, pubs, work and entertainment close at
hand. In occupational composition, the better tenement
districts, where the four-apartment flats are mainly to be
found, are very heterogeneous. The architecture of the
tenement building, end the life that goes on within it, has
a very distinct character. Perhaps, too, people choose
owner-occupancy because it offers greater opportunity for
control- over one's living conditions; there is more freedom
to alter one's dwelling to suit one's needs, and one can
sell one's house and move houses when one pleases, whereas
to change council houses.is more difficult to arrange and
only possible by the grace of the local authority.
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I do not think, therefore, that the greater fre¬
quency of owner-occupancy amongst A-type couples is purely
due to the fact that they have higher incomes than P-type
couples; rather, it is a direct correlate of the house¬
keeping system, or of the life-style which underlies the
housekeeping system. This point \vill be further con¬
sidered in section 4 of this chapter.
Is the A-type system a natural consequence of owner-
occupancy? According to my method of classifying house¬
keeping systems, a couple of v/hom the husband paid the
mortgage would automatically be classified as A-type, since
this is a major expense. Thus, if husbands usually paid
mortgages, most owner-occupiers would be A-type by definition.
However (referring to Table 1 again), 18 wives and only 12
husbands paid the mortgage in this sample, and in six house¬
holds it was a shared responsibility. Thus, although there
is much greater participation by husbands in the payment of
mortgages than in the payment of rent, there is not a
priori reason to expect owncr-occupiers to have an A-type
system.
Rather, the A-type housekeeping system and owner-
occupancy both seem to be features of a particular life
style which places emphasis on a high standard of "home-
centred" or "collective" consumption. Although it appears
that there are no non-economic cultural differences -between
the A-type and the P-type which can be.detected from the
23
survey data,there ere important differences between the
28"
If differences in the allocation of domestic tasks do
exist, they cannot be detected here because the
questionnaire did not ask about this.
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owner-occupiers of four or more rooms end the others, in
the occupations of the couples1 friends and in the
eucation of their children. Owner-occupancy is thus not
a purely economic aspect of behaviour; it involves more
than simply consumer choice. (These differences appear to
be independent of housekeeping type, but since owner-
occupancy of large flats seems in general to be so
strongly associated with the A-type system, this inde¬
pendence may appear by chance, particularly given the
small number of cases involved. (Sixteen couples in the
main sample, and one in the control group, owned four-
apartment or larger dwellings).
There were nine families in the sample in which a
child attended or had attended one of the fee-paying high
schools which represent the equivalent of the grammar
school in Edinburgh. (Nearly all of the state secondary
schools are non-selective, but only a few, the senior
secondary schools, provide a sixth form course). The fees
at these schools are modest - in several cases charged in
relation to the parents' income. Nonetheless, to pay £5
or so per term, as well as buying uniform, it' a small
though significant sacrifice on the part of parents in the
income range to be found in the sample. The parents who
paid these fees were not apparently better off than the
rest of the sample - in .fact, one of the fee-paying ^fathers
only earned £15 per week. That children should attend such
schools, therefore, is an indication not only of their
ability to pass the entrance exam, but of their parents'
willingness to foot the bill. In addition to these nine
families who were paying school fees or had paid them in the
i
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past, there were two families with a child who had stayed
at a state school to take Higher School Certificate, and
intended to apply for university. There are, therefore,
altogether 11 families in the sample to whoa the
children's education seen3 unusually important. Of these,
five ere owner-occupiers of four rooms or more, and one
had a smaller flat.. The table below shovrs that this
does represent a substantial association between owner-
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r-lote: Those who have no children of secondary
school age are excluded; but those
whose children have left school (in¬
cluding control couples) are included.
The next table shows the relationship between owner-
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Some friends have 1n PP 7P
mentioned have 7 58 65
white-collar jobs
Total 17 80 97
Note: Controls ore included
*WM>W»KMB
A somewhat higher proportion of the large-
scale owner—occupiers hove white-collar
friends* (->0.53, A.41
significance is obtained at the 97*5# level
of confidence)*
These two things, having white-collar friends, and
taking a special interest in the children's education,
could be related to each other and to the owner-occupancy
phenomenon in various 'ways. Through living in the bettor
tenement districts, the class composition of which is vary
mixed and contains a substantial middle-class element,
people may come into contact with professional and clerical
workers end rseko friends with them, ouch friends could be
»
parents of children's school friends, or neighbours, or met
through local pubs or churches. Meeting ouch people could
mean that the working class couples adopt certain features
of their friends' life stylo, which may include sending
their children to high schools. On the other hand, some of .
the children oi* the large-scale owner-occupiers who went to
high school, reached the ago of twelve while living in some
other sort of accommodation, kith such a small number of
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cases, it is not possible to assess how important was tho
effect of the district of residence on the choice of
school. Another possibility is that children who went to
high school may have introduced ther parents to the middle-
class parents of their school-friends.
In most cases it is not possible to tell from the
questionnaire data how long the large-scale owner-
occupiers had known their raiddle-class friends, or where
they hod met them. One couple had made such friends
thoough their church, and two others through the wife's
work. As for the others, it is not known how their
acquaintance with while-collar friends originated. People
may meet them through living in a partly middle-class dis¬
trict, or they may go to live in such a district because
they have already taken on, or wish to take on, some as¬
pects of a middle-class life style.
There are, then, certain distinctive cultural
characteristics of tho larpje-scale owner-occupiers, which
however do not seem to be associated with the A-type house¬
keeping system itself. But, owing to the fact that there
are so few large-scale owner-occupiers in the sample, there
is a danger of committing a Type II error here if one denies
»
tho possibility of a connection between the A-type system
and the life-style associated with large-scale owner-
occupancy, which embodies certain features of a middle-class
culture.
Summary of the connections between housekeeping
system and otner aspects of economic behaviour
The conclusions of this section may be summarised as
follows:—
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(1) the A-type husbands are mors likely than the
p-type husbands to put some of their overtime
earnings towards collective purchases. But
this does not seem to act as a disincentive
to the A-type husbands to do overtime.
(2) A greater proportion of A-type than of P-type
husbands take some responsibility for saving.
Joint saving is also more common amongst the
A-type couples.
(3) Durable goods ownership, including home
ownership, is more extensive amongst the A-
type couples; so, too, are ambitions to ac¬
quire more durable goods.
(4) A-type couples are much mora likely than F~
type couples to buy the larger tenement
fists in districts of mixed occupational con-
position - a decision v/hich may be made not so
much because of the intrinsic quality of such
housing but because of the particular life
style with v/hich living in such districts is
associated in the minds of the sample.
f
Section 4-
Gumraary and conclusions of the
previous three sections
Vfnat are the implications of the foregoing findings
for the questions about housekeeping systems posed in
Chapter 3? Ihe reader will recall that these questions
were of two kinds, one relating to the commodity set issue,
and the other to the effects of the housekeeping system
upon the propensity to work.
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The typology of housekeeping systems developed in
this chapter shows that commodities in the household budget
ore of three kinds:-
(1) a "core" of husband's personal expenditure,
commodities which ere very rarely paid for
by the wife: this group includes tohocco, in so
for as it is purchased for end by the husband, and
alcohol.
(2) one which may be paid for by either spouse, but
which ore more frequently paid for by the hus¬
band than the wife; namely, husband's clothes,
(3) s group of items which form the "core" of the
wife's commodity set: food and cleaning
materials. Po instance was found in the sample
where the wife did not pay for these items.
(4-) a group of items which are more frequently paid
for by the wife than the husband; rent, medi¬
cines, other chemists' goods, children's
clothing, women's clothing, mortgage, rates,
fuel, furniture and hire purchase, insurance,
T.V. rental.
(5) a few items which ore almost equally likely to
>
be paid for by either party: children's pocket-
money, husband's clothing, the running of the
cor, household repairs.
In the A-type system, owing to its greater flexibility,
and to the fact that the husband's pocket-money fund is held
.jointly with money to be used for some major collective pay¬
ments, the boundaries of the commodity sets are more fluid
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end one would expect there to be greater cross-elasticity
of cubetitution between sets*
Since less F-type husbands devote any of their over¬
time earnings to collective expenditures, it seems
reasonable to assume that any increment in their income
is more likely to be allocated to the husband's Tcocket
money, than is the case with A-type couples. Yet there
does not seem to be any evidence that this provides P-type
husbands with an incentive to work harder. This finding
is examined at greater length in the next chapter.
A number of findings in this chapter identify the P-
type housekeeping system as a set of budgeting practices
pq
associated with economic individualism within the family."
That is, these practices ere associated with a way of life
in which the individual has a considerance degree of inde¬
pendence in both spending and labour supply decisions.
^ One should perhaps stress "within the family". If
the F-type system is associated with a "traditional"
life-style, and possibly with a segregated marital
role-relationship, one would expect this type of
economic individualism within the family to be
associated with a relatively strong degree of attach¬
ment to workmates, high conformity to work-group norms
including those relating to trade unionism. The A-
type system, on the other hand, nay represent what I
have roughly termed "collectivism" within the family,
but in so far as it.is associated with en "affluent"
or "homo-centred" life style, it may go. together with
a low degree of involvement with the work-group and a
relative lack of interest in trade union affairs.
(See Goldthorpe, Lockwood et al:"The Affluent Worker:
Industrial Attitudes and Behaviour, 1938;''the same
authors "Affluent Worker: Political Attitudes and
Behaviour", 1988, pp. 29, 7'f et seq., and their
"Affluent 'Worker in the Class Structure", 1969, pp.
65, 156-70). The relationship between "traditionalism"
and class-consciousness is, however, more complex than
these simple generalisations suggest (see Lockwood,
1956).
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The area of decision-making in which the individual may
be said to maximise his individual utility subject to
normative constraints, may be much larger for P-type
than for A-type couples. Conversely, people with an A-
type system may make a larger proportion of their
decisions with regard to a notion of joint utility of
the kind pointed by Fleischer and Kahoney (c.f. Chapter
2) than do P-type couples.
Couples having the A-type housekeeping system tend
to be younger than those with the P-type system; the
former are more likely to be owner-occupiers and to have
a large number of durable goods, as well as being more
likely to want more such goods, A-type couples also
have higher incomes. Bearing in mind these economic
differences and the greater division of labour between
the sexes in the family's economic functions which is to
be found amongst the P-type couples, it may be possible
to identify the P-type housekeeping system with a
traditional working-class life style, and the A-type
system with a so-called "affluent" life style. If this
is valid, it nay well imply that the P-type system will
become less common a? time goes on.
The findings about housekeeping systems in this
chapter must, however, be qualified by the recognition
that there may be substantial regional difference ih the
nature and relative frequency of budgeting practices. A
preliminary analysis of the "Life Styles" study of
Edinburgh and Reading carried out by Edinburgh University
in 1959, showed that the A-type system was much more
18 6
common amongst manual workers in Heading than manual
workers in Edinburgh. This could be because the
"traditional" life style is more common in Edinburgh, but
possibly the cultural correlates of budgeting practices
70
differ from one region to another. Data covering
several regions may be necessary to determine whether
this is the case.
Section 5
Note on the housekeeping system and the
distribution of income between Imsband^s
pocket money and collective exp-anoTtures
In this note, I shall attempt to answei* the
questions posed by Young (1952) and others as to what
proportion of the husband's income is retained by him as
pocket money, and what factors lead to variations in this
proportion. As I pointed out in Chapter 3, this issue
has been seen, in the past, as one of great social im¬
portance. It has been argued that variations in the
amount kept by husbands for personal expenditure on beer,
tobacco and so on, may entail that the family's total in¬
come is a poor indicator of the resources available to
the wife for collective expenditures.
I agrued in Chapter 3 that there is considerable
evidence that the face value of the "housekeeping
allowance", is not a complete guide to the amount husbands
contribute to collective expenditure, The survey data con¬
firms this, and shows that it is not true even in the P-type
xn
At the tine of writing, Professor Burns' data has not
been completely analysed. Unfortunately, since 1 left
Edinburgh some time before completing this thesis, I
did not have access to his material for long enough to
investigate this point.
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cases. Host of the P-type husbands paid for one or two
small collective items out of their retentions. In the
A-type families, the size of collective payments out of
husband's retentions is large, and it is important to
have some way of estimating their value.
The THKA was therefore estimated according to the
formula given in section 1 of this chapter; THKA = face
value housekeeping allowance + contributions made by the
husband to collective expenditure, out of his retentions -
payments made by the wife on behalf of the husband. There
are 7^ couples with children for whom such an estimate can
be made and for whom husband's take-home pay is also known.
In the questionnaire, questions were asked about rent,
31
rates, mortgage and feu-duty payments; and about amounts
spent on hire purchase, including clothing clubs. These
items are therefore known for individual families. Other
items paid for by husbands, both in the A-type and P-type
systems, were estimated from the Family Expenditure Survey.
(The exact methods of the calculations are given in Appendix
3 to this chapter). Having classified a family according to
its gross family income and the number of children, it was
possible to find out what was the family's likely expenditure
on a particular commodity group, from the appropriate part
of table 5-7 of the 1987 Family Expenditure Survey. Since
expenditure patterns in Scotland are rather different from
that of the U.K. as a whole, I adjusted the figures by the
ratio of'Scottish expenditure to U.K. expenditure over the
period 1965-7» for the commodity in question. For this,
^ A form of ground-rent virtually universal for owner-
occupiers in Scotland.
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J:
Table 5/+ of the 1987 Family Expenditure Survey was used.
This produced an estimate of the amount families in
Scotland, of a particular income group and family size,
would, on overage, have spent at the time of the survey.
It was then possible to add up the value of all the items
the husband paid for on behalf of the family, out of the
money he kept, end add this to the face-value housekeeping
allowance (the money actually given to the wife) to obtain
an estimate of expenditure for collective purposes, or the
"true" housekeeping allowance. In the few cases v/here the
wife bought the husband's cigarettes or paid for the car
expenses, the value of these things had to be subtracted
before the "true" housekeeping allowance could be obtained.
In the rest of this section, the term "true housekeeping
allowance" or THKA for short, will be used to refer to the
estimate of collective expenditure just described.
There are, of course, several flaws in the method of
calculation which I have used. The Family Expenditure
Survey uses rather broad income groups, so that, for
example, a family in this sample whose total income is £18
per week is assumed, in my calculations, to have the same
expenditure as the average for the Family Expenditure
Survey income, group £15-£20. The distribution of income
within the groups used in the reports is not published, and
without any knowledge on this point, it did not seem
appropriate to try to make any adjustment for a family's
position within an income group. Although one would not
expect there to be much variation in expenditure at a given
income level on some items, such as fuel, one would expect
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there to be considerable variation even at a given income
level on other items, such as furniture and household
repairs and decorating. The estimate for children's
pocket money may be a bit unreliable (see Appendix B) be¬
cause one would expect pocket money per child to vary, to
some extent, with the size of the family. Land (1969)
says that in large families, with five or more children,
pocket money is small, and in some cases rarely given.
There are only six families in the sample with five or
more children under working age; but there are another
twelve with four children. Presumably it is very likely
that families with four children are less generous with
children's pocket money than families with only one child -
they have to be. A few children may receive some pocket-
money from their grandparents or other relations; if so,
they would receive correspondingly less from their parents.
Hilde Behrend's statements (1966), which have been used as
a basis for the pocket money estimates, refer to the amount
children receive as spending money from all sources, and
therefore presumably include money given by grandparents,
etc. But this is only likely to occur where a family says
that they have close contact with the grandparents, and
this will show up in what the couple say about their
leisure activities.
Another reason why the estimate of THKA may be regarded
as crude is that it is not possible to take into account
differences in expenditure patterns arising from differences
in size of dwelling and type of tenure. Expenditure on
repairs, decorating and furniture is likely to be related to
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the size of dwelling; and owner-occupiers are likely to
spend more on repairs and decorating than tenants. The
FES reports prior to 1968 did not separate owner-occupiers
from tenants, and still do not do so for each region. One
would expect that the much smaller scale of housing expenses
in Scotland, and the much smaller differentials in housing
expenses between council tenants and owner-occupiers than
exist elsewhere in Great Britain, would make the FES tables
by type of tensure a poor guide to the expenditure
differences which are caused by this factor in Scotland.
All of these potential inaccuracies in the estimate of the
THKA have to be taken into account when assessing the value
of the data presented here.
Gar ownership is a source of variation in expenditure
patterns which is particularly important when measuring the
relative size of collective expenditure and the husband's
pocket money. One would expect car-owning husbands to keep
a much larger amount of pocket money than non-car-owners at
the same income level, in order to pay for their cars. I
have therefore treated car-owners and non-car-owners as two
separate sub-samples in analysing variations in the size of
THKA relative to the husband's take-home pay.
Graph 1 shows two regressions of THKA on TUP, one for
car-owners and the other for non-car-owners, together with
a scattergram of individual cases. Most surprisingly, these
two regression lines appear to show that at any given income
level, car owners keep less, not more, pocket money than the
others. In fact, the levels of pocket money which,
according to the regression line, are kept by the car
owners, are much smaller than, according to the FES data, men
1
191
do spend on car expenses, tobacco, drink, and other
personal purchases. The sum of estimated pocket money
plus THKA exceeds TUP by an average of £3-1, in the sub-
samples of car-owners. A plausible explanation of this
seems to be that several items in the estimates of
collective expenditure (TIIKA) were taken from FES data
which do not distinguish between car owners and others,
so that at. least some such items have been over-estimated
in my initial estimates of THKA for car owners. Car
owners, in order to pay for their cars, must- spend less on
other things than non-car-owners having the same income.
Corrections to the estimates* of THKA for car owners there¬
fore seemed to be required.
It is necessary at this point to consider more
generally how sources of variation in household expenditure
may affect the validity of the original estimates of the
THKA. For any household it must be true that:-
THP = THKA' + P + e^ +
where:
THKA' is the original estimate of THKA,
*
P is the expected value of the husband's personal
32
expenditure, as estimated from FES data,
32
P was estimated by exactly the same method as was used for
the original estimates of THKA items from FES data. A
separate figure was calculated for each family size/income
bond combination, and each such figure modified by a
regional adjustment factor as described on page of
Appendix B. According to the FES report for 1967» 56/<j of
households recorded expenditure on car maintenance and
running costs. The actual figures in the tables were
therefore multiplied by 100/56 to give what car owners
actually spent. Twenty-one per cent of households in the
FES recorded expenditure on the purchase of a car, so that
the actual figures for this item were multiplied by 100/
(21 x 56/21) to give the average expenditure by car owners
themselves.
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is an error term arising from the fact that
the FES data which enter into the estimate of
THKA do not distinguish between car-owners and
others,
e^ and are error terms arising from those
individual variations in collective expenditure
and husband's personal expenditure respectively,
which will be found after car ownership ha3 been
'
controlled for.
As stated, car owners must spend less on most other
items, than the average amounts given in the FES, and
similarly, non-car-owners must on the whole spend more than
these average amounts. Thus, e^ will be negative .for car-
owners and positive for non-car-owners. The original estimate
of THKA should therefore be adjusted downwards for car-owners
and upwards for non-car-owners, by an amount equal to the
term e-^ as.defined above.
For car-owners, I took as a measure of e^ the amounts
which a household would, according to the FES figures, be
expected to spend on car purchase, running and maintenance.
Each car-owning household was assumed to spend on'its car
the average amount obtained from the FES for its income
band and family size. Having thus estimated e^, I dis¬
tributed it between THKA and husband's personal expenditure
in the same proportion as total expenditure. (Thus, if the
original figure for THKA constitutes 80# of the husband's
net income, 80£,: of the error term was allocated to, and sub¬
tracted from, THKA to make a revised estimatecC THKA).
To adjust the THKA estimates upwards for non-car-
owners by the same method would be much more complicated.
)'
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It would involve estimating by how much the expenditure of
non-car-owners on household items exceeds the average
amounts given in the FES by virtue of the fact that they
do not spend money on cars. To avoid extensive com¬
putations I used a more crude measure of e^ for non-car-
owners. The basis of this was a measure of the sum of all
three error terms, S, obtained by the formula:-
3 = THP - (THKA' +P)
The average value of E (the amount by which estimated total
expenditure falls short of income) is only El for non-car-
owners, so that the amount of adjustment required for the
THKA estimate is fairly small, and errors arising from the
crudity of the method are probably insubstantial.
Where total expenditure exceeds income, as it did for
4"*'
21 non-car-omers, S is negative. The average value of E
was calculated for each income band, and this average value
v/as used as a correction factor for all cases where some
shortfall was present. (I distributed the correction
factor betv/een THKA and husband's personal expenditure in
the same way as for car-owners). Where the sum of THKA'
and P exceeded THP anyway, I made no correction to the
original estimate of THKA, so that 21 cases remained un¬
altered.
The corrections for non-car-owners are, then, in¬
accurate to the extent that the correction factor used was
a measure of the mean value of all three error terms, not
of e-^ alone. In a large sample, the mean values of on<3-
e^ v/ould each be zero, so this would not matter; but in
a small sample like this they may distort the estimate of
e^ slightly.
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Sources of variation in the size of THKA
Revised regressions and scattergrams of TIIKA on TUP
for both car-owners and non-car-owners, using the revised
THKA figures, are shown in Graph 2. -3oth these regressions,
and the ones in Graph 1, have substantial a-coefficients,
so that the ratio of THKA to THP falls as the income
variable rises. To take THKA as a proportion of THP would
not, therefore, be an appropriate way of controlling for
income, although it would be the simplest. I have there¬
fore analysed variations in THKA by examining the deviation
of particular cases from the regression line. In the
analysis which follows, the dependent variable, D, is
defined as actual THKA minus the expected value of THKA
given by the appropriate- regression line. Thus, if actual
THKA is greater than expected, D will be positive; if it is
less than the expected value, D villi be negative. Since
these deviations are measured from whichever regression line
is appropriate (car owners or non-car-owners) the two sub-
samples can be re-aggregated, and the average value of D' for
households having some particular characteristic calculated
over both car-owners and non-car-owners.
Such calculations of the overage value of D were per¬
formed to test a number of variables which might be thought
to affect the size of collective expenditure relative to
husband's income. The results are given in Table 13. The
values of Student's t for difference of means tests per¬


































Sources of variation in THKA
Chaisct eristic Mean 'Value Difference N Student' s
of D (a) of means t?
Husband and wife have - £2.40 ) 10
separate acquain- )
tance sets ) £2.60 ) 2.16
) )
They do not + £0.20 ) 64- )
Wife works - £1.10 ) 32 )
) £2.00 ) 2.30
Wife does not work + £0.90 ) )
More than 3 children + £1.30 ) 17
) £1.60 ) 1.46
3 children or less - £0.30 ) ' 57
At least one child
working - £1.10 ) 13
) £1.30 ) 1.86
No children working + £0.20 ) 61
Eldest child at
least 14 - £0.90 ) 18 )
) £1.30 ) (b)
Eldest child less ) )
than 14- + £0.40 56 )
A-type housekeeping
system + £0.50 ) 36 )
} £1.00 ) 1.77
P-type housekeeping )
system - £0.50 ) 38'
»
Husband skilled - £0.30 ) 30
) £0.70 ) 1.09




occupation - £0.20 ) 14- )
) £0.70 ) 1.02
Neither husband's nor )
wife's father did
, ^ )follov a traditional -^O.yO ^ 60 ^
occupation ) ' )
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Characteristic Mean Value Difference N Student1s
of D (a) of means t
Owner-occupier of at
least 4- rooms (c) ) 14
) negligible (d)
Not an owner-occupier )
of at least 4- rooms + £0.10 ) 16
Some hire purchase
debt + £0.1 ) 41
} £0.30 (d)
No hire purchase debt - £0.2 ) 33
dotes:
(a) D = actual THKA - expected value of THKA given
by the appropriate regression line
(b) Not calculated because the effect of this
variable is suspected to be spurious
(c) Negative value of less than lOp
(d) Not calculated because the difference of means
was so small
The variable which I have entitled "separate
acquaintance sets" requires some explanation. From several
questions in the schedule it was possible to build up a
picture of whether husband and wife had most of their
acquaintances in common or whether they moved in separate
circles. Those couples of whom the husband and wife moved
entirely in separate circles, without mentioning any friends
in common, were defined as having separate acquaintance sets.
This variable appears to be important in the analysis of
variation in overtime hours, which will be given in Chapter
6, and that wqs why it occurred to me to test it here.
The relative importance of these variables as
determinants of the size of the THKA may be gauged by the
magnitude of the difference between the mean value of D for
one score of the dichotomy and its mean value for the -other
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score. Table 13 places the variables in rank order of the
difference of means. It will be seen that TrEKA is more
likely to be lower than the expected value (D negative)
where the wife is working, where there are separate
acquaintance sets, where one or more children are working,
33
where the eldest child is at least and where there are
34-
more than three dependent children.
The product-moment correlation coefficient between D
and the number of dependent children is 0.36, which is
significant at the 99/7 level of confidence. All of these
variables show a difference of means of at least £1.3* The
influences of the wife's income and of the separate
acquaintance sets variable are significant at the 95/7 level
of confidence. The effect of working children's income is
not significant, but almost so. (The critical value of t
for a 90% confidence level with 72 degrees of freedom is
1.67). I did not calculate the value of t for the age of
the eldest child, because, as explained later, I suspect
its effect is spurious.
Sixth in order of importance, and giving a difference
of means of £1.0, is the housekeeping system variable, and
this is particularly interesting in the light of the
analysis carried out in the earlier part of this chapter.
I have argued there that A-type couples in various ways
place more emphasis on collective expenditure than P-type
33 The age of the eldest child was chosen for testing be¬
cause it is the only available indictor from the data
of the parents' age.
34- •
i.e., living at home and not working.
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couples. This seems to be borne out by the differences
between A and I—type couples in the size of D; those with
an A-type system have a substantially higher mean value of
D than the P-type couples. The difference of mean values
of D for this .variable is not significant at the 9% level
of confidence, although it is nearly so, there being a
chance of over 90>j that this result would be repeated in
the population..
There is, however, a slight association between the P-
type system and the presence of secondary wage-earners,
both wives and children, as shown in Table 14-. I therefore
examined the effect-of the housekeeping system on. the size
of TKKA,controlling for the presence, of secondary income.
The results of this are shown in Table 15*
Table 14-
No. with at least one
child working 9 )
No. with no children
working 32 29 )
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Table 19
affect of housekeeping system on the value
of D, controlling for secondary income
< Average value of D
A-type P-type
Either wife or child
working - £0.4- (N=12) - £1.0 (N=25)
Neither wife nor child
working + £1.1 (N»24) + £0.7 (N=13)
Thus, although controlling for secondary income
reduces the difference between A-type and P-type cases, A-
type coses even then have higher THKAs. The effect of
skill level, and its relationship to the effect of the
housekeeping system, is at first sight puzzling. Since
the A-type system predominates amongst skilled workers,
one would expect that if the effect of the housekeeping
system is genuine (rather than spurious), skilled workers
would have higher values of D than unskilled workers. But
the opposite is true. Why does skill level have this
effect? Unskilled workers tend to have a larger number of
children, and the unskilled group also contains a larger
number of people whose fathers (or whose wives' fathers)
55
followed "traditional" occupations, as shown in Table 16
below. The first of these factors will tend to raise the
values of D for unskilled workers, but the second will tend
to reduce them. There is no association between skill
level and the presence of secondary income. The only
reason which occurs to me: why unskilled workers should
have larger THKAs than skilled workers is that the wives
35 .
i.e. farming, fishing, and mining; this variable has
already been discussed earlier in this chapter.
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of unskilled workers may have a greater sense of insecurity,
and may want to keep a larger share of the husband's income
under their control in case of some sudden shortfall of
income arising from a loss of overtime opportunities, or
from unemployment. But this is only speculation.
Table 16
Skill level, occupations of the couple's

















If the effect of the housekeeping system is re-tested,
controlling for skill level, it is found to be larger
amongst skilled workers than it is in the sample as a whole,
as shown in Table 17 below.
Table 17
Effect of the housekeeping system on the
size of THKA, controlling for skill level















The question must be raised, however, is the apparent
influence of the housekeeping system on the overage value
of D really due to the "traditional occupation" variable?
201
i ■
It will be seen from Table 13 that the mean value of D
is negative (i.e. THKA lower) where the husband-' s or
wife's father followed a farming, fishing or mining
occupation. In table 17 above, the smallest values of
D are obtained for the unskilled, P-type group. Table
18 below shows that families with origins in "traditional"
occupational communities are concentrated in this group.
Table 18
Distribution of couples whose parents followed
"traditional" occupations between skill and
""housekeeping type categories
ho. whose parents followed
"traditional" occupations:
A-type P-type
Husband skilled 2 1
Husband unskilled 2 9
N = 14-
This suggests that the effect of the housekeeping system
should be tested again, this time omitting the families
of "traditional" origins from the sample. Table 19 shows
the results of this test.
Table 19
Effect of the housekeeping system on the
size of THKA, controlling for skill
level and omitting couples whose
parents followed "traditional"
occupations
Average value of D
A-tyne P-type
Husband skilled + £0.7 - £2.0
(18 cases) ( 8 cases)
Husband unskilled + £1.3 - £0.1
(13 cases) (21 coses)
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The effect is to reduce the difference between A-type
and P-type couples, where the husband is skilled, but,
curiously enough, to increase it where the husband is un¬
skilled, Neither the differences in this table, nor in
the previous one, are significant. Obviously the sample
is too small to control for secondary income, skill level,
and occupations of couples' parents all at once. Only by
doing this on a larger sample would one be able to evaluate
the effect of the housekeeping system reliably.
Some other connections between the variables listed
in Table 13 also deserve attention. That the value of D
appears lower where the eldest child is 14 or over may be
a spurious finding, since the age of the eldest child is
obviously strongly associated with the existence of
secondary income from working children. The eldest child
is also more likely to be at least 14 where there are a
large number of children. In any case, the product-moment
correlation coefficient between D and the age of the
eldest child is only - 0.12, which is not significant.
The separate acquaintance sets variable was tested
extensively for spuriosity, because it is not immediately
clear why it should have any connection with the house¬
keeping system or the size of household expenses.
Table 20 shows that there is no association between this
variable and the others listed in Table 13 of such a
nature as to cause a spurious difference in the size of
THKA. The> couples with separate acquaintance sets are
slightly less likely than the rest of the sample to have a
large number of children, which would tend to make their
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THKAs low, but to offset this they are less likely to have
working children or a P-type housekeeping system.
Table 20
Characteristics of cou-oles having separate
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a traditional
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It may be possible to explain the effect of the
separate acquaintance sets variable by reference tp Bott's
concept of a segregated marital role relationship, a point
to which I shall return shortly.
On page 87 above, I put forward the hypothesis that
the proportion of his income which the husband devotes to
collective expenditure might be smaller where, by reason of
fatigue or lack of overtime opportunities, he cannot
guarantee to earn the same amount of money each week. I
did not dichotomise this variable 3ince it is difficult to
postulate a suitable point of division in the scale. The
correlation coefficient between D and tho percentage of pay
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obtained from overtime and bonus earnings is only - 0.14-,
which is not significant. But this may not disprove the
hypothesis, which postulates the risk of a fall in income
as the critical factor. Possibly a heavy reliance on
overtime earnings is not associated with such risk for
the men in question.
The above analysis throws up five variables which have
a substantial effect on the size of the "true" housekeeping
allowance relative to the husband's take-home pay. Where
the wife or a child is working, the proportion of the
husband's income devoted to collective expenditure is lower
than where he is the only wage-earner in the household.
The larger the number of children, the larger is the true
housekeeping allowance.
The analysis also reveals that THKA is higher for
couples who have an A-type housekeeping system than for
those who hove a P-type one. Although this result is not
significant, it may at least provide some tentative
evidence in favour of the general argument put forward
earlier in this chapter, that A-type couples place more
emphasis on collective expenditure in their consumption
patterns and aspirations.
Another finding is that THKA is very much lower
where husband and wife have separate acquaintance sets.
If Bott's findings on the social correlates of the
segregated marital role-relationsh'ip are correct, the
separate acquaintance sets factor, which is one feature of
3o
a segregated marital role-relationship, may be identified
^ See Bott (1957) 1968 edition, pp.67 et seq.
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as part of a "traditional" life style which entails a
considerable degree of economic individualism alongside
a rather rigid division of labour between the sexes. A
further finding, which will be presented more fully in
Chapter 6, is that husbands with separate acquaintance
sets from their wives do a large amount of overtime work
without any apparent economic pressure, from household
expenses, to do so. This again suggests an association
between having separate acquaintance sets and a high
degree of economic individualism.
2Q£
It cannot oo over-emphasised that the face value ox
the housekeeping allowance may have little bearing on the
proportion of husband's net income which is actually de¬
voted to collective expenditures. In other words,it nay
make no difference in the end whether the husband gives
his wife a small basic allowance, perhaps to cover little
more than purchases of food, and pays for other household
expenses himself, (as in the extreme A-type system), or
whether he gives his wife a very large housekeeping
allowance, keeping only two or three pounds for himself,
but expeots hi3 wife to pay for all collective purchases
(the extreme P-type system). I think, therefore, that
Young's 1952 article perhaps paid too much attention to
the phenomenon of the husband handing over all his wages
to the wife. Presumably in most such cases, discovered
by earlier writers (Goutar, for example) to whom Young
refers, the husband did receive some pocket money back,
and the amount he actually had for personal expenditure
may well ..have been no less than where ha kept it back in
the first place. However, since there were only two
instances of the "whole wage" system in my sample, I am
unable to substantiate this suggestion. It should, more¬
over, be qualified by Land's evidence that amongst her
sample of large families, many of whom had experience of
living on social security benefits, both the "handing-
over" system and very small amounts of pocket money for
the husband were common. Possibly, though, there are
certain circumstances (many children, unemployment) whex'e
the whole wage system does aot as a check cn the amount
the- husband keeps.
To conclude, one must emphasise that the amounts
kept by husbands in the Edinburgh cample are typically
7C
small, and that the distribution of income between hus¬
band and wife does not seem to be a source of touchiness
or stress in the couple's relationship; nearly all
couples talked about their housekeeping systems quite
freely when both partners were present. In stating that
the P-type system represents an individualistic pattern
of consumption, it is not therefore my intention to
associate it with the stereo-type of the stingy, even
irresponsible husband that creeps into the \;ork of Young
(1952) and Dennis at al (1962). When it is considered
that half cf the wives in the sample worked as well,
and that 18 families had working children contributing
to the housekeeping money, the husband's pocket-money is
seen as a relatively minor fraction of total household
resources. Moreover, the expenses of running a car have
been counted as husband's personal expenditure, and in so
far as the car is a collectively used commodity to soon
extent, this leads to a slight over-estimate of the hus¬
band's personal expenditure.
In the case of car-owners, husbands keep an average of £6.10
pocket money (29.4$ of their average take home pay of £21.4-0).
Husbands who do not have cars keep an average of £2.10 out of
an average take home pay of £19.20, i.e. 11.0#.
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APFS1IDIX A
TES CHOCKI;:G O? I::CGIJD SYATXISIITG
The most important concept of income used in
analysis was TOTAL TAKE HOME PAY (referred to as Till3
for short). This is equal tos-
the sum of; husband's basic wage, overtime
earnings, shift allowance, and
bonus earnmng3 if any
minus the sum of; estimated tax, national
insurance flat rate and graduated
payments, and any payments into a
private pension shheme; also, in
one case, payments into the firm's
holiday fund
Deductions which would have been taken .out of
the actual pay packet, but which have not been
subtracted from the TUP amount are:-
payments into a firm's savings
scheme, where applicable*union
dues (usually less than -Is, a
'week).
The questionnaire was intended to obtain statements of
the men's income which 'would correspond to this concept
and also statements of the amount of overtime they generally
worked. Their statement could differ from what their TUP
really was, either because they misunderstood the question,
and therefore gave their basic wage or gross wage, or be¬
cause of deliberate understatement or overstatement of
their income, I have attempted to check men's statements
■*"
This seemed to be in the nature of a customary deduction
which then entitled the employee to holiday pay, I have
not therefore counted it as voluntary saving by the husband,
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against a calculation of what their income "should" have
2
been , based on the firm's wage rates. Unfortunately,
not all firms wore willing to give this information, and
for the smaller printing firm I did not like to ask, be¬
cause only.five men wore employed, and it would have been
tantamount to asking for information about individuals.
Information given by firms was supplemented in some cases
from the Department of Employment and Productivity's
handbook on wage rates laid down by union agreements:
"Dime rates of wages and hours of work, 1958". 2he tim¬
ber engineering, paper and building fines did not provide
information about wage rates; in the brewery, the pay
structure was undergoing change during the interviewing
period, and information provided by the firm was scanty,
so that I was unable to check men's statements there.
?or those firms where checking was possible, the exact
sources of information used were as follows
p
If a man's hourly wage rate, overtime premiums and
overtime hours are known, it is easy to make an
independent estimate of his income which can be
used to check his own statement. If the man is a
shift-worker, one also needs to know how fre¬
quently he works each shift, ana what the shift—
working allowances are for each shift. It is then
possible to work out his average earnings over the
shift-work cycle (e.g. a three-week cycle of one
week nights, one week mornings end one week back-
shift).
^ Ihe rates actually paid in Edinburgh may well hesre
been above the nationally agreed minimum rates, so
that there is a possible source of under-estimation
here. But in fact, there was no marked degree of
disagreement between men's income statements and
the rates given in this document.
2-10
Gas Board: detailed list supplied by the
organisation of'hourly rates applicable to
different occupations, for all except foremen
and one other.
Rubber factory: rotes given by the firm for
the two main grades; semi-skilled production,
workers and maintenance craftsmen. Charge-
hands * rates were not given, but only ono
occurred in the sample. A nodal range of bonus
earnings for the semi-skilled men was also
given.
Bus company: basic rates given by the firm.
Some special rates exist (such as long distance
coach journeys and payment for private hire
trips) for which no information was available,
but these would only apply to a few drivers,
and then not all the time.
British Roil: a very complex wage structure
naming more than a hundred different occu¬
pations, for which I was referred to the
Ministry handbook, mentioned above.
♦
Larger printing firm: information on basic
wage rates supplied by the trade union repre¬
sentative who helped to select the sample.
There was a productivity bonus which worked out
on average at about 30# above time rates.
Information en shift allowances was obtained from the
Ministry handbook in all esses except for the rubber
factory. (In the printing firm, there was no shift
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working). Information on overtime premiums was obtained
from tbo some source# Obviously the difficulty of
estimating piece-work or bonus earnings is the main
source of error in this method of estimating earnings
from data given by employers. For tiro-rate workers
errors can only arise through:
1. Men describing their occupation in¬
correctly or ambiguously;
2. Men stating their working bourn in¬
correctly or ambiguously - this is
particularly likely to occur where
working hours vary a great deal from
week to week.
Having obtained an estimate of gross income from a man's
main 30b, 1 then added his stated income from his second
Job, if any. Si:-: men had second Jobs; two wore port-
time barmen, two were in the Territorial Army Reserve,
and two did odd Jobs for friends. To obtain THP, the
appropriate national insurance contributions and super¬
annuation contributions, where applicable, were de¬
ducted (men stated what their contributions wore to
private pension satones) and then it was. necessary to
make an estimate of income tan and deduct that.
Estimating the amount of taw relief, children's allowances,
and of course the married couple's allowance, could be
known from the rates laid clown in the Inland Revenue's
leaflet for taxpayers. Earned ireowe relief was simple to
calculate, cnce gross income v;cs known, auporarmuatlon
contributions were assumed to obtain tax relief at face
value. The only other category of tax relief' likely to bo
2 IT
of any substantial size was mortgage relief, which had to
be estimated by a rather complex procedure.
The interest rate on mortgages was assumed to be the
rate prevailing at the time the mortgage was taken out.
All couples were asked how long they had lived in their
present house, and it was assumed that the mortgage
dated from then. In the old questionnaire, couples were
asked the duration of their mortgage, but since the
answer was nearly always twenty years (with one exception)
this question was dropped from tbe revised %rerr»ion of the
questionnaire. Knowing the total period of repayment, the
number of years tbe mortgage had already run, the assumed
interest rate and the monthly payments, it was possible to
work out the annuel interest charges of the current year,
on which tax relief can he claimed. In four cases, the
amount of payments was unknown, so a guess was made.on the
basis of the date of purchase, type and location of the
dwelling. Two couples had mortgages combined with life
insurance policies; in these cases interviewers did not
ask the amount of the policy payments, and the appropriate
part of these couples' tax relief could not be estimated.
A further adjustment to the tax estimate then had to be
made for the wife, if she was in an occupation where
P.A.Y.E. was obviously not paid - that is, the four women
who were domestic helps in private houses. It was'assumed
that in these cases, the tax payable on the wife's pay was
deducted from the husband's income.
Having obtained an estimate for the total amount of
income tax and other deductions paid by the husband out of
his gross pay, it was possible to arrive at an estimate of
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CUP against which his statement of income could be
checked. Three such estimates may have been wrong be¬
cause the man's .job description could not be identified
with a particular wage rate. For example, one man said
he was a crane driver, and railway crane drivers have
different wage rotes according to the sise of crane
they drive. A more important source of possible error
is that it was sometimes difficult to assess the amount
of overtime men worked on average. The questionnaire
asked: "How many hours did you work last week? h'as that
a usual week?" The answers to tho latter part of the
question were sometimes vague; men made remarks such as
"it's more before Christmas" or "we can't get much at the
moment". Some men were interviewed during a week when
they were off sick, or had been off because of a public
holiday, and then they hod to bo asked how much overtime
they did during the last full week they worked* This,
of course, might not have been remembered exactly.
In nearly all cases, men gave their incomes rounded
to a whole number of pounds. I therefore assumed that
their statements corresponded to TUP, gross pay or basic
wage if they wore within one pound of what I estimated
that figure to "be. The table below shows which of the
estimated figures, if any, men's income statements
corresponded to. The checking process was possible for
61 people. About half of these men stated their TIIP, 10
gave a range of income, which was difficult to interpret,
13 apparently misunderstood the question, and 8
deliberately under-stated their income.
21H-
Correspondence of stated income to
aJulmated income
Stated TIIP ...... * . 30
Stated range of income, within which
estimated TUP fell but not estimated
gross pay or basic pay ..... 3
Stated range of income within which both
gross pay and TUP estimates fell 7
Stated gross income 7
Stated basic wage 6
Under-stated income, i.e. gave on amount
less than estimated TEP which did not
correspond to basic wage 8
Total for whom an independent estimate
was made: 61
The tendency to understate income was much less than
had been anticipated. In several previous community
studies, it has been noted that wives are not told their
husbands' incomes - suggesting that if the husband is
asked his income in front of the wife, he may tend to
understate income. All husbands except three were asked
this question when their wives were present. This rarely
caused embarrassment; no-one refused to say what his in¬
come was, although two men were somewhat evasive (I have
classified them as qtating their basic wage, but they may
have been deliberately concealing their overtime earnings,
rather than misunderstanding the question). The only wife
in the main survey interviewed without her husband'knew
only roughly what her husband earned .(-116 to £20), but
this vagueness may, of course, have been due to the fact
that his income varied a lot, rather then to the fact that
he did not tell her. It is possible that some of the men
who gave o range of income were deliberately trying to be
However, possible bias in the sample should be considered here.
See p. Ill et seq.
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vagus because their wives were present, but all of them
said it y/an difficult to give an exact figure because
their overtime earnings varied so much.
It is interesting that out of the 8 cases where
under-statorient of income may have been made, there were
two where the wife's mother was present, and one where
the wife's father was present. There were altogether
five cases where the wife's mother was present during
the interview, and this factor did seem to make the
husband somewhat inhibited and embarrassed; so that it
is quite possible that some of the under-statements of
income were due to a desire to forestall the mother-in-
law's comments on the size of the housekeeping money.
Another possibility is that informants may have been
trying to stress to the interviewer how small was the
income which they could rely on, so that the "under¬
statements" may have represented what these men would
have earned if a minimum amount of overtime was worked.
The revised version of the questionnaire asked men
to state their basic income in addition to their total
net income. I inserted this question because I had by
then given up hope of obtaining information on wage
rates from all the companies approached. But it may also
have had the effect of making the income question clearer.
Hone of the men who were interviewed with the new -
questionnaire gave their basic wage. .
In view of the fact that about half those men for
whom the checking procedure was possible, gave their take-
hose pay as I have defined it, it seemed reasonable to pro¬
ceed as if this von the meaning of the income statements
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given by the mentor whom no independent check was possible.
The probability that their statements meant anything else
seemed likely to be lower than it was for the rest of the
sample, for the following reasons:
(a) by coincidence most of the brewery workers
were interviewed using the revised
questionnaire, so that there was a low chance
of them giving their basic rate;
(b) none of the men for whom independent checking
was impossible, gave a range of income;
(c) most of the brewery men were semi-skilled pro¬
cess workers and most did 10 hours overtime.
Thus one would expect their net incomes, if
correctly stated, to be very similar, end in¬
deed their stated incomes wore very similar.
(d) most of the building workers were not doing
overtime, because it was winter, and there¬
fore if they had given their basic wage in¬
stead of their total wage, it would have made
little difference. (Host basic wages through¬
out the sample fell below the level at which
the individual's income would have been
f
liable to tax).
In order to find the full value of a family's
collective expenditure, it was necessary to find the
value of items paid for by the husband apart from the
housekeeping allowance given to the wife. The latter was
known from the questionnaire, as were expenditure on all
types of housing expenses except repairs and improvements,
and hire purchase payments (including x^oyments to
clothing clubs) were also asked about# Thus, such items
as fuel, furniture, clothing, children's pocket money and
several minor items had to be estimated independently.
This was done by assuming that the family spend the
some amount on any one of these items as the ovei'Sge ex~
penditure for families of their income group and with the
some number of children as given in the Family Expenditure
Survey. The Family Expenditure Survey report for 1967
was used - the 1938 report would have been better, but it
had not yet been published at the time I wanted to do
this part of the analysis. All figures in the 1957 report
were raised by &'/j to allow for the increase in prices
between 1967 and the period of the survey (the last few
weeks of 1968 and t?ae first quarter of 3.969) * Since items
were estimated to the nearest IQp, the exact amount of the
price increase assumed does not make rauch difference, most
single items paid for by husbands were smaller than £2 in
value. I did not, therefore, think there was much point
in waiting until the 1968 report came out in order to do
these calculations.
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In the 1%7 report, a full breakdown of expenditure
by income groups on! number of children was only given
for the country as a whole. Expenditure patterns are a
little different in Scotland. A "regional adjustment
factor" can be defined by takings
average expenditure on Item x by all Scottish families
average expenditure on item x by all British families
Expenditure by families in each region is given by bread
commodity groups in 'fable 3d of the report; details of
expenditure by income and number of children in fables
d, 5 and 6. I used the regional adjustment factor to
transform the figures in the latter tables into Scottish
equivalents.
Each family in the sample was allocated to an income
group on the basis of its total gross family income
estimated as follows
Total family income » the sum of:
husband's take home pay, as defined in
Appendix A
. wife's stated income
family allowances
contributions by 'working children to
the housekeeping money
»
The last item differs .from the Family Expenditure Survey
definition; the PES would include the entire income of
working children. It seemed better to me, however, to use
my different base for defining family income, as my
interests were different from those of the PES. The level •
of contributions to collective expenditure made by the
husband will be commensurate with his own income, and will
if anything be reduced by the income of other family members.
219
Thus, if a man earns £20 end his son £10, counting them
as a £30 family instead of as a £20 family will mean that
expenditures by the son on clothing or electrical goods
may he attributed wrongly to the father. On the other
hand, if the son's contributions to the common kitty are
excluded from the family income, it will be counted as
having a smaller fund for essential collective ex-
penditures than it really has, and this may lead to its
non-food expenditure being under-estimated.
The folloid.ng list gives the items in the FES which












- ~r 1 lO
F53 item(s)
includes hire of appliances
and "manufactured fuels"
all women's clothing plus
half the footwear for 2-
adult families, one third
of the footwear for families
with one child, and one
quarter of the footwear for
larger families
all children's and infants'
clothing, plus one third of
footwear if one child, half
footwear if more than one
"toilet requisites, cos¬
metics" (group ?2)
items 71 and 92
"seeds, plants, flowers"
half items 68, 69, 70, 72,
73
half of item 70
half of .the items given under
"presents" end half "toys"
* an arbitrary guess was made here as to the
division of such oxoauditure between
Christmas and other occasions.
220
Questionnaire item(s) PE-5 item(g)
hairdressing





"durable goods" minus in¬
surance and what the family
way they spend on IIP
saving up items 100, 101« Anything
else would be an uncounted




bus fares for wife and
children
item 31, minus an estimate
of what the husband spent
on bus fares to work, which
could be known from the ob¬
vious route which would be
taken from the family's
house to his place of work.
The above constitute all those items which the husband
might pay fox* on behalf of the family as a whole, which
could he estimated from PE3 data.
In. some cases the following items were paid for by the
wife for the husband, and must be subtracted from the
housekeeping allowance to arrive at an estimate of total
collective expenditure
car expenses items 77, 73
visits to pubs - _ ' drink (items 44, 4-5, AG)
husband's clothing items pi end p2, plus a
gome items which the husband might pay for could not
be calculated from the PES. fliese were: the television
rental and children's pocket money. Some families gave
the amount of the television rental they paid under the
hire purchase question. There were 3 who rented a tele-
share of "footwear", cal¬
culated as for the wife.
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vision sot but did not give the amount under that
question, and of these A- rentals were paid by the hus¬
band. In these cases it was assumed that the rental paid
was the same as the average amount paid by families whose
rental was known - 75p«
The estimation of children's pocket money was rather
more complex. I used a scale derived from en article by
Hilde Behrend (1936), which quotes a school-teacher's
assessment of the amount or pocket money given to school
children in "on industrial area" of Edinburgh in 1963.
Hilda Behrend's informant thought that children aged 10
would receive between 7s. 6d, (37rp) ond 10s. (50p).
Using this yardstick, I postulated the formula of (n-1)
shillings per week for each school child, where n is the
number of years of age. This seemed rather low for
twelve to fifteen year olds, so I then added an extra two
shillings (lOp) for this age group. In the few cases of
children over fifteen who were still at school, I assumed
that they received the same en a fifteen year old, i.e.
16s. (SOp). Working children and children of three years
or less were assumed to receive no pocket money. Four
and five year olds were assumed to receive one shilling
(5?) each. (Obviously children under school age must
receive hardly any pocket money, as they are not old
enough to go shopping by themselves). It must bo em¬
phasised that this way of estimating .pocket money is very
much guesswork. However, it seems reasonable to assume
that thero are local norms about how much children receive,
which would be disseminated by means of children demanding
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from parents the some amount as their school-mates.
Hardly anyone in the sample said they made any
expenditure on v;indov:-clecners , drink to keep in the
houset or betting."*" I therefore ignored these items.




In order to clarify the foregoing analysis, it is
useful at this point to describe a few cases which,
comes fairly close to the "pure types" of the A and P
housekeeping systems, (families have been given
fictitious names).
Case 1:
Mr. Si Mrs. Jamieson: P-tyne
Mr. & Mrs. Jamieson present a good example of a F~
type couple. Mr. Jamieson worked as a shunter on the
railway - he had had a variety of railway jobs ever
since he finished National Service. They had moved to
a suburban council house after owning a small flat in o
central tenement district for the earlier part of their
married life. Mrs. Jsmieson had a full time job cooking
school dinners. She paid all the household expenses out
of her £12 per week housekeeping money plus her own wages
which were £8.25, and a small contribution from her
eldest son, who was on apprentice plumber. Mr. Jamieson*
wages varied on a three-week cycle of shift work, and
correspondinglydifferent overtime arrangements; on average
he earned £16.55 after tax and national insurance. (He
hesitated a good deal before telling me anything about lis
wages, then told me his basic hourly wage rate and ex¬
plained the shift-working and overtime cycle). Mr.
Jamieson kept over FA for himself sorne weeks; the re¬
gression equation referred to earlier which describes the
relationship between income and housekeeping money in the
sample as a whole, would predict that he kept £4-.50, so
this was fairly typical. All of Mrs. Jamieson's earnings
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went "into the house", i.e. were nut with the house¬
keeping money. t/lien asked "Is the amount he gives you
flexible ot all? - do you over van out before the end
of the week?" she merely said "touch wood". Mrs,
Jamioson kept stressing that she was very careful to
manage on what she had} "Most couples get into too much
debt; I don't take debt on much - I try to save a hit".
She had no hire purchase commitments, She did not save
for any particular purchase: "I keep a bit of money in
my pocket for emergencies"• Mien asked: "So women have
different ideas about money from ten?" she said: "Women
load, but men agree" - in other words, budgeting is a
woman's job, Eer husband worked on average 45 or 46 hours
a week. Ee objected to the fact that the recent rise in
family allowances had entailed a "cut in wages" for him -
that is, o reduction in the tax allowances for dependent
children (of whom they had two, not counting the working
son). As Mr. Jsnieson worked a three-shift system he
had little opportunity for social life, and therefore
spent his spare time watching television; but his wife
said: "He goes cut for a drink now and again". In
talking about her spare time activities, she stressed the
domestic side of her life - "I knit, and bake. I don't
like bingo. It's a pity there are no theatres any more
in this city." (Presumably she referred to music-halls
end such like, as "highbrow" theatrical entertainment is
certainly available in Edinburgh, and there are many
cinemas). Mrs. -Tarsieson hod friends at work, though they
did not exchange visits or go out together, Mrs.
$
Jamieson's father was present at the interview - he had
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03311 a chip repairer. She did not mention any other re¬
latives except. liar mother, who was dead. Mr. Jamieson's
lather was a minor. Mr. Jamioson was a bit reticent,
and did not talk about his friends or relatives. He
seemed a bit surprised that I wanted to talk to him about
the topios covered by the questionnaire, as if to imply
that family budgeting was his wife's business. The
Joniiesons did not havo a car or a telephone, nor any
fitted carpets, nor a dining room suite, dor did they
want anything in the way of consumer durables. Mrs.
Jamiason'3 notion of luxuries is indicated by what she
said she spent her earnings on - "a wee bit extra for
the children - a wee bit of luxuries in the house; we
put more c-n the table, and we always have a fire." She
wanted to cake cure that her children had a good future;
the second son was already planning to stay at school
until he was seventeen, and take his "flighers"; and she
wanted the youngest "in a trade" (a teem used by many
of the informants in the survey to mean a skilled job
involving an appreticecfcip, as distinct from semi-
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The Mccacnalds
The Macdonalds provide another example of the P-type
Mr. Macdonald was a semi-skilled machine operator in the
rubber factory. Mrs. Mscdonald had recently given up her
.job as a nursing auxiliary, because she found it de¬
pressing to work with very sick people. She implied that
22S
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sh3 Lai needed the money v/han aha tool-: on that job, but
that aha did not need it no badly now that she could not
wait until she found a job she liked batter.
They rented a four-apartment tenement flat near the
city centre. The rent wa3 only 26.25 per month, although
they had to pay the annual rates bill of ?A3* When first
married they had lived in a smaller flat not far away,
but that had been demolished. They had three children,
all at primary school.
Mrs. Mccdonald received 215 from her husband - it
varied s bit with his overtime earnings, and he kept "a
bit of pocket coney". (I think a fixed amount, in view
of their joke about family allowances: these went up
shortly before the interview, with a corresponding re¬
duction in tax allowances and Mrs. Macdenaid said "We've
been wondering if he should get a pay rise"). She em¬
phasised that he gave her cost of his overtime money, as
if this might be unusual, end said that it was used to
buy furniture. She hoi just started buying a bedroom
suite for the children, but was careful to restrict her
hire purchase commitment to £1 per week "in case he's
ill". The only other thing she wanted for the house was
c dining room suite: like the Jamiesone, they hod neither
car ncr telephone, and expressed no desire to have either.
They did, however, have fitted carpets and on electric
sewing machine. Mr. Mecdonald worked a two-shift system,
days and nights on alternate weeks. He worked ss much es
52 hours when he could, though this was net often because
trade was very erratic for his section of the factory.
It had been affected by strikes elsewhere, so that in the
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lost month or two he had worked little overtime. Lately
he had been earning about -CIS per week after tax.
Before her marriage Mrs. Mecdoneld had v/orked in
factories, which she disliked: "I want the bairns to have
decent jobs - net working in factories like we've had to
do. The eldest boy is pood a figures -I'd like him to
use that". She went back to work when the youngest was
three. She emphasised several tiroes that they had been
under considerable financial pressure; that she could
save only a very little as an emergency reserve, even
now; and. that a family like themselves needed £25 per
week. She said it would definitely be necessary for her
to work in the long run. She had spent most of her
earnings on furniture; the "single end" (one room flat)
which they had lived in before had not held much
furniture, and no core had to be bought when they moved.
She implied that she wished she could have spent her
money on ether things: "I didn't pet anything out of it
except maybe the washing machine and Hoover - just
things for the house". (This may confirm my hypothesis
that P-type couples, particularly the lower-paid,have
individualistic consumer aspirations). She was very
»
contemptuous of people who spend a lot of money "keeping
up with the Joneses".
Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Macdonald's parents were still
alive; although Mrs. Hacdonald was friendly with her
sister, a widow. Her husband went out to football matches
on Saturday, and on Saturday evenings be went out for a
drink. She said: "Once or twice a year we have a night
out with his mates". They also had his "mates" to visit
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them sometimes. Otherwise they bed no .joint friends;
they spent their spore time watching television end
decorating their flat. Mrs. Mccdonald said at first
that she "didn't see much of the neighbours". But
later on in the interview she mentioned instances of
practical co-operation with them. She had offered an
elderly bachelor help with cleaning his flat, which ho
had refused. She also helped another woman on the
stair tidy up the back green so that the children
could play there, after one of the Hacdonald children
had been knocked down while pllying in the street.
Case 5;
Mr. &" Mrs. Allen
The P-type system of one of the control couj)les is
the oiie which in all the sample perhaps most corresponds
to the model of the P-type that I have outlined.
Mr. Allen, a turner, had one son, aged 21. He
himself must have been in his late fifties or early
sixties (he said that if he were made redundant, he would
retire early). His wife did not work; he emphasised that
he earned enough to keep her, and disapproved strongly of
# .
women working, unless, they really had to (an unusual
attitude in the sample, perhaps partly attributable to
his membership of an older generation than the others).
He gave his whole wage packet to his wife, who opened it
and gave him back his personal pocket money. His son also .
put £3 or £4 into the housekeeping money and ran a car
which the parents sometimes used. The father sometimes
contributed towards the expenses of his son's car. The
son had boon in the police force, but was now apprenticed
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to a butcher. Although I'r. Allen gave all his wages to
his wife, ho did not want to tell the interviewer what
they wore. He usually worked 50 hours a week, but some-
tiros the foreran asked bin to do an extra eight hours
on a Sunday toe, which he disliked, although he was ob¬
liged to do it. Ideally, he said, he would only work AO
hours; if he had a pay rise bo would cut down on over¬
time. The Aliens had a more lavishly equipped home that
the two couples already mentioned; they had fitted car¬
pets, a dining room suite, and Venetian blinds, although
they had no fridge or telephone. They had oil they
wanted in the way of durable goods, and thought that
most people of their age could afford what they wanted in
this respect. In the. "bad old days", they would borrow
from relations or neighbours, but they had no need to
now. Mr. Allen had a savings tank account, though
commented that most of bis workmates had net. ITis
friends and his .wife's friends were completely separate -
her main interest was a bowling club, be played in a pipe
"b3nf "tV1 1*. io ^ pri/fc o ^ood rl^s 1 of t±?ae
practising. The Allen family were Catholics, although
**
they bed no apparent Irish connections.
Case
Kr„ d Mrs. Gordon
Mr. & Mrs. Gordon provide an example of the
system. lie was a bricklayer - she did not work,
a little money by holding "Tapper parties". Her
c.f. the similarity between their way of life end






VPS p T.7. mechanic, bis father worked in a rubber
factory. She bed done three years V training to be o
nurse, but never took up this career because of her
marriage. She loved her work, and vented to go back to
it soon, although she could not do so yet because of her
baby son. Mr. Gordon bed studied maths and technical
subjects at evening classes for four years after leaving
school. They were buying their throe-roomed tenement
flat, but were not satisfied with it; they vould have
liked a house in the country with a garden and bathroom,
but could not afford it yet. They were saving up for a
better house, and this meant that Mr. Gordon had to work
very hedd. They did not "get on very well" with the
neighbours, who, Mrs. Gordon said, were "always fighting
their husbands". Mr. Gordon gave his wife £8 per week,
out of a wage of £19 after taw and national insurance,
but he also paid the mortgage, rates and fuel bills,
and provided money for furniture and decorating. He had
about fA.GO left after this. If she needed it, he gave
his wife a couple of pounds extra. They were buying a
car on hire purchase, which cost £10 per month out of
his pocket money. Saving was mainly Mr. Gordon's
t
responsibility, though it was a joint effort in the sense
that Mrs. Gordon tried to keep down the amount she needed
for housekeeping, so that he could save as much as.
possible. Over the lest year they hod "saved and spent"
about £150, which was for bills, e new television, re¬
wiring of the flat, and new plumbing. Their net saving
during this year, towards a new house, had been about £30.
Mrs. Gordon had a bank account as well as Mr. Gordon. They
vented e v.'psbing machine, but otherwise hsd most of the
things which Mr. Allen end his friends heel taken most
of their working lives to acquire.
Mr. Gordon vent out to the pub twice a week, end
ployed darts there; his wife did. not go, probably be¬
cause of the baby. Bhe bad kept in touch with many
school friends and other student nurses, with whom she
exchanged visits. She said her husband knew them all,
so that she didn't really have r separate female circle«
They had other "joint friends to visit thorn, who were not
his workmates, Mr, Gordon said. In another part of the
interview, he mentioned that one of his friends was an
•architect, and another a draughtsman.
Mr. Gordon did no overtime at the time cf the inter¬
view, because overtime was not available in bis trade in
winter. Mo wished he could. v.?or^" lender hours to s*ct
more?/ for the new bouse they were thinking about. How¬
ever, be war. trying to make as much as be could out of
^y» o
time work. Mr. Cordon said that if he had a pry rise he
would save it. If he had shorter working hours, he would
ploy with the baby, read, and "do up the house" more, as
well as watching T.V."
for.'"STl'lrs« "hindsoy: an A-type example
Mr. Lindsay was a compositor; his wife did not work,
although they fostered a child, which brought in a bit
extra money. They bad two grown-up children; one had left
homo; the second, a typist, still lived with thorn. They
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Ihey also had one child at primary school, end the footer-
child was about the same ago. Mr. Lindsay was from the
Borders, Mrs. Lindsay from County Durham; they had lived
in two other towns before settling in Edinburgh. Mrs.
Lindsay had been a Civil Service Clerk before her
marriage; she had not worked since. She had become a
foster mother because she liked children, not because
she needed the money. They owned a four-apartment tene¬
ment flat, and said they were happy with it on the whole.
Mr. Lindsay gave his wife £C for housekeeping, and, like
Mr. Gordon, he paid the mortgage, rates and fuel bills.
In fact, he paid for all household expenses except for
food and clothing; Mrs. Lindsay bought clothes for all
the family including her husband. Mr. Lindsay had a
savings bank account; they also kept a pool of money in
the house for irregular expenses, and Mrs. Lindsay said
that if she ran short during the week she would take some
extra money from the "pool". Saving was a Joint res¬
ponsibility; they had saved up to visit relations in the
U.S.A. the previous year. Mhoy had nearly all of the
commonly owned durable goods except a telephone and
fitted carpets, whiph they wanted. Mbey ran a car. Tkey
had friends whom they had met through their church, and
through being foster-parents; end they exchanged visits
with them occasionally, as well as taking part in 'church
activities. Mr. Lindsay also liked fishing. But they did
not go out much, and said that most of their friends were
kept busy with the husbands' overtime working. Mr.
Lindsay worked 30 hours the week, boforo the interview, the
maximum amount of overtime available in his firm. Ho said
ho was working particular!;/ hard at the moment because
be wee savins up for tbeir holiday, but that even
usually ho works1 at least six hours overtime. (2his
was o lot for the printers in the sample; the median
number of hours amongst them was •!-•'!• per week). Mr.
Lindsay earned £26 per week after tax end national in¬
surance. If he had o pay rise, he would give it to his
wife for housekeeping, or save it. If he had more spare
time he would go fishing more often, or work in the
garden 'which they shared with other occupants in their
tenement. Mr. Lindsay's father was a postman, Mrs.
Lindsay's a minor, Tfeither of their mothers had v/ox'ked
after marriage. They thought that education was a very
important thing in life, khan asked what sort of job he
would have chosen if he could go back to being lb or 15
row, Mr. Lindsay said ho would have done "something
mathematical". Uhon asked whether ho had any idea about
what ho Wanted his younger son to do when he left school,
Mr, Lindsay saw this question in terms of his son's
further education: "I would encourage bin towards science
and maths, but it devonds how ho develops". When asked;
r r% v-rm-ii /? /-\,-» n ,1 r\ «-»V> /*» "1 nog v- "v r\ r > 1 o f v, o. •» lrTl o fi f* *1 rtl
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standing thoy have?" " Mr. Lindsay and Mrs. Lindsay both
said "Education", though Mr. Lindsay thought this was not
so important as it used to bo. Mrs. Lindsay thought that
having interesting work was very important; it was all
right for married women to work "as long as they find it
interesting"; and to the question; "bhot do you think
people generally gc for when thoy think what sort of job
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they would lihc to have?" she said "Cone go out for the
lienor, hut I don't thin!: they cue happy". education,
perhaps not surpirisingly, was highly valued by these
employees of en academic publisher; another printer in
the scrapie snrld. that, given another chance in life, he




Two coupler in the main sample, and one amongst the
younger controls, said that they pooled all their in¬
come. In all three cases, the wife v.-os working. Here
nothing is known shout how expenditure responsibilities
are allocated between husband and wife; the husband must
presumably use some of his income for personal ex¬
penditure, but no distinction was made by these couples
between funds for different purposes in their description
of the system. This pattern was found to be common
amongst the middle-class couples surveyed in the
Edinburgh "Life Styles" study (Burns, 1969) - in fact it
held about equal sway with the allov/ance system. Two of
the three couples who employ the pool system in this
sample are middle-class in orientation - they say that
their friends are mainly white-collar workers, both are
owner—occur!ars and one of the wives followed a pro¬
fessional occupation. The third lived in a council block
and nixed mainly with their neighbours there,whom thoy
described as "tradesmen". All three husbands were
printers (one a compositor, one a camera operator and one
»
a printer's reader): the latter two occupations, by vir¬
tue of their highly technical nature and high pay, may be
considered marginal to the working-class. All three
couples were fairly young; none had a child older than
eleven. The "pool" system seems to be something distinct '
from either the A-type or the P-typo, perhaps generated
by particular social circumstances, and I have therefore
excluded it from the analysis, w. .1 .
Under the heading of the P-type X have included
two cases in which the husband hands over the entire
contents of his wage packet to the wife, and receives
pocket-money back. One such case consists of a middle-
aged couple in the control group, so that there is only
one in the main sample. One interpretation of this
system, (which I shall refer to as the "whole wage"
system) is that the wife in such cases has charge of
what I have called the first-level decision; it is pos¬
sible that she decides how much pocket money the husband
shall keep. If it is the husband's pocket money which
is fixed, rather than the housekeeping allowance, it
will be the- latter which varies with overtime earnings;
the effect of what Friedman (195?) would call "transi¬
tory income components" will be entirely on collective
expenditures. This may be an important feature of
systems in which the husband's pocket money is a fixed
amount. But such a feature may not be exclusive to the
whole wage system; some P-type cases could have it too.
(Statements such as "he keeps about £2" occurred in a
few interviews; these could refer to fixed pocket-money
amounts, or to what the husband kept out of a typical
week's earnings).
Alternatively, it is quite possible that the whole
\jage system is in no way different from the pocket money
system, in which the handing over of everything does not
occur. It may be that the handing over of the wage
packet does not signify that the wife has control of the
initial allocation of income to housekeeping money and
the husband's retentions. It could, as suggested in
23?
Chapter 3* he just a xtLtual whereby wives ore assured
1
that thai*"husbands ©re ploying fair, perhaps a relic■
i
of an earlier age when, so some writers suggest (c.f.
Chapter 3), a wife was privileged if she knew what her
2
husband earned. Certainly this is no longer a pri¬
vilege, nearly all of the husbands in the sample were
quite open about stating their wages in front of their
wives, and most gave a figure at least as high as my
estimate (from their employer's wage rates) of their
3
total net pay including overtime earnings.
Moreover, in speaking of the amount of house¬
keeping money they received, several wives mentioned
spontaneously the amount their husbands kept. It is
not possible to say whether the handing-over practice
is associated with a greater degree of control by the
wife in the housekeeping system. As stated, it may or
may not entail that she decides how much pocket-money
the husband should have, by contrast with the other
systems (A-type, P-type, end "pool") in which the pri¬
mary allocation of resources seems to be a joint or a
husband's decision. There is no reason to suppose that
^ 'Hie wage packet may not be handed over un-opened; as
one woman said: "there's always a few bob the woman's
no' supposed to ken about".
Griselda Rowntree (195^0 states that before the birth
of their first child, 71% of couples employed the whole
wage packet system in an Aberdeen sample of working-
class families, interviewed in 1931-2. A large pro¬
portion still did so after the birth of their first
child. It is possible, therefore, that the system was
very common in Scotland until recently. Kerr, however,
(195S) states that it was a declining practice in
Liverpool in the early 1950's,
3
The issue of how valid were the men's statements of their
wages, and the methods of estimating their pay from the
firm's wage rates, are dealt with in Appendix A,
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the "whole wage" husbands kept less pocket-money than
the P-type husbands. In any case, they are too few to
form a separate category .for analysis. I therefore
decided not to exclude them from the P-type group.
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CHAPTER 6
fiudiugs ore this family's
supply op labour
In en earlier-chapter I considered some questions
posed by previous economic and sociological literature,
concerning the family's supply of labour to the market.
The purpose of this chapter is to find out what are the
determinants of the family's supply of labour according
to the survey data; end how these results compare with
other writers' findings.
The general plan of this chapter is divided into a
number of sections, following on from the issues x^aised
in Chapter 2. They are as follows:-
(1) a consideration of the relationships between
husband's overtime working and housekeeping
arrangements; \
(2) the other determinants of the amount of over¬
time worked by husbands.
(3) the use of the wife's discretionary labour
power.
In order to examine how the variables mentioned in
Chapter 2 affect the utilisation of the family's labour
power, 1 feel it is necessary to perform an overall
analysis of the determinants of labour power utilisation
decisions, not all of it having particular reference to
the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 2. Unless this is
done one can have no idea of the relative importance of
the variables identified by these hypotheses, or with
what other variables they may be associated. The reader
must therefore forgive a certain amount of matter which -
may seem on the surface of it irrelevant, but which is in
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feet necessary to obtain a thorough understanding of the
relationships which the data exhibits.
!• Labour market participation end house-
In Chapter 2 I argued that labour supply decisions
within the family cannot be said to be made with regard
to the maximisation of a joint utility function. This
argument must now be expanded. Firstly, the notion of a
joint utility function in this context, as put forward by
Fleischer end others, seems to assume that all family in¬
come is pooled for the purchase of goods and services for
the family as a whole„ But from the sociological studies
cited in Chapter *S t of a wage-earner's income
(particularly in the case of the husband end children) tends
to be reserved for personal consumption, which may provide
utility only for the wage earner. The second objection to
the idee of a joint utility function is that leisure is to o
large extent a personal utility. Except in so for as wives
demand their husbands' company and vice versa, it can only
give satisfaction to the person who actually has the leisure
time to spend. These two points lead one to speculate that
in almost all families, there will be at least an element of
individualism in the fcsy in which labour supply decisions
are made. In the light of the last chapter, one may suggest-
that the extent to which the individual will make such
decisions with regard to his individual interest (in leisure
end personal consumption), rather than'with regard to the
interest of the family as a whole, will depend on the family'
life style. In particular, it may depend on the degree of
segregation of the role relationship - en issue which I shell




in the couple's particular social milieu, on the house end
home as s centre of the individual's activity. Members of
home-centred families will tend to see collectively consumed
commodities (house, furniture, electrical goods) as re¬
latively important in their life style, end important in
the range of goods on which marginal earnings may be spent,
that is, for the sake of which extra hours may be worked.
I have provided in Chapter 5 some evidence that the P-
type system goes together with a considerable degree of
economic individualism. P-type households have a life
style v/hich places less importance on the ocquisitbn of
expensive possessions for family use than does the life
style of the A-type couples. This means that one might ex¬
pect to find P-type husbands, when making labour supply de¬
cisions, considering more their personal need for marginal
earnings, end less the family's ambitions as a consumer
unit (since these ambitions are less extensive) then do A-
type husbands. A man who weighs up the marginal utility of
leisure against the marginal utility of extending his per¬
sonal expenditure, will surely tend to place a higher value
en leisure than a men who sets leisure against the utility
of major purchases fro the family as a whole. This is
simply because the commodities on which husbands spend
their pocket money have a low income elasticity of demand;
commodities like lunches at work, cigarettes, alcohol, and
fares. The exception, of course, is a -car; although it
must be noted that whilst this commodity, like other
durable goods, has © high income elasticity of demand on a
macro-economic level, the individual who already has a car
v/ill tend to regard it as a fixed expense, $ust like feres
2.4-2
to work. The only variable kind of expenditure associated
with cars once bought is, in fact, expenditure on petrol,
(i.e. the amount of use made of the car).
Considering the kind of marginal expenditure which
the P-type husband may be expected to have in mind when
making labour supply decisions, one would therefore expect
him to have a lower "marginal propensity to work" than the
A-typa husband. That is, one would expect P-type husbands
to take less advantage of overtime opportunities (a point
on which the survey data provide evidence) and also to be
more likely to reduce his working hours in response to a
wage increase (a point which is not investigated by the
survey).
It comes as no surprise, therefore, to find that
amongst the skilled workers in the sample, A-type husbands
work longer hours than P-type husbands, as shown in the
table below.
I have controlled for skill level firstly because it
is the most important variable influencing the level
of overtime hours (as shown in the next pert of this
chapter) and secondly because this being so, one
would expect the effects of skill level and house¬
keeping system on overtime hours to cancel each other
out. Skilled workers do less overtime than the un¬
skilled; so that if there is a tendency for the A-
type men (many more of whom ere skilled then P-type
men) to work long hours, this tendency will be hidden
in the sample as a whole by the skill factor.
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Table 1
Housekeeping sys tea » skill lavol ,



















10 1 11 10 21 31
Total 1? 8 29 19 90 45
Koto: This table is for all men with children who
can choose how nmch overtime they work, and
whoso overtime hours end housekeeping system
ere known.
The Q-value of this association botwoon housekeeping
type end overtime hours for skilled workers is 0.82.
(Fisher's exact test shows that the association is signi¬
ficant at the 99$ level of confidence. Obviously, the
reason why no association between the housekeeping system
end overtime appears in the sample as a whole is that the
skilled workers in the sample do less overtime than the
unskilled, and yet a larger proportion of the A-type men are
skilled than the P-typc men. The effects of skill level and
the housekeeping system therefore cancel each other out in
the sample ss a whole.
Why does the association between housekeeping system
end overtime occur in the skilled but not in the unskilled
group? The explanation which must first be considered is
that there is a greater pressure upon unskilled workers to
do e lot of overtime, because their basic wag© is lower. If
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rnany of them do at least 10 hours overtime; for* financial
reasons alone, one should investigate whether the house¬
keeping system accounts for exceptionally long hours
being worked# But reconstructing the table with the
dividing line put at 14 hours overtime instead of 10
still finds no association in the unskilled group. The
average number of hours worked by unskilled P-type men
is 13#8, and by unskilled A~type men 14.3• There is,
therefore, only a very smell difference between the two
housekeeping types in the unskilled group. Can this be
explained in terms of the preceding arguments about the
possible effects of economic individualism? If these
arguments ere correct, one would expect that the
difference between A-type and P-type men in the amount
of overtime they do, would be most marked where owner-
occupancy and extensive consumer ambitions are most
likely to be economically practicable - that is, amongst
the skilled workers, since they have higher basic wage
rates than the unskilled. It may be, therefore, that at
the income levels accessible to the unskilled workers, no
substantial difference in work effort arising from the
housekeeping system should be expected. This explanation,
however week, is the only one which I can offer as to why
the association between the housekeeping system and over¬
time is not apparent amongst the unskilled workers.
I now turn to the question of whether couples with
segregated role-relationships ore more likely to be in¬
dividualistic in making labour supply decisions. One
.needs to be careful in formulating hypotheses about the
nature of the relationship between individualistic do-
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cision-making end degregoted role-relationships, i'o
suggest that these two phenomena may he associated would
apparently be to soy that people with segregated role-
relationships are more self-interested. Yet this would
be to fall back into the trap of the many early studies
on working-class family budgeting referred to by Michael
Young (1952)? to think that the traditional working-class
husband is selfish because he is apparently detached from
the process of making decisions about purchases, and be¬
cause there tends,in such families, to be a rigid dis¬
tinction between the housekeeping allowance and the hus¬
band's pocket money. Rather, the point to bo made is
that where the responsibilities of husband and wife to
the family economy are rigidly defined, and where the area
of joint decision-making, in economic and other matters, is
small, it is highly likely that the potential utility of
extra income to the family as s whole will be ill-defined,
That is, there will tend to be little in the process of
everyday communication between husband and wife which
facilitates the formation of joint ambitions for major
purchases. Thus, the husband may tend not to have any
picture of things which could be bought for the family with
marginal earnings, and will tend to weigh up the utility of
marginal earnings only in terms of what he, personally,
might spend them on. Moreover, the family's conception of
his role as breadwinner may confer on him on obligation to
maintain the household at a conventionally appropriate
standard; how much he should work may depend not upon whet
the family wants as a group of individuals, but rather upon
what is thought a decent end proper housekeeping allowance.
2'vB
(It way be significant in this context that whereas both
Shaw and Dennis et al cite some evidence of local, norms
as to what the housekeeping allowance should be amongst
"traditional" families, Zweig, speaking of the "affluent"
working class, finds a good deal of variation between
families both in the amounts given end the items in¬
tended to be covered by the allowance)®
Owing to the failure of the survey data to identify
types of conjugal role relationship, I am unable to test
these hypotheses. In the last chapter, I argued that the
A-type housekeeping system is probably associated with a
home-centred, "affluent" type of working-class culture,
and the P-type system with a "traditional" culture. As I
stated in Chapter 5, the survey dots do not provide any
evidence for a link between the housekeeping system end
the typo of conjugal role relationship (but neither does
it provide any evidence that there is no such link). In .
fact, the survey data provide little information on the
conjugal role-relationship itself, so that I am really
unable to investigate the effect which role-relationships
might have on labour supply decisions. However, it does
seem plausible that the association between segregated
conjugal role-relationships end "traditionalism" entails
that the P-type system, too, is associated with this type
of role-relationship.
Phe^negative income effect
In Chapter 2, I suggested that the utility which a
worker obtains from marginal earnings (S.1-1,3.) may be
effected by the distribution of marginal income within the
family. I therefore suggested that certain types of house-
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keeping arrangement.providing a low H.M.E. for the husband,
would predispose him to work less hours when his wage rate
was increased.
Studies over time, involving responses to wage in¬
creases, would obviously be the only conclusive way to
establish determinants of the negative income effect. But
the static data available hero can at least provide us with
a plausible hypothesis. Money - i.e. income - is only
desirable for most individuals as a means to exchange, The
individual's reward from marginal earnings is seen in terms
of goods. Consequently, how much he wants to work for more
money will depend on how badly he wants to extend his range
of purchases. It has already been pointed out that P-type
husbands ere less materially ambitious than A-type husbands,
spend their pocket money on goods tor which there is a low
elasticity of demand, and are less likely to devote their
overtime earnings to household purposes. They are also
less likely to be involved with their wives in joint
saving for household purposes. It seems likely, therefore,
that P-type husbands are much more likely to exhibit the
negative income effect than A-type husbands, although in
order to show this one would need to conduct a long¬
itudinal study on people's reactions to wage rate changes.
Summary of findings concerning the effect of
housekeeping arrangements on overtime working
In Chapter 2 I put forward the hypothesis that the ,use
made of the family's discretionary labour power will be
determined not with reference to the family's total needs,
(perceived through discussion with other family members or
through consensus derived frora social norms) but with
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reference to the individual's subjective perception of the.
benefits he will obtain from the collective and personal
uses of his earnings. This would mean that the way in
which income from different sources is allocated to
different uses in the family budget, may hove incentive or
disincentive effects upon the individual's use ox his or
her discretionary labour power. But, os shown in this
section, it turns out that the effect of the distribution
of income within the family is much more subtle than any
individualistic incentive effect of the kind postulated by
Bremen (op.eit. 1959), Hillwsrd (op.ext. 1968) or
Shimmins (op.cit. 1962). P-type husbands, are less likely
than A-type husbands to give their wives e housekeeping
allowance which includes overtime earnings, and have a
fund more strictly reserved for their personal expenditure
than do the A-type husbands (whose "pocket money" is inter¬
changeable with some collective expenditures), so that they
appear to have a greater incentive to work overtime than
the A-type husbands. But in practice they do not, be¬
cause of the low income-elasticity of demand for the com¬
modities on which the husband spends his pocket money.
(See Chapter 5)* it seems likely that A-type husbands, on
the other hand, participate with the wife in making de¬
cisions about collective epnsnditures to a much greater
extent than P-type husbands. If so, the proportion of
expenditures for collective purposes of which the husband
approves and in which he has an interest, is likely to be
larger v/ith the A-type housekeeping system than with the
A-type system. Moreover,- a larger proportion of A-type
couples are owner-occupiers, and the A-type couples also
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hove ambitions to purchase durable goods which ere ex¬
tensive relative to the ambitions of the P-type couples*
Consequently, there is a range of goods and services with
a high income-elasticity of demand on which the husband's
marginal (overtime) earnings can be spent, and this
apparently does act as an incentive to do overtime, at
least among the skilled workers.
determinants of the amounts of overtime
worked'by husbands
This section attempts to place the findings of
section 1 in a more general perspective; it examines a
number of determinants of the level of overtime working,
so that the effect of the housekeeping system may be seen
in its contextr
Methods
^ o f-isn a lysis
In order to see the apparent effects of the house¬
keeping system on the use of discretionary labour power
in their proper ■ context, it is necessary to build up a
fairly complete model of the factors affecting overtime
end the interaction between them, and to compare these
factors with the ones identified in other similar studies.
In order to build such a model, analysis of variance would
be the best tool of analysis. But the assumption of .in¬
dependent random samples would not be valid for the com-
2
porison of sub-groups from the sample; and, moreover, the
distribution of overtime hours is not normal, it is bunched
around the lower figures, with a long tail trailing off to
a maximum figure of 30 hours. Another possibility is to
compare'the median overtime hours of the sub-group having
some particular characteristic with the median overtime
*r>
Except for sub-groups divided by employer, such groups would
not bo independent, and, as stated in Chapter 4, it is
doubtful whether the sample is truly random.
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hours of the rest o.f the sample. But this leads to
difficulties if, by examining the determinants of over¬
time within cub-groups, one deals with smaller end
smaller groups of cases, till the median is no longer
meaningful measure. The third alternative is the crude,
but versatile, Q-test. As this works reasonably well
even with very small sub-groups, I decided again to usg
a variable tree based on Q-tests. This required setting




Work 10 or more
hours overtime
Have charactertistic




Ten hours overtime was chosen as the criterion value in such
tobies because it is the median number of overtime hours
for the sample as a whole#
Since very few variables, apart from skill level and
employer, give high 0 values at the level of the whole
sample, the medians were calculated for various sub-groups
to see which variables were worth testing for incorporation
into a variable tree#
Whether to treat employer as s determinant of overtime
raised a difficult problem# At first I tried to avoid .it
by setting up an index which measured each man's hours re¬
lative to the median or mean hours of all those in the
sample working for his employer# But such an index would
have been rather meaningless for individuals from those
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firms poorly represented in the sample, since a median or
mean calculated from two or three cases has little meaning,
However, it appears that variations in hours due to skill
level are much larger then those due to differences be¬
tween employers (see Table 2 below) and, moreover, that o
large part of the differences between firms can be ex¬
plained by the proportion of skilled workers in each firm#
Table 2




or more 12 51 45
Less than 10
hours 18 14 52
Total 50 45 75
Notes: Q=0.54: = 6.14 • signifi¬
cance is obtained at the 97«5/»
confidence level.
This table includes all men with
children who can choose how many
hours they work.
Table 5 shows the median hours worked by the sub-
sample from each firm, end the number of skilled workers
in.each such sub-sample.
Table 5
Overtime hours and the Proportion of
Skilled Workers in"different firms
(a) Men who can choose how much overtime they work,
excluding firms represented by less than five
men in the sample
Pirn Median hours Hughor of Number of
overtime """ men skilled
Vv OXX'3X3
Gas Board 1?»33 " 8 5
Rubber Factory 13-00 13 4
252.
Firm I■ledian hours Number of Number of
overtime men skilled
workers
Brewery 10.00 14 2
British Rail 10.40 11 9
Bur- Company 21.00 10 0
Larger
Printing Firm 3.60 _9 _Z
All these firms 10.40 65 27
(b) All firms in the sample,





All men 10.50 79
Skilled workers 9.24 33
Unskilled
workers 12.20 46
Notes: 1. The firms which are represented in the sample
by less than five men are excluded from the
first part of this table, since the data for
them would really be meaningless.
2. Men who could not choose how much overtime to
work were excluded. This cuts out the only
two "controls" (with no children) in this sub-
sample.
3. Four men's overtime hours were not ascertained
because they were ill or on holiday the week
preceding the interview.
There is a tendency for the amounts of overtime worked
by the company sub-samples to be inversely related to the
proportion of skilled workers. This is particularly true
at the extremes of the working-hours- range; the printers,
doing least overtime, are nearly all skilled workers, but
the busmen, who do most overtime, are all unskilled. The
brewery is rather out of line with the other firms, with a
median figure of 10 overtime hours worked, but very few
skilled workers. This may be because several of the men
in the sample went onto a "consolidated wage" system during
the survey period, whereby overtime was reduced as part of a
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productivity deal. . (I have considered these people as
amongst those not free to choose how much overtime they
worked, for the purpose of further analysis® They wore
offered a package deal of 10 hours compulsory overtime in
return fox^ an increase in the basic wage).
All except one of the employer variables, despite
the relatively high Q-velues which they produce when
tabulated against overtime (see Table 4- in the next
section) shrink into unimportance as determinants of over¬
time within the skilled and unskilled groups respectively®
Within the unskilled group, those who work for the bus
company work particularly long hours, and so this variable
does appear in the variable tree.
Determinants of overti'1": sunmany and comparison
with Prices and Incomes board finlings
The variables which produced any noticeable
differences in overtime hours are listed in Table 4- below.
Some of the variables included in this table ro?o variables
which one would expect to make some difference to the
amount of overtime worked, but which in fact make very
little difference, such as hire purchase committments,
do-it-yourself work interests, being a large-scale owner-
occupier (which means heavy financial commitments) end
also the housekeeping system. I have already pointsd^aut,
in the first section of this chapter, that the house¬
keeping system is strongly associated with the amount of
overtime worked by skilled workers, although it is not
associated with overtime in the sample as a whole. It is
possible that a number of cultural characteristics are, in
the some way as"the housekeeping system, associated with
skill level in such a way that their effect on overtime is
25*4-
cancelled out, in the sample as a whole, by the effect of
skill level on overtime. 1 therefore decided to include
in the tests made to establish the variable tree, both the
housekeeping system end other variables which ere found to
influence overtime working in another study. Several of
the variables listed in (Table 4 were suggested to be of
importance in what is probably the most important British
study on the factors affecting the amount of overtime men
do - the Prices and Income Board Report: "Hours of Work,
Overtime and Shiftworking" (December 1970). This con¬
tains the result of s survey of establishments concerning
the incidence of overtime and shiftworking.
Table 4
Vcriables relate A to the amount of
overtime worked
Variable or Median hours Median hours















































































































































Q-valires were based on tables of the
form described on page 246 of this
chapter.
Totals exclude those who said they
could not choose how much overtime they
worked,
Controls are also excluded.
In both their study and this one, it appears that the
amount of overtime work done is greater amongst the un¬
skilled and semi-skilled, car-owners and those paying
2%
mortgagesj and less eraongst those who take port in sporting
7
activities,''' (though the influence of the lest three factor
is very smell in my sample token as o whole). Che Prices
and Incomes Board also find that men with on interest in
"do-it-yourself" activities work more overtime then those
who do not. In the Edinburgh sample, those interested in
"do-it-yourself" activities work less then the rest. A
possible reason for this difference is that, whereas in the
N,B.P.I, sample, do-it-yourself activities ore strongly
associated with owner-occupancy, in ray sample, about half
the do-it-yourself enthusiasts are tenants. It may be that
the KPBI's finding is really a spurious one, and that in
fact the "d.i.y." men really work more than the others just
because they are owner-occupiers, This would explain why
the seme sort of association does not occur in the
Edinburgh sample. On a priori grounds, one would expect
men with d.i.y, interests to work shorter- hours than the
others, Do-it-yourself work, after all, is analogous to
the "domestic production" of the wife, and in economic term
it is en alternative to paid work, since it saves the house
holder money spent on other people's labour.
The only other simple factor which the Prices and
Incomes Board find has en influence on overtime is "relaxin
reeling, playing records, etc." as a main leisure activity,
which exerts a downward influence on the amount of overtime
worked. This type of leisure pursuit was mentioned only
three times in the Edinburgh sample - very few men, in fact
mentioned leisure activities other than visiting pubs,
watching television, playing or watching football, playing
golf, and "do-it-yourself" work,
x
op.cit., p.183 et seq. of supplement.
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This rather narrow range of leisure activities is
!
perhaps accounted for by the fact that the men in the
Edinburgh sample worked-unusually long hours compared to
the national average for their industries and compared to
the men in the Prices and Incomes Board sample- (See
table below). The EPBI report does not give any data on
the amounts of overtime done by the "high overtime" and
"low overtime" workers in their sample, but it is clear
from the proportions in these two categories that the
median amount of overtime worked was not less than 6 hours.
In the Edinburgh sample the median amount of overtime
worked was around 10 hours. Since unemployment in
Scotland is higher than in the country as a whole, those
long working hours were probably not due to a local
shortage of labour. Several men in the sample - the
printers, particularly, but also some of the rubber
factory workers - reported that the amount of overtime
work available in their firm, or department had fallen in
the last year. These long working hours may have been due
to the fact that all the men in my sample (except the 7
controls) had dependent children. It was found by the
KPBI that, as one would expect, men with dependent
children tend to work relatively long hours. On the other
hand, the control couples did not work much less; their
average working hours were 4-8.9, which is still higher
than the national average, though with only seven in the




National average overtime hours in
different industries ~~
October 1968
All industries: 5»8 hours per week
Pood, drink end tobaccoj 7*6r ->'c
Engineering end electrical goods: 5»o
Timber, furniture, etc: 5,9
Paper, printing and publishing: 6,2
Transport end communication
(excluding railways) : 10.4-
Gesj electricity end water: 3*9
Construction: 7.6
Other- manufacturing: 6.7
Source: Statistics on Prices, Incomes,
Employment and Production,
Kerch, 1969• (Deportment- of
Employment end Productivity)
Relationships between the variables which
Tn7Tu~nce^oyarrime~~cnA~tne"vorf r.oTe^l:r~e
Returning now to the list of characteristics given in
Table A, one must consider which of them ere independent
of each other? Moreover, which can be said to have s
casual influence on overtime, rather than being o result
of the amount of overtime worked?
The variable entitled "husband and wife have entirely
separate friends" is a particularly problematic one in this
respect. This variable refers to e state of affairs in
which the wife has her friends and the husband his; they
are two distinct sets of people which do not overlap. One
must ask, does this state of affairs arise because the
husband does a lot of overtime or does he do a let of over¬
time because of it?
2!)9
Only sloven couplos in the sample have a double sat
of acquaintances like this. Such a pattern entails a
high degree of separation of husbands* and wives* leisure
activities. For example, one such couple, who may be
referred to as the "Bobertsons".were "very seldom out
together", The husband's friends were his workmates in
the gas works; his wife 'was a nurse, and had friends who
v/ere also nurses. Their respective work environments
were the main sources of social contact fox"' both Mr. &
Mrs. Kobertson. (Six of the eleven men who had entirely
separate acquaintances from their wives, drev; their
friends mainly from their work-place whereas this was
very unusual in the rest of the sample). Mr. Robertson
worked back shift (4 p.m. to midnight) two weeks out of
three, and night shift the third week, so that they did
not frequently spend their evenings together. Shift
work was compulsory in his job, but Mr. Bobertson did
night shifts more frequently than was obligatory, because
he liked to have an extra day off at the end of the week.
Thus, ho never did day work by choice. Mr. Robertson
worked 18 hours per week overtime in winter; in summer,
when work yes slacker, he mode his week up by doing odd
jobs for friends.
Another couple who had separate acquaintance sets
were Mr. &. Mrs. Clark. They did not entertain anyone at
home except their relatives; Mrs. Clark said she "had a
small circle of her own" but in fact "was only out visit ix
relatives and friends". Mr. Clark played golf and wont fc
a drink with a friend. He did not do shift work, but
worked between 57 and SO hours per week none the less,
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usually over both days of the weekend* He was a main¬
tenance worker at the rubber factory. (He said that he
took ell the overtime going, although there did not seem
to be any special reason why he should work so hard -
they had saved £150 in the last year, which was not ear¬
marked for any special purchase). Asked: "Does the
amount of tax you pay discourage you from trying to earn
an much as possible?" he said "yes, but I still work".
Mr* Clark said he liked his trade, and that he would not
do anything different if he could have the choice of
starting all over again. Ills father worked for the same
firm.
Probably such a pattern of separate acquaintances
is both cause and effect of the husband's involvement in
his work, in such families as these, The more a man finds
satisfaction in the company of his workmates, the less
are the disutilities attached to work, and the longer
hours he will be prepared to work. But on the other hand,
e pattern of very long working hours, once established -
end it may be established in the first place for purely
economic reasons - may cut a man off from acquaintances
outside the workplace. This is particularly likely if he
does shift-work. But some of the things Mr. Clark said
suggest that the first point was the salient one for him.
The fact that he positively liked his work, although he
did so much of it, and that it was, for him, part of a
family tradition, supports the idea that work involvement
induces people to work long hours, rather than vice verse.
_ The same issue of" "cause or effect?" arises with
other aspects of a man's leisure activities which appear to
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be associated with his overtime work, • Both participation
in sport and an interest in do-it-yourself activities are
associated with relatively low amounts of overtime in
this sample. One could argue that men work less overtime
because they have o hobby which makes leisure parti¬
cularly attractive to them. But on the other hand, men
might develop such interests when they have time on their
hands, perhaps when little overtime is available* If
this happens, their established hobby might make them
less willing to do overtime at a later period. Because
of this possible "self-reinforcing" effect of these two
leisure activities, I decided to continue to regard them
as independent variables which have a causal effect on
overtime, insteed of vice versa. The seme applies to the
two variables describing friendship patterns. ("Husband
and wife have mainly Joint friends" is at the opposite
pple to having separate acquaintance sets; it means that
the acquaintance sets of husband and wife overlap to a
high degree).
The variable tree developed to explain differences
in overtime working is shown below. A problem arose as
to which variable to use for the initial sub-division of
the sample. The variable with the higher Q-value for the
whole sample is "works for a printing firm" but "segre¬
gated network" comes a very close second. 1 decided to
use the second variable for two reasons: firstly that a
largo port of the difference in overtime working between
the printing firms and the rest of the sample can be
explained by the high proportion of skilled workers
amongst this group: end secondly, that many of the
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printers said that overtime was unusually low at the time
of the survey. The most remarkable thing ©bout this tree
is the importance of the two non-economic variables, the
separate acquaintance sets end, for the skilled workers,
the housekeeping system. The Q—value for the
acquaintance sets variable is extremely high, and there
is a reesonsMe probability that such a result would be
replicated in a larger sample, provided this scrapie is
not non-random in respect of the way overtime and friend¬
ship patterns ere related# This relationship is signifi¬
cant at the 99$ level of confidence (using Fisher's
exact tost).
f^ricblo T^eo for Overtime Hours
Whole sample ,* excluding controls
(43 high, 32 low)
T ~ —5 — i
husband end wife have husband end wife do not have
seoorato acquaintance separate acquaintance sets
sets " >, (33 high, pi low)
(10 high, 1 low).... Q«0.31 .... <
^ _j — |
skilled workers unskilled workers
(8 high, 16 low)..Q»0*3/t''.«(23 high, 15 low)
I '—i -—I .
A-type house- P-type system housekeeping
keev-iny system (1 high, 6 low) system not
(6 high, 7 low) " known
I ..... .....
. 1 Pig
^ ( — —~I
participate don't take bus workers nor bus
in sport part in (8 high, 2 low) workers
(2 high, 5 low) sport (1? high,
('*■ high, 2 low) 13 low)
»«#.* Q«=G«67 ..... ♦»«!«. Q®Q»9c- *• *■ • {
.
j •«
have car don't have ear
(/ nxgii, p low) (10 high, X\< ■■
«... ."tQ .... |
I — 1—~ -*
have high purchase no hire pur-
commitments chase commit-
(7 high, h low) menfco
(3 high, 6 low-
See notes over page. **■•«» o.IS6»r....
(1 high, 3 low)
2,63
Kotos: 1 "Whole sample" moans all those who
(a) have children; (b) can choose
how much overtime they do; (c) whoso
overtime hours are known end (d) whose
housekeeping system is known to be
either A-type or P-type.
2 "High" overtime means 10 hours per
week or more; "low" overtime less than
10 hours.
3 The "sport" end "car o\mership" di~
visions are dubious in so far as one
or two cases transferred to another
category could reduce the Q-value in
either case to less than 0.3? which is
meaningless. However, car ownership
is the only variable which has a Q~
value even as high as 0.4-0 at that
stage in the tree.
A- Significant at the confidence level of
99»9/o, using Fisher's exact test.
3 Significant at the confidence level of
The probability of the housekeeping system having a
similar effect in a larger sample is more doubtful - with¬
in the sub-group of skilled workers not having separate
table of overtime against housekeeping system in the
sample as a whole is 3»!2, which would not make the re¬
sult significant at any normal confidence level, but would
allow a confidence level of over 90$. As shown in the
variable tree, the relationship becomes significant when
the sub-group in which husband and wife have separate
acquaintance sets is removed from the sample.
These results therefore offer a pointer towards two
potentially important variables which the Prices and Income
Board may hove found without actually identifying them. Th
cluster analysis carried out bythe Prices and Incomes Board
cn their sample does not obtain any groups in which the pro
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portion of men doing overtime was substantially below the
sample average, but those two clusters in which it was
above the sample average have some characteristics in
common with the two groups I hove identified in this
analysis as having the strongest tendency to do large
amounts of overtime. The first cluster, which the Prices
and Incomes Board entitle "young marrieds", are defined
as relatively young workers with dependent children, re¬
latively likely to hove cars and to be buying their
houses, all of which are characteristics of the A-type
sen in the Edinburgh sample. The second cluster
identified by the Prices end Incomes Board, which they
call "work oriented, including social life", is, like the
group with separate acquaintances sets in the Edinburgh
sample, a group who are strongly involved in their work\
"their involvement in their firm is further indicated by
their stronger interest than most groups in social and
sports amenities, good worker/management relations,
interesting work and a friendly atmosphere". It is
suggested, therefore, that these two variables are of
considerable interest and that they would be worth in¬
vestigation in a larger* sample.
Summary of findings on the determinants
of overtime
This variable tree has confirmed the relatively high
importance of the housekeeping system as a determinant of
overtime amongst the group of skilled workers* It also
shows the worker's social network to bo a very important
determinant of overtime. In agreement with the Prices and
Incomes Board's findings, car ownership, hire purchase
commitments and interest in sport also appear to have a
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substantial influonce on overtime in this sample.
3. The Labour Force Participation of fives
The objectives of analysing this aspect of the
family's labour supply are similar to the objectives of
analysing men's overtime working. Firstly, it is intended
to examine the general determinants of women's labour
force participation; the housekeeping system being amongst
the variables to be tested. The relative importance of
the latter may then be seen in its proper context.
Secondly, I have pieced in this section the investigation
of the second hypothesis formulated in Chapter 2; that is
so far as the family's supply of labour is a joint effort
to supply joint needs, the wife's labour should be a sub¬
stitute for the husband's. If this is the case, ones would
expect a negative correlation between hours worked by
wives and hours worked by husbands.
The^influence^of chan^in^custom
The first question which should perhaps be asked is,
to what extent is the labour of married women discre¬
tionary? If it were the custom for all wives to work,
just as it is the custom for all men to work, we should
not need any explanation of why wives work. Both
sociologists and economists have, up till now, found it
necessary to ask this question bocause a large proportion
of married women still do not work; hence the large volume
of literature presenting various answers. Rossett (1953)
finds that successive cohorts ("generations") of women up
to the late fifties have boon more likely to work than the
cohorts b.efore them. He thinks that the most recent co¬
hort has come to work about as much as child care commit-
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merits will permit, end that therefore the rate of increase
!
in the labour force participation of women is slowing up0
What, then, is the limit determined by child care commit¬
ments? Audrey Hunt (1965) finds that 4-1*5$ of mothers
of school-age children worked, but only 15,6$ of mothers
of children aged under 5, and only 19.3$ of mothers of 5
to 4 year olds. Thus, mothers are much less likely to
work if their children are under school age. One m.s$s
postulate that unless end until more nursery facilities
become available, tn1 gain acceptance amongst mothers,
this barrier to women's employment will remain; that
wives will tend to give up work during their first preg¬
nancy, and not recommence until their youngest child is
at least five. Wives' employment could increase up to
the maximum compatible with this constraint, and, in so
far as attitudes towards women working have become more
favourable amongst successive generations of women and
their husbands, one would expect the younger cohorts to
approach maximum participation mora nearly than elder co¬
horts. In fact, a cohort can be identified in the
Edinburgh sample who seem to have nearly reached a maxi¬
mum for part-time employment. These are the group of
women who have no pre-school children, and who had their
first child in 1956 or later; almost all of this group
work, although most of them only part-time. Women who had
their first child before 1956 are rather less likely to'
work, although only one of them had a child below school
age at the time of the survey. It may be that this co¬
hort in the sample represent.a generation of women for
whom it is customary to work once their children .are at
26'
school. On the other bend, it may be that the proportion
of women working in this sample is unusually high for
some reason, as is the incidence of overtime work amongst
the men, Exactly half of the women in the main sample
with children work, whereas Audrey Hunt finds that even
amongst women whose children are at school, the proportion
of workers was only 4-1.5# in 1965. Amongst the women with
schoolchildren in the Edinburgh sample, five cut of six
work; even amongst those with pre-school children, just
over one quarter work (see Table 7 below).
Table 7
'fife's employment by age of
children
Wife works Wife does not Total
At least one child




some school- 35 7 42
children or working
children under 19^
No children yet 30 3
Children all 19 or
over 3 14
Total 55 4-2 97
i.
There was no family in the sample having only
working teenagers and no schoolchildren.
It appears, then, that either because of their particular
economic circumstances,or because many of them belong to
a generation of women who are more work-oriented then any
previous generation, the work of these Edinburgh wives
nay be less "discretionary'' than that of many other samples
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which have been studied in Britain end the U.S.A. In
other words it is possible that these women feel that
their husbands, and other relatives and friends, con¬
sider it usual that wives should contribute to the family
income. From thinking it normal for women to work, it is
only a short step to thinking that they ought to work.
Perhaps some families, particularly the poorer ones, do
think this already. If this attitude were to become
general, one would see no reason to do research on women's
motives for working; possibly we ore moving towards an age
when all married women will work once their children are
at school, in which case the prediction of married women's
participation in the labour force would become a very
simple matter.
Tdne yegi.ablo tree end the importance""
One must regard the presence of pre-school children
es the over-riding factor in the explanation of why some
wives .in the sample work and others do not. The focus of
interest in the data is the minority of mothers of pre¬
school children who did work, and the even smaller
minority of older women who did not work. A variable
tree was drawn up to attempt to explain why women in the
sample worked or did not work using the Q-test again to
find the most important variable in each sub-group. The
results are as follows:-
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All mothers
(4-9 work, '11 do not)
1 1
have pro-school do not have pra-school
children children
(11-work, 3<1 do not) (35 work, 7 do, not)





















wife disapproves wife does' not
of women working disapprove of
when they have women with
young children young children
(1 works, 15 do not) working
(13 work, 9 do not)











(3 work, 7 do
not)
"1
husband is an un¬
skilled worker
(10 work, 2 do not)
.9. Q=0.81*
Note: All the relationships shown in this tree
ore significant at least at the 97•5%
level of confidence.(Fisher's exact test
was used for those starred, T2 for the
others).
This analysis shows that above a certain income level, women
with pre-school children do not generally work. Below the
income level of £1300 per year, whether the mothers of pre¬
school children work depends to a large extent on their
attitude to child cere. (Such attitudes were expressed in
response to an open question: "Do you think it's a good
thing for married women to work, in general?"). Those
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mothers of under-fives who thought a women's place was in
the home whilst she had young children (some specified
children under 5) were most unlikely to work, even if they
had a relatively low family income from #fcner sources# In
the group of young children's mothers who did not hove a
disapproving attitude, the skill level of the husband
appears as a further variable distinguishing those who
work from those who do not# At this stage, any
dichotomisation of the.income variable, taken as husband's
take-home pay, does not produce such a high Q~value as
skill level# It could be, however, that the skilled
workers' wives consider themselves better off because their
husbands have higher basic wage rates than the unskilled
husbands, end that this is why these skilled workers'
wives tend not to work whilst the unskilled men's wives
mainly do.
A cross-sectional negative income effect, then, is
definitely present amongst the mothers of pre-school
children, but it does not appear amongst other wives. For
the older women, those whose children are at school, the
generation to which they belong is the main determinant of
whether they work. Since neither the women's actual age
nor the dotes of their marriages ere known, I took the
date of birth of their first child as the best available
indicator of age. 1956 in the date which most sharply
distinguishes the work-oriented generaticn from the pre¬
vious generation.
Both Mincer (1962) end Coin (1966) find that the "wage-
effect" - the positive influence of the wife's own potential
earnings on her willingness to work - is stronger in cress-
2-71
section then the negative income effect of the husband's
pay. This is not so in the Edinburgh sample\ perhaps
partly because there is little variation in the wives'
wage rates, as shown in Table 9 below . However, 1 am
also suspicious of the nature of the data presented as
evidence for the "wage-effect" by these two writers.
That higher-paid women are more likely to work than lower
paid women may simply indicate that women in professional
and clerical occupations have e more favourable attitude
towards the ides of mothers working than, women in manual
occupations. Or it may indicate that women in non-manual
gobs find v;ork more interesting. Audrey Hunt finds that
women in non-manual occupations are more likely to be
motivated to work by non-financial considerations that
women in manual occupations. Such non-financial reasons
are; to hove company, to avoid boredom, to use qualifi¬
cations or interest in a particular field of work. Time-
series data, showing that as women's wage rates have
risen over time, more married women have taken to working,
ere adduced as evidence for the "wage-effect". But this
rise in women's wage rotes has been taking place at the
same time as a widespread change in attitudes towards
wives working, and at the same time as a change in the
distribution of women between different occupations. Over
the last few decades, the proportion of women in clerical
jobs has risen very rapidly, and the proportion in domestic
service has declined. In other words, women hove become
increasingly able to obtain jobs which provide interest
and company. In the Edinburgh sample, there is also some
2?2
evidence that women who hod non-manual jobs (excluding
shop work ) before marriage, and their husbands, are less
likely to express total disapproval of married women
working than ore women who had manual jobs before marriage,
end their husbands. Of the 27 women in the sample with
children who had non-manual jobs before marriage, only one
was entirely against married women working, although two
of these women's husbands were. But of the S3 women in the
sample with children who had manual jobs before marriage,
nine expressed unqualified disapproval of married women
working and 14 of their husbands did. Could this be be¬
cause non-manual work is regarded as cleaner and less
tiring, less likely to moke a women too tired for her
domestic work and perhaps more respectable? Or because the
increasing employment of women in factories is seen to be a
threat to men's employment, and this feeling is ration¬
alised into en idee that work interferes with a woman's
domestic role? The latter explanation seems unlikely, for
only one man who disapproved of women working, did so be¬
cause he thought women were putting men out of jobs. The
former explanation seems plausible, but the survey offers
no further data to support it.
Some shop occupations (e.g. supermarket cashier, or
stores assistant) are effectively manual, so 1 ex¬
cluded five former shop assistants on the grounds










































^2klZ£i5„2i_v'222™'s rd'titudes to work
Since the variable tree shows this factor to be of
considerable importance amongst the mothers of pre-school
children, I have analysed it at some length« Tables 10
and 11 show that women ere more likely to express concern
that working mothers should not neglect their children,
rather than to say that married women should not work at
all. This tendency is particularly marked where the
Mi
women herself has a pre-school child# The men in the
■W
sample, on the other hand, were oust ss likely to express
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total disapproval for married women working cs to moke
objections related to children. However, there does not
seem to be any association between the husband's attitude,
where ascertained, and whether the wife does work or not.
Perhaps husbands hove become less influential in this
respect in recent years; Thompson and Findleyson (196.3)
report, of an Aberdeen sample ox mothers of pre-school
children interviewed in 1954, that a large proportion of
those women wanted to work but their husbands would not
let them.
Table 10
Attitudes to married women's employment




















3) It is all right
for married women


















See notes over page,
2?5
1
Note: The question was not asked of 10 husbands
and two wives* In the second version of
the questionnaire the question to husband's
was deleted, because it seemed that where
husband and wife disagreed, it was
damaging rapport, and because the husband's
attitude did not seem to have any effect on
whether the wife worked* However, several
husbands made spontaneous replies ^ven when
the question was only asked of their wives
which was the main issue at stake* The
wording of the question for wives was also
changed because I feared that some of the
replies which were given in answer to the
old question, "Bo you think it's a good
thing for married women to work, in general?
might be producing replies which the in¬
formants felt were expected of them (for
example, some which referred to delinquency
and to "children left on the streets")
rather than expressing their- real personal
feelings on the matter. The new question
asked wqs "Would you prefer to work or stay
at home?" In fact, the women who were asked
the revised question showed no smaller
tendency to express some degree of dis¬
approval than did the.women asked the
original question. The women replying inde¬
pendently of their husbands to the old
question were divided into half (19) who
approved of women working unconditionally,
and half who disapproved to some extent* Of
the women replying to the revised question,
9 disapproved, 10 approved and 2 gave am¬
biguous replies.
Table 11
Attitudes to married women world,ng
expressed by mothers of"""cTToc'l-
children and thVir~T;.usbands
Categories of opinion Opinion expressed by:
Husband only Wife only Both
1) Married women should 2 17
not work if they have
young children
2) Married wornen should 3 2 2
not work (unqualified)
3) It is all right for
married women to work p c o










2or person not 3 0
present
6) Question not asked 10 0 0
Total 22 22 20
Of the couples whose children hod grown up, ell four hus¬
bands (but only one wife) expressed total disapproval of
married women working. Of the couples with no children
yet, ell three approved of married women working, both
husbands and wives. Comparing the control group with the
rest of the sample this suggests that favourable attitudes
towards wives working have become more common over time,
A variable more generally associated with unqualified
disapproval on the part of the husband is the type of
acquaintences a couple have, .(Twelve couples in the sample
mentioned no friends, apart from relations^ and four
mentioned only one. Of these 16 couples, nine husbands
expressed unqualified disapproval of married women working,
whilst in the rest of the sample, only 10 other husbands
held this view, (Q=0*78: this relationship is not, how¬
ever, significant). One may speculate that if this re¬
lationship is vaM, it exists for the following reasons.
that it is possible that husbands who hold this sort of
opinion are people who hove few social contacts outside
the family because they do not find a need for them. Such
people would perhaps bo less sympathetic to the view of the
woman who wants to go out to work for the soke of company.
Onr?
£-((
Also, if they have no close contacts with non-relatives,
men may be more influenced by the older generation whose
attitudes to women working are less favourable. Shis
could apply to the wives in this sub-group too#
In this group of 16 family-oriented couples, six of
the men's wives agreed with their husbands in saying that
married women should not work at all, three disapproved
only in so far as the children might be effected, and
seven approved of wives working. Thus, ell the couples
who jointly expressed total disapproval of women working
wore in this family-oriented minority.
The "disapproving" wives amongst those with pre¬
school children, both those who were entirely against
women working and those who thought it was a bad thing
while the children were young, possibly felt able to in¬
dulge in their misgivings about mothers' employment be¬
cause they had relatively less responsibility for bud¬
geting than other mothers of pre-school children. The A-
typo housekeeping system, in which the husband takes a
relatively lorgor amount of responsibility for budgeting
that in the P-type system, is relatively common amongst
the disapproving group, as shown in the table below,
although this relationship also is not significant ; 0^ <=
3.61 : Q-0.54).
Table 12
Attitudes to work and housekeeping
system amongst mothers of
pre-school cinderon
Housekeeping Disapproves Does not Total
system ' disapprove
A-typo 10 10 20
P-type 6 20
r\ f
Total lb 30 46
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Moreover, within the group of A-type cases in this
table, the disapproving wives are more likely than the
Approving wives to have their husbands pay for hire pur¬
chase instalments (Q3s0»?5)l more likely to have their
husbands pay for furniture (Q»0,5;+)> as wo11 as for toys
for the children (Q-C-'/G) * They ere barely more likely
to have their husbands pay for their own (the wives')
clothes (Q~0»33)» Thus it appears that the mothers of
pre-school children who are apparently kept from working
by their attitude towards the care of children, are in
fact given less incentive to work, by virtue of the house¬
keeping system they operate, than are other mothers of pre¬
school children. Perhaps, basically, ell mothers of young
children feel this way, but those who find it hard to
manage on their housekeeping money accept that financial
necessity may have to over-rule other considerations. The
point is not that the husband's taking responsibility for
the items of expenditure just mentioned necessarily gives
the family a ligher standard of living. Rather, these
items are items of discretionary expenditure, which people
like to foel they can splash out on every now and again.
They feature prominently in the things which working wives
in the sample spy they spend their money onjjf as shown in
the next table. This suggests that many women work in
order to have a fund from which discretionary expenditures
can be paid for as required; they like to have a bit of
money for non-essential purposes under their control, so
5
that they do not have to ask their husbands for too much,
5
c.f, the view of Pearl Jephcott, referred to in Chapter
3, that the wife's wages give a welcome degree of
flexibility to the family budget.
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Those whose husbands expect to provide for discretionary
expenditure are not, therefore, so strongly motivated to
work as the others.
In practice, it is difficult to see how the mothers
of pro-school children who did work, were neglecting
their small children. One of this group of working women
took her child to her mother's while she worked. Another
sent her child to a public nursery. Two domestic helps
took their children with them to work, Three women
worked in the smell hours of the morning before their
husbands went to work, and eight had evening jobs. (The
lost of the 1A working mothers of pre«school children was
a shop assistant, and it is not recorded what she did
with her child while at work)« Thus, there were very
few who handed a young child over to someone else whilst
they were at work. Perhaps the disapproval expressed by
so many mothers in the s ample was induced by the mass
mediaj or perhaps it was a "respectable" attitude which
people wanted to emphasise to the interviewer. Some
statements made by women in the sample, such as: "I
think it (mothers working) causes a lot of delinquency",
or "It's all right if the children are not left in the
streets" seem to support the former hypothesis. (3ach
of these statements occurred three times in varying
forms). Alternatively, the idea that a woman's first .
duty as a mother should preclude her working may be e
widely held view amongst a certain section of the working-
class - perhaps those whom Margaret Stacey (I960) would
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However, these doubts as to the genuineness of this
attitude cannot be used as on argument that the house¬
keeping system, rather than attitudes, is "really" the
determinant of labour force participation in the lower-
income section of the pre-school children's mothers#
Attitude does have a higher Q-value than the house¬
keeping system for this group#
Effect of help from husbands
This survey did not investigate the extent to which
husbands helped with domestic t&sds?; evidence on this
point from other studies suggests, however, that this
would have been substantial. Goldthorpa and Lockwood
(1969, page 107) find that 43# of manual workers in their
sample helped to put their children to bed, and 30#
he3.ped to take younger children and babies out. Jephcott
(1962) thinks that the help given to the working wife by
her husband was substantial but does not specify any data.
Audrey Hunt (1935) finds that 67.8# of all married women
received some help from their husbands, but only 54.8#
of working wives did. Thompson and Findleyson (1963) also
find that working wives get less help from their husbands
than housewives| 54# of working wives, but 72# of house-
wives, received some help. Since Thompson end Eindlayson.
were writing some years earlier than Audrey Hunt, end
since one would expect, if anything, a trend towards
greater help being given by husbands, it is possible to
dismiss any idea that Scottish families ore "behind the
times" in this respect. I am therefore tempted to re¬
iterate the suggestion that the disapproving mothers'
attitude in the Edinburgh sample was not generated by the
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fear that their husbands were unable isr unwilling to
cope with the children in the early morning or evening,
bpt possibly by statements made by television and the
press about the ill-effects of mothers working on
children's behaviour«
Effect^of segregation in the conjugal role -
relationship - — ^ - - -
Why do two of the studies referred to find that
working mothers receive less help from their husbands
than non-working mothers? It seems worth digressing a
little on this issue because it throws some light on the
connections between attitudes to work the housekeeping
system and role segregation. Could it be that the younger
the children, the more help the mother requires, and at
this stage of the family's development she is least
likely to work? (Phis could bo the explanation in Audrey
Hunt's sample, but it is less likely to be so in
♦Thompson's end Findlayson*s study, which is entirely about
families with children under These authors suggest
that both a relative laok of help on the pert of the hus¬
band, and a tendency for the wife to work, are produced
by a "lack of family integration", a concept which they
do not define very clearly, but which may be useful if it
con bo clarified. If "lack of family integration" means
a high degree of role segregation, both in task-per-
forraance and in financial responsibility, it could cor¬
respond to the 3?-type housekeeping system. As stated in
the last chapter, this type of housekeeping system en¬
tails strong segregation of economic roles, with the wife
as "manager" and the husband as "breadwinner"• It also
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entails some segregation of leisure activities. In this
chapter, I have already presented some evidence that the
A-type housekeeping system is associated with un¬
favourable attitudes to work on the part of the mothers
of pre-school children. So there may be an interesting
set of associated continue herej-
low family integration,
defined as high role
differentiation «•••••••••»•• high family integration
defined as high partici
pation by husband in
domestic tasks
P-type housekeeping
system A-type housekeeping sys
Favourable attitude to work
on the part of the wife ........ Unfavourable attitude t
work
If these continue are valid and are associated, it means
one has to be careful in relating the trend towards a
greater proportion of married women working with a
gradual breakdown of the traditional division of labour
between the sexes, as Jephcott and, for that matter,
Dermis, Henr'cques and Slaughter (1962) seem to do. For
if, in cross-section data, s willingness to work on the
part of the wife goes with low family integration,
little domestic help from the husband, and high role
differentiation, it seems likely that the apparent re¬
lationship between the breakdown of the sexual division
of labour and a greater propensity of women to work,
could in fact be spurious. However, one should perhaps
be cautious about positing any new hypothesis on the
basis of these continue. The apparent relationship be¬
tween the P-type housekeeping system end s favourable
attitude to work could merely reflect the association
28H-
betwoen the P-type system end having an unskilled hus¬
band with relatively low earning capacity. The numbers
hero are too small to investigate whether the
association between the housekeeping system end the
wife's attitude to work, which I have described, is in¬
dependent of skill level of the husband or not.
Relgtionshig^of _ v;oraen^s_pro^ensity^to>rwork
to^tEe^SecSenisB^Ion'or^tlie . home" ~~ "
Do the Edinburgh survey date throw any light on
Clarence Long's hypothesis (1958) that women's propensity
to work is influenced by the extent of mechanisation of
the home? Long thinks that as the standard of living has
risen over the last few decades, homes have become better
equipped with labour-saving devices for the housewife,
end thus women need to spend less time in the performance
* of household tasks. Consequently the marginal utility of
hours spent in "homework" will decline relative to the
marginal utility of time spent at work outside the home.
In any case, on a priori grounds, I em somewhat dubious
of the validity of Long's hypothesis. Even if one does
regard washing machines, vacuum cleaners end so on as
labour-saving innovations, then surely, like innovations
in industry, they must be introduced because there is on
economic need for them which justifies their expense.
One such reason could be that the wife wants to go out to
work, or is already doing so, which creates e potential
or actual shortage of labour for domestic production. A
second reason could be that the standard of hygiene and
home comfort, as well as trie frequency and complexity of
entertaining, increases as the standard of living rises,
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end likewise creates a shortage of domestic labour. A
third such reason could be that as industrialisation -
and, in Europe, war - created demand for female labour,
end raised the wages of women in the industrial sector,
domestic servants became more expensive and harder to
obtain, and the middle-classes therefore used labour-
saving machinery in their homes as a substitute for
servants. This may entail that such machinery has
taken on the significance of o servant-substitute, and
become a symbol of a middle-class standard of living.
Thus, os electrical appliances have become cheaper the
acquisition of such possessions may have become on ob¬
ject of ambition for loss affluent women, and it may be
that they go out to work in order to buy modern domestic
equipment. Jephcott thinks that a large proportion of
working women spend their money on durable goodsi-
"Qne of the claims the Peak Pre an women made was
that their wage enabled them to stock up the
house with better furniture and bedding, with
labour-saving devices, radiograms, and many
big buys they considered benefitted the family
as e whole", (ibid., page 11?)
She did not, however, find that wives who worked were
more likely to have s washing-machine or a refrigerator
than wives who did not work.
°
The prices of electrical applicences have fallen
substantially since the second world war. See
"Long-term forecasts of demand for cars, selected
consumer durables and energy" by 0. St. J. 0'
Herlihy, K. K. Gwilliam? end G. Pone, in National
Institute Economic Review, No.AO, May, 19S?, pp.
3-1-61.
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In the 'Hdinburgh sample, there is hardly any sug¬
gestion that the possession of a range of labour-saving
devices is a necessary condition of going out to work as
Long seems to think. Women who worked were slightly
wore likely to possess washing machines than housewives
(47$ of working wives had them as against 54.2$ of
housewives) but they were no more likely to possess hair
dryers nor vacuum cleaners. Working wives were slightly
less likely to use coal for heating, a practice which
entails extra housework (12 working wives and 17 house¬
wives used coal). Only seven of the housewives said
that they wanted a washing machine - they all had young
children, and therefore would probably not have worked,
however many labour-saving machines they had had. Five
housewives wanted a vacuum cleaner, of whom four had
pre-school children, and six wanted a fridge, of whom
five hod pro-school children. I suggest, therefore,
that married women are not deterred from working by lack
of domestic equipment.
Is there any other evidence, besides Jephcott's,
that working wives do in fact spend their earnings on
durable goods? Audrey Hunt find3 that 20.8$ of married
women say that they spend most of their earnings on
domestic appliances (ibid., p.125, vol 1). In the
Edinburgh sample, very few working women mention durable
goods specifically (see Table 12 above), though a few
more say their earnings ore used for saving, which may
come to the same thing to a large extent. Hore than a
third of the working 'wives in the Edinburgh sample say
they spend their pay on "essentials" or "housekeeping"
28?
and it nay be that in this day and age, furniture and
electrical appliances come under the heading of
essentials, Obviously in many cases durable goods are
purchased with the housekeeping money,.and to the ex¬
tent that the wife's pay goes together with the house¬
keeping money, it will provide more money for this pur¬
pose along with other purposes#
DifTerences^between .full-time^and
Previous writers on the subject of married women *s
employment have paid little attention to tie question of
whether women work full-time or part-time, and why. If
it is becomes increasingly normal for wives to work, this
question becomes of more interest than hitherto. Only
twelve women in the Edinburgh sample worked full-time
(which I defined as over 30 hours per week - in fact all
the full-time workers worked over 35 hours), The table
below shows the distribution of hours fox1 the whole
samplei-
Tsble 14



















Only one of the full-time workers hod s pre-school child.
Eight of the full-time workers had school-age children,
and three had not had any children yet. It is interesting
that' despite the fact that most of the women without pre¬
school children worked, very few of them worked full-
time. What ore the characteristics of the full-time
workers? One ran her own business, so perhaps she
worked full-time because she was interested in her work
and it was particularly profitable, compared to the jobs
of most of the other women in the sample. Three other
full-time women had husbands with very low incomes
(between £16 and £17 per week, as against the median in
the whole sample of £21.8). One of these three was the
only full-time worker with a pre-school child. This
leaves five full-time women with children of school age,
of whom four were clerical workers. Only two of the
part-time workers were in clerical occupations, which
carry a higher wage rate (average 28p per hour), In the
sample than do the manual occupations and shop work in
which most of the working women in the simple were engaged.
The average hourly rate for cleaners and catering workers
in the sample was 24p per hour, and for shop assistants
only 22p per hour. It thus appears that the clerical
workers have a financial incentive to work full time.
Moreover, two of the three women who may have been working
full time because their husbands' wages were so low, were
earning relatively high wages - one had 32p per hour as a
bus conductress, the other 33p per hour as a factory
worker. It is likely, therefore, that there is a "wage-
effect" which is widely responsible for women choosing
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full-time in preference to part-time work; although
women's potential earnings have apparently negligible
influence in this sample on whether women work or not.
The substitutability of husband's
and wife's labour
If there is any possibility of important substitution
effects between wage increases for husbands audthe hour's
worked by wives (or vice versa) one *?ould expect that
husband's and wife's hours would be negatively cor¬
related in a cross-section such as this sample. But the
product-moment correlation a between husband's end wife's
hours ia only 0,08 - a long way short of being statistically
significant.
Within the group of pre-schhol children's mothers, I
have already pointed out that women are more likely to work
if the husband's income is low. This finding confirms that
of Yudkin and Holme (1983) and Hunt (196.9)» who also find
that husband's income has a negative effect on wives'
labour foz'ce participation.
It is also possible to test whether the husband's end
wife's labour are substitutes for each other, in the sense
of whether the wife is more likely to work if the husband
con obtain little overtime. One may postulate that if the
husband is unable to supply the couple's desired standard
of "collective" consumption because not enough work is
available for him, the wife will make up the difference by
working; herself. If no control is made for the income
variable (which would bo impractical because the numbers
ore so small) a table is obtained as follows:-
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Table 13





















Hots: This table excludes control couples (since
their situation is rather different from
those who still have dependents) but it
includes men who cannot choose how much
overtime they do. Information as to how
much overtime was available was obtained
from the questions "How much overtime can
a man (in your job) get if he wants as
much as possible?" Answers to this question
were sometimes vague, but all wore sufficient
to tell whether the answer was at least 10
hours or not.
This table shows that there is no association between
wives working and the husband's opportunities for overtime
work, in either group of mothers.
Summary of findings on the labour force
]parv ic iga^Ton"oT~women "" * * *
In conclusion, it seems that the determinants of
married women's participation in the labour force are
fewer end more simple in this sample then the determinants
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this statement by saying that if the sample were larger,
s greater number of relevant factors might become
apparent. Amongst women with children under school age,
less than a third (29$) work, and those who do are all
in the lower income brackets. Amongst women who do not
have children under school age, five out of six (85$)
work, end almost all of those who do not are older women,
those who started their families before 1955# One may
speculate that once this generation of older women reach
retirement age, it could be almost universal for working-
class women to work once their children are at school.
One could also speculate that as living standards rise,
it will become increasingly rare for women to work
whilst they hove children under school age, since in this
sample, all of the working mothers of pre-school children
ere below a certain husband's income level. If these two
things occur, the prediction of women's partic.it;ation in
the labour force could virtually cease to be on
interesting question for research; age of the youngest
child could be a satisfactory predictive variable in it¬
self. A question of greater potential interest for the
future may be why women work part-time as opposed to full-
time; end here a wage-effect is apparent. Because of the
very large importance of age of children and income as
determinants, in this sample, of women's labour force
participation, the effects of the housekeeping system are
difficult to assess. The only cub-group in which this
factor appears of any importance is the group of mothers
of pre-school children whose family income without the
wife's earnings is less than £1300 per year. Within this
2$2
group, attitudes to-the disutility of mothers working seem
to be the main determinant of whether the women do work.
But on analysing these attitudes one finds that dis¬
approval is associated with the A-type system of financial
arrangements, The numbers involved are too small to dis¬
cover whether this association is spurious.
Previous literature suggests that the wife's pro¬
pensity to work may be increased by role segregation,
which I have previously suggested may be associated with
the P-type system and with individualism in labour- supply
decisions. But the Edinburgh survey data throw no light-
on this hypothesis.
There is no evidence that the wife's hours of work
are negatively associated with che husband's.
5. Conclusions
In summarising the conclusions of this chapter, I
shall include a few minor points raised by earlier
chapters which have not so far been considered. The
following findings have been made:-
(1) The distribution of income fritbin the family does
have an influence on the husband's propensity to work,
but this influence is not of the kind postulated by
Shimmins or Millwerd for working girls, or by Brennan
for fathers of large families. That is to say, the hus¬
band does not regard his reward from marginal earnings as
being solely the extra pocket-money he keeps from those
marginal earnings. The formula postulated for the reward
from marginal earnings, in Chapter 2 appears to be a
reasonable one. This'included those collective expendi¬
tures in which the wage-earner takes on interest and which
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are made possible by his marginal earnings. It burns
out that the A-type husbands participate more fullyin
decisions concerning collective expenditures than do P-
typa husbands, so that there is e larger area of dis¬
cretionary collective expenditures in which the A-type
husbands are interested, and for which they themselves
take the responsibility for providing money, P-type
husbands, on the other hand, tend to give their wives
a fixed housekeeping allowance, leaving purchasing de¬
cisions much more exclusively to their wives than do A-
typo husbands, The P~type husbands are less likely to be
responsible for finding the money for discretionary
collective expenditures, A large proportion of marginal
(i,e, overtime) earnings of P-type men is allocated to
their personal pocket-money, which is spent on goods
such as drinks, tobacco, fores to work and lunches, for
which there is a low elasticity of demand. Consequently,
the P-type husband has rather less use for extra money
than the A-type husband. This creates a tendency for the
A-type husbands to work longer hours, amongst the group
of skilled workers in the sample. For some reason, no
such effect is apparent amongst the unskilled workers.
(2) A point which I have not mentioned earlier is that
the actual ratio of the husband's personal expenditure
to his income is not a determinant of how much overtime
he does, (as Brennon would seen to imply). Overtime hours
are not correlated with this ratio, nor with any of the
factors Lending to make it abnormally high or low which
were identified in Chapter 5, except for car ownership.
Cox1 owners both work a large amount of overtime and hove a
large amount of pocket-money.
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(5) The latent demand factor, mentioned in Chapter 2, is
strongly associated with the housekeeping system. A™type
couples have much more extensive ambitions to own certain
durables than P-type couples. They are also mora likely
to he owner-occupiers, which means that a larger area of
potential expenditure in the way of house improvements
opens itself up for them than for the P-type couples.
This, also is a factor which may tend to make A-type men
work harder.
(A) Another factor tending to make husbands work long
hours is what might be called the intrinsic utilities
arising from work. Men who have relatively many friends
amongst their workmates, and relatively few in ether
circles, work very long hours compared to the rest of
the sample. A strong interest in leisure activities
external to work (sport) has the opposite effect - men
with on interest in sport work little overtime. Both
these findings also occur in the Prices end Incomes
Board's study of overtime and shiftworking.
(5) Large hoiisehold financial commitments - particularly
car ownership, hire purchase, end a large number of
children - entail that the husband works particularly
hard.
(G) Notwithstanding these influences on overtime,
occupation - in particular skill level - has a very strong
effect. The sample exhibits the occupational distri¬
bution of hours worked which was found by Peldstoinj the
higher-paid skilled workers work shorter hours than the
lower-paid unskilled workers.
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(?) Tao labour of .wives is not so "discretionary" as
has previously been supposed by many writers (Rossott
perhaps excluded)* Almost ell the younger women in the
sample work part-time, unions they hove pro-school
children* Shore is very little evidence that the house¬
keeping system exerts any influence on the wife's pro¬
pensity to work, except a slight tendency for the mothers
of pro-school children who have an A-tjtpe system, to bo
less likely to work on the grounds that their children
might be'neglected* It could be that A-typo mothers
feel free to subscribe to this attitude because their
husbands are more ready to enlarge the family income by
working extra hours when extra money is required*
(8) There does not appear to be any negative cor—
relation between husband's end wife's hours worked,
either in the sample as a whole or when controlling
for the preBonoe of pro-school children* However, it is
true that above o certain income level, no mothers of
pre-school children work, so that some negative income
effect appears*
(9) A correlation -matrix of all internal scale variables
in the data (which I have not discussed in full here be¬
cause it produced few findings of importance) shows that
the amount of to: paid by wage—earners, however measured,
seems to have no effect on the propensity to work in this
sample; at least none that is not obscured by other
factors® Since the time of investigation was unproductive,
I have not hitherto mentioned it*
(10) The smeller material ambitions of P-typ-e husbands, re¬
lative to A-typs husbands, make it likely that the negative
income effect in response to pay rises would bo more common
nmAncnt the I—typo men*
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Oi*APTi33 7
IITE FAMILY *3 SATIBGS 135. :AV TOUR
In the first chapter I pointed out that the theory
of saving hss developed to s large extant separately from
the theory of consumers' choice between commodities® I
suggested that this is one example of how academic fields
ere artificially defined and separated for convenience
in theory-building, presenting a need to consider whet
affect this separation of terms of reference siey have on
tho usefulness of the theories so developed® In this
chapter I attempt to bring together some concepts from
both of these two fields, end develop the consequences
of the hypothesis that some types of saving are inter¬
changeable with the demand for particular commodities®
'The notion of functional saving
Seen from tho point of view of tho community eg e
whole, the choice between covings:and spending has often
teen regarded eo a choice between present end future con¬
sumption®
But in the theory of tho consumption function, that
is, throughout most of economists' thinking shout the
nature of individuals' end households' decisions to save,
saving has generally boon considered as a combination of
residual and contractual elements^ In the most widely
accepted theory of saving, Friedman's "permanent income
hypothesis", the greater pert of saving is considered to
Geo, for example, Lydell (1955)» who distinguishes be¬
tween contractual and residual saving, and Friedman
(195V) who regards saving mainly as & residual, The
only important exceptions era Lawrence Slain (Katonn,
Klein at si, 195-0 who finds that discretionary saving
("residual" saving) is inversely related to purchases
of durable goods, and Ketone end Huollar (1988) who re¬
late the incurrence•of now debt to changes in contractual
saving® -
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ba a residual. It crises frora the divergence of the
spending unit's income from the usual level $ thet is,
"permanent consumption" io a function of "permanent in-
coco". (Friedman also recognises a precautionary motive
for savingj ho gives evidence that entrepreneurial house¬
holds sova a larger proportion of their incomes then em¬
ployee households, end attributes this to the greater in¬
stability of entrepreneurial Income).
The data from the Edinburgh sample suggest that, for
from being o residual, or even b precautionary measure,
most saving by working-class families is towards planned
future purchases, or arises from the fact that many types
of payment male by the household ore made at longer in-
p
torvrls than the income-receipt period, for example,
quarterly fuel bills, rates, mortgage payments, road tax
and insurance premiums, end so on, (For e full
description of the dote see the Appendix at the end of
this chapter). This is not to deny the validity of
Fx-ie&mon's theory, or of any other consumption-income ad¬
justment model5 such models are reasonably adequate for
their purpose, which is to explcdn the discrepancies be-
between the long-term or time-series and the short-term o
cross-section consumption function. But in concentrating
on the explanation of these discrepancies end on the
analysis end prediction of the changes in the relation be
between consumers' total expenditure o,n all commodities,
and their income, economists have tended to overlook some
2'
i.o. the interval of time between one income receipt an
the next; in. the case of British working-clsso families
tills is of course only o week.
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other interesting issues concerning the relationship be¬
tween savings behaviour end the consumption or indi¬
vidual commodities. It is these that I shell be noinly
concerned with in this chapter.
If e large pert of households' saving is indeed o
reservation of funds for planned future consumption, one
would expect there to bo important substitution effects
between current expenditure on particular commodities
end planned saving for particular future expenditures.
Some types oS saving, in other words, should be con¬
sidered not as the antithesis of consumption, but at
least in pert as en extension of the commodity-expendi¬
ture stream. Of which types of saving is this true?
One may conveniently think of saving as being com¬
posed of several elements, each element representing e
fund for a specific purpose. Several such elements will
be funds for specific future purchases such es holidays
and durable goods* These may be designated elements of
functional saving* Another type of functional saving
consists of money set aside for expected future lia¬
bilities (rates, fuel bills and the like). Saving to
meet expected liabilities mey be distinguished from true
precautionary saving, which I would prefer to define as
8 desired liquid asset balance to meet unexpected lia¬
bilities. A third element of caving is contractual
saving - consisting of life insurance,- S*A»Y.S., and so
on. Contractual coving may be functional or pre-
29.9
cautionary, or it coy "be carried out for the sake of the
z
interest received* But its salient characteristic is
that the amount saving cannot bo cut back without losing
some of the benefits which were envisaged when the pro¬
ject was started* Thus, substitution between current ex¬
penditure end o contractual saving project once started
will generally take pleco only when the consumex* is
having great difficulty in making ends meet. Conse¬
quently, I shall not include contractual saving in this
discussion of substitution between functioned saving and
current expenditure.
A fourth element of saving is a residual element -
which may be defined as tm unplanned shortfoil of ex¬
penditure below current income* Money "left over" in
this way may be transferred to the functional-saving fund.
J An interesting aspect of this shown by tho data from the
Edinburgh sample, is that some families use contractual
saving, in tho form of short-term endowment policies, as
a means of saving for specific purchases. One young
couple had had such policies whilst saving up to got
married, and had now taken out a longer-term life in¬
surance policy to use as security against a future
mortgage when, they bought e house. They thought this a
good way of saving because they could receive tax relief
on the premiums. But for most couples in the sample,
tex relief was probably not en incentive to undertake
this form of saving; they paid little tax on the whole,
jend were not at all tax-conscious; many indicated that
"they had insufficient knowledge of how their income tax
was worked out to think of how they might sove tox.
Rather, life insurance end endow:; ent policies were
popular because they forced people to save, in the
knowledge that part of the benefit would bo lost if
they did not keep it up. Endowment policies, fre¬
quently in tho children's names, wore used to save up
for the expenses associated with children leaving school
end getting married, end more rarely for general house¬
hold purchases like furniture. Such policies might run
for five, ten or fifteen years.
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Functional saving may bo thought of ss inter¬
changeable with particular present expenditures• I shell
now attempt to show that fluctuations in the aggregate
savings/income ratio soy bo portly explained by shifts
between functional saving and current expenditures
■The effect of char,-or In functional coving in
the er^re;'WJte"savin;"s7inooro ratio
Consumers * purchases racy be divided into two types;
those mode with money from one income-receipt period, end
those for which money is saved from one income-receipt
period to another (like durables end holidays). The
letter may be termed "deferred expenditures". How goods
arc divided between these two cetcgorico will dopond not
only on the availability of consumer credit, but also on
the consumer's incomo, the length of the income-receipt
period, end the percentage of income devoted to com¬
modities which may become deferred expenditures. The
influence of the length of the Sitnome receipt period is
simple; if a men is paid weekly, he will need to put
money aside from more than one income receipt period for
& monthly bill, but if ha is paid monthly, he will not.
That is, the weekly paid man must save for this payment,
but the monthly paid man need not.
To understand the influence of the consumer's in¬
come end the percentage cf income devoted to certain
commodities, on the amount of functional saving, ono must
first consider whet sort of purchases become deferred ex¬
penditures • Food end tobacco ere immediate and necessary
demands on a consumer's income, and they ere available in
small quantities, so that expenditure cannot be postponed,
nor is there any need to save up for these things, kith
3CH
durable goods end clothing, the situation is rather
different| purchases can very often be postponed, and the
©mount of money which s consumer can spore in one income
receipt period to buy o coot or e television sot will very
ofton not bo enough to buy ono such orticlo. Ha must
therefore save up for such purchases, unless credit is
available# Tho influence of income on the need to sevo
is now apparent# The smaller a consumer's income, the
greater the proportion if it which is token up with pur¬
chases of food and other non-postponsble expenditures#
She poor consumer is more likely then the rich consumer
to find that the amount of money he con spare, in any ono
income-receipt period, for postponoble purchases such as
a cost, is smeller than the amount required to buy one
article# For example, a man earning £20 per week may
only have £1 per week available for clothing, so he must
save for 10 weeks to buy a £10 coat# But a man earning
£50 per week may be able to afford © £15 or £20 coat from
one week's earnings# This is not to say that the poor
save more than the rich; for only one of the four elements
of saving is being considered here, and moreover, the use
of credit is mora 'widespread amonot the lower income
groups, end a smaller proportion of low incomes is devoted
to expenditures other than food and rent. All that is
argued is that if there were no consumer credit, or if
there were no .inter-incone-group differences in the use of
credit, lower income consumers would be more likely than
higher income consumers to finance © purchase of e given
type end size by functional saving.
Given non-aveilability of credit, end given the con¬
sumer's income end inccss-rocoipt period, functional
saving will generally be a greater proportion of income,
the greater the percentage of expenditure devoted to
postponablo purchases* Thus, if the son in the last
example who spent £1 per week on clothing decided to
spend less on food and sore on clothing, he would add
his extra "expenditure" on clothing to hie functional
saving* In general, if a consumer starts to buy less of
those commodities which are financed from one income-
receipt period, and buy sore of seme new commodity which
was to be saved for, his savings/income ratio will rise*
What effect will such behaviour on the pert of many
consumers have on the aggregate sovings/incoao ratio?
ffffoot^of an increase y-n functional savin.,-; on
tEo a~grog~co"3avin"'s""ratio~"""" ~~ —~ — «-- — _ __ ■ - « ... _
I now intend to chow that the effect of more
functional saving on the aggregate savings/income ratio
will be o short-run increase in aggregate saving* But
in the long run, tbo aggregate savings/income ratio will
fall back to the previous level. It will reach the pre¬
vious level again when tbo volume of dis-scving per unit
time by households who hove saved up thoir money end ©re
now spending it on the now commodity, is equal to tho
volume of saving for tbo now commodity, por unit time, by
other households*
This is made clear by tho following example* Sup¬
pose that all consumers' expenditure is taken up with two
commodities, A end B, both being goods which ere financed
within cno income-receipt period, end for which, therefore
no functional saving is required* C, e new commodity,
which has to be saved for, than coses onto the market.
Prior to this, consumers spent half their incomes on
A end half on B* how, they will spend half their
incomes on A, a quarter on B end o quarter on caving
up for C* The savings/income ratio therefore rises in
the first place from zero to anything up to 25$, de¬
pending on how fast households take up saving for C.
It later falls back to zero* Or, if households * first
purchases of C are bunched together giving rise to
stacks of G which will tend to bo replaced together,
replacement booms (analogous to replacement booms in
industrial investment) will take piece, and will cause
regular fluctuations in the savings/income ratio* The
tables below illustrate these two alternative effects;
the first shows the savings/income ratio gradually
rising and then falling to zero again, and the second
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How general are these examples? Generally, the
amount of functional Sevang for any commodity will be
given by the equation;
S ™ D»n»i. — n — X*«15 •Y ,»,«•«<
fi
where: Y » average income of households,
D = fraction of each households income set
aside for future purchases in each period,
n « number of households,
R » average number of income-receipt periods
over which saving; for one purchase is made
(counting the period of disbursement)
P » the price of a unit of the commodity saved
for, divided by the amount saved in each
period - i,e, the number of one-period
savings required to accumulate sufficient-
money for a purchase.
If consumers buy the saved-for commodity in the same in¬
come-receipt period as they finish ©messing the money for
it, P will be equal to fi. If, on the other hand,
functional saving leads to money being saved up fox* a
purchase and then held for one or more income-receipt
periods (say while the consumer is deciding exactly what
to buy), then R will be greater than P»
Aggregate saving arising from individuals* functional
saving will be greater than zero in the long run only
whore;
D.n.Y>§•
If, on the other hands
i) • 21 e i. ** ^ a J? * » £ <0 C )
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then aggregate saving arising from functional saving will
be zero. This equation may bo simplified to:
1 * 5
or P « K
The condition for aggregate caving to increase in the long
run as a result of functional saving (condition 2$ is only
satisfied if R io greater than P, in other words if
functional saving gives rise to idle liquid asset ba¬
lances, because of a log between accumulating money for a
purchase and actually making it.
I do not intend to investigate!, or oven to speculate,
whether such a leg exists. Tho purpose of this argument
is merely to show that changes in the volume of functional
saving can temporarily effect tho aggregate covings/in¬
come ratio, end therefore that shifts between functional
saving and current expenditure ore a matter of interest.
To sum up, an increase in functional saving will always
lead to an increase in the aggregate savings/income ratio
in tho short run, for tho duration of the period during
which dissaving by consumers who are making purchases
with their savings is not yet large enough to cenel out
the effect on the aggregate savings ratio of other con¬
sumers# The length of this high-saving period will de¬
pend on the value of ? (the tine it takes consumers to
cove up), and on the speed at which consumers react to
tho initial stimulus which leads thorn 'to shift from
current expenditure to functional saving# Tho importance
of such effects will be greatest whore P is very long.
For example, if there is a reduction in tho supply of
rented housing, somo people will start to sova to buy
5CS
their own houses, end this may take them several yoors* It
may therefore be several yocrs before disbursements of
such saving ere equal to the volume of new saving* An in¬
crease in the deposit required for hire purchase conti'ucts,
on the other hand, will affect the aggregate savings ratio
for a much shorter time, because it does not take people
no long to save the deposit for, say, a wahlving machine
as it does to save for a deposit on e house*
.Effects of a reduction
^ in ^ functioncl saving
In these examples I have discussod only shifts from
current expenditure into functional saving* Villi the con¬
verse effect, that is, a short-term reduction in the
aggregate savings ratio, take place if functional saving
is reduced and current expenditure increased? It is clear
from equation 1 above that such a reduction will only take
place if new saving for, say, house-buying, is cut back
faster then disbursements of savings which have boon made
for this purpose# This will be the case if oil those
consumers who were reedy to buy a house do buy one or use
their sevod-up funds for some other purchase# But it may
not be the esse if come of them continue to hold their
covings* It is however possible that the rate of dis¬
bursement will rise (end therefore the aggregate savings
ratio foil) if consumers who would previously hove held
their money and continued saving, abandon their pertly
completed hous©-saving project and spend their accumulated
funds straight awry# The effect of a shift from
functional saving to current expenditure is therefore rnoro
complex to predict then the other way round, end I shell
therefore concentrate in the analysis which follows on the
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simple case of shifts from current expenditure to
functional caving.
Summary of the offsets of changes in functional
Tho following conclusions fteve therefore emerged fro
this section:-
(1) A large proportion of working-class families•
saving is made to fulfil plans x"or .future
purchases, or to meet future expected lia¬
bilities (like rotes and rood tax),
(2) An increase in functional saving and © cor¬
responding decrease in current expenditure may
occur an e result of:
(a) a reduction in tho expected price of the
future purchases being saved for;
(b) en increase in price of currently pur¬
chased commodities}
(c) a change in consumers1 preferences in¬
volving a substitution effect towards
commodities requiring saving and away from
commodities financed within cue income-
receipt period;
(d) an increase in the price of credit, that
is, the interest rate;
(o) a decrease in the evoilability of credit
not involving e change in the interest rate,
<•
(3) Such on increase in functional saving will load
to e temporary rise in the saving/income ratio,
(k) Similarly, s decrease in functional saving with
c corresponding increase in current expenditure
(which may arise from tho same factors as
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listed in (2) operating in revarso) will pro¬
bably lead to s temporary reduction in the
savings/income ratio. But the effects of
this opposite type of shift ore snore
difficult to determine.
Uses of ,the anclyr.ig^pf i functional saving
(p) A shift from current expenditure to functional
saving will not load to & permanent increase in the
savings/income ratio unless there is a tiiao-^sg of at
least one income-receipt period between accumulating
sufficient funds to sake the planned purchase and
actually making it. If there is such e time-leg, there
will be a smell permanent increase in the covings/income
ratio.
To brabble to predict the size of changes in the
savings/income ratio arising from changes in functional
Saving might bo of considerable use in the following
circumstances:-
(e) when attempting to predict the offset of pro-
budget speculation by consumers. If con¬
sumers expect the price of soma commodity they
plan to buy, to go down as c result of a tax
reduction, they may wait until the tax re¬
duction occurs before buying. This con¬
stitutes on increase in functional saving in
response to a change in the expected future
price of a commodity.
(b) when attempting to predict the size of a change
in consumers1 demand arising from en increase
in the price of consumers* credit. In this in¬
stance, the consumer may bo considered as fecin
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en. increase in the current price of a com¬
modity (e credit-purchased good), for which
he may therefore substitute a future pur¬
chase of e commodity which will have to be
saved for®
In order to predict the size of changes in the
savings/income ratio arising from those sorts of changes
in consumer behaviour, one must first be able to pre¬
dict the size of the substitution effects themselves®
The next section will be devoted to outlining a simple
method of doing this®
A mathematical analysis of substitution between
present and future consumption. ~~<to«—» * nn'.nro—»® «M.wu»— !■.■» --I—ii II iii! ..»-V®w<iii.. «i®n—
How can one predict the size of change in functional
saving? (such cs will arise from one of the stimuli
listed under joint 2 of the conclusions of the last
section). To establish empirically a set of quanti¬
tative relationships between functional saving and any
of tho stimuli listed would at first sight require ex¬
tensive observations of functional savingj in other words,
a good deal of survey work. At least some of this sort
of work could be avoided if one could construct, on the
basic of known parameters of consumer behaviour,
hypothetical quantitative relationships between the
stimuli and functional saving; end from these, hypothe¬
tical relationships between tho stimuli end the aggregate
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savings ratio, which could then bo tested on actual dots.^
How, then, con one construct hypothetical relation-
ships between stimuli of the type mentioned end
functional saving, on the basis of known poroEatsrs of
consumer behaviour? What known parameters era required
to do this?
In this section, I want to show how one con use
observations of choices between the present consumption
of two commodities, x end z, to predict how consumers
will allocate or reallocate their income between future
purchases of x and current purchases of z» I shell show
that this is possible if one knows individuals * rate of
time preference for money, and I shall therefore suggest
a way of finding this rate of time preference, also from
very simple observations. Finding the rate of time pre¬
ference in this way may additionally be of use for cost-
benefit analysis, though there are some problems con¬
cerning this, which I shall discuss later.
The nature of tinto proferunco rates
The first stage in this analysis is to consider the
tine-clement in the consumer's evaluation of utility.
That is, the simple fact that for most people "jam today"
is preferable to "jam tomorrow"♦ Thus, the utility of
The nature of the relationships between functional
saving and change in the aggregate savings ratio has
already been established in the first section of this
chapter. The only unknown parameters required to
establish this reletjionchip ere P, 'which could be
found quite simply from survey work, and the length
of time consumers take to adjust their functional
saving following a stimulus to change it. The latter
period may be assumed to bo equal to the period during
which consumers1 current demand appears to be changing
in response to the sense stimulus, so that some approxi¬
mate values could be assigned to this parameter by ex¬
amining changes in sales of commodities for which functional
caving is thought to be a substitute.
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future consumption Tolls short of the utility of present
consumption by on amount which increoses the lurthar
ahead in time the future consumption is to be enjoyed.
This shortfall racy be thought of ss e rate of discount,
and expressed as v percentage of future utility. Thus
one may writes-
ti *5
where U . is tho future utility of a unit of the itfe
pl good,
Uf. is the future utility of a unit of the ith
good, as perceived at the present time
r. is the rate of discount or, as it is often
called, roto of time preference, for
the ith good, for one period
and n is tho number of periods between the time at
which tho future unit of tho ith good
will be enjoyed, and tho present.
There is no reason why the rate of time preference should
bo the sane for all commodities. It will be greater, the
greator is the uncertainty surrounding tho eventual en¬
joyment of the good in question. This uncertainty could
be related to the demands which other members of the
family will make upon the saving which one member makes
for a certain purchase; or it could bo related to ex¬
pectstions concerning the price end availability of goods.
Ramsey (1928) maintains that since consumption now
may reasonably be assumed to have greater utility for the
consumer than tho same amount of consumption in tbo future,
consumers will only sova if the retcof interest thereby
earned is greater than their rata of time preference. Yet,
This is the familiar compound interest formula used in
assessing the marginal efficiency of investment (coo
for example F« 8. liroomsn, "Macro-economies" (1962.
p.151).
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as I hove already pointed out* most workings-class femilis
hold short-term savings in a non-intorost-bearing form
(at home or in a current beak account) or in a vary low-
interest-bearing form (e.g. the Post Office Savings Bank)
and they mostly hold these savings simply in order to
make future purchases. Such caving in their only method
of making some types of purchases without paying s high
prico for credit, so in a sense they may be forced to
save if they want to buy those particular goods. The
utilities which are obtained from functional saving are
different in nature from the utilities obtained from
current consumption - that in, different goods are in¬
volved - so that it is not necessary to posit an in¬
centive to cave in the form of a positive subjective rate
of return. If a man saves up to buy o car, whilst not
obtaining interest on his savings while they accumulate,
the implication must bo that a cor ct a given future time
is expected to bring et least as much utility cs the
other consumption goods meanwhile foregone. Or, to think
of it in n different way, the men is prepared to receive
o negative "subjective rate of return" on his savings in
order to obtain a cor.
Time ^reference rotes and consumers' *
Lot us now consider in more detail the way in which
the consumer compares present and future utilities. We
can now make use of the well-known proposition (0) that
in an equilibrium position of consumers* choicei-
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where x and z ere two commodities, U,r the marginal
Je*.






Using xr end :cr to denote the present end future
marginal utilities of x, and P* to denote the expected
future price of x, end r„ to denote the rate of time
preference for x, when the consumer is making o choice
between saving up for x and buying z now, the optimum
amount of saving towards x per unit of time will bo
reached when:-
u;;f/ (1 - rx)° «
P* P
X 2
But this is not strictly correct, for if the marginal
utility of x is discounted, its future price should also
be discounted. To discount its price, one is concerned
with the utility of all the goods which the money could
be used for if it wore spent now instead of saved. The
appropriate time preference rate by which to discount
the price is therefore the time preference rate for money\
and it seems reasonable to assume that this is
theoretically equal to a worthed average of the time pro-
forenco rates for oil individual commodities.
^
Honey is considered here as a medium of exchange only;
hence the only consideration is the' fact that pur¬
chasing power'now is worth more than the eerie amount
of purchasing power in the future. The time pre¬
ference rote for money as I have defined it should,
strictly speaking, be reduced by the interest rote which
money could earn if lent. But I do not think this point
is materiel in considering short-term saving by working
close families, which corns little or no interest.
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However, this is not the easiest way to find the time
preference rate for coney in practice, as I shell show
later#
If i? stands for the time preference rate for coneyHi
end r,,» as before, the corresponding rote for i:, then
4f*
the above equation can be revised thus?-
UVJ (1 - r )n « Uw
p':/ a - Vn
#*+*»** f + (8)
or, oltemotively formulated,
I",/ (1 - i- )n - ».,f/ (1 - rv)nx N cr xr - X'
P U
2 2
I shall refer to the term P'.y (1 - r )n as the "sub-3C Lit
joctive present cost" of the future purchases of x*
Use ofmthe concept ofitine preference
rates to""rjaxoi^efinngoe~in ""
?uncLXonal"rcsvXng"'
How does this set of concepts help to predict
changes in functional saving? Lot us return to the list
of stimuli which may lead people to change their
functional saving, and examine the type of prediction
problem which oecb presentsj
(a) functional saving may increase because of u
reduction in the expected price of the future
purchase which is being saved for, (The first
problem here is that consumers8 expectations
of future prices may be very different from
those of the economist. But there may be
widespread agreement whore a company
announces price changes (as often happens with
cars) or where there are reports in the mens
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medio about the effect en prices of announced
or expected te>: changes* If some plausible
essuaption can be mode ebout what changes in
prices consumers expect, the corresponding
changes in functional saving can be predicted
by means of the discounting concepts, using
en ordinary demand function* In other worSsh**
one may assume that the amount e consumer will
save, per unit time, for future purchases of x,
when expecting the price to bo P', will be
equal to the amount of x he would be expected
to buy now at a price 1% whores
P » P«L / (1 - r )n:/X s Hi
(b) functional saving may increase because of an
increase in price of currently purchased com¬
modities , loading to © substitution of
functional saving for deforrod-axpondituro-
commoditioo in place of currently financed
commodities* To predict the siso of such
changes in functional saving, one must know
the cross-elasticity of substitution of pre¬
sent consumption of x with respect to s
7
current price change in s* All that is then
necessary is to opply this cross-olesticity,
again making use of the formula for the sub¬
jective present cost of future x* In other
words, if we know tho change in current con¬
sumption of x which will occur whon the price
next chapter dovelows a simple method of com-
«u•Wj lar^e numbers ox cross—slsstxcioios*
8
3IS
ratio changes from V/l\, to P + &P /P_, wo
<U .-/W 4J)
can acy that this is equal to the change in
functional saving which will occur with the
eroiG price ratio changewhere t
P « P* / (1 - x* )n
x :c ' v nj
(c) A substitution of deferred for current ex¬
penditure say occur because of a change in
tastes, but this is by definition not pre¬
dictable ;
(d) An increase in the price of credit may cause
an increase in functional saving* In this
coco, tho consumer is weighing up the re¬
lative utility of a credit purchase of vl ot
a higher price than before, and e future pur¬
chase at the cash price which remains con¬
stant* For this purpose, x purchased new on
credit say bo considered a different "com¬
modity" from "future x'\ end then the problem
can be dealt with as a problem of type (b),
with credit-purchase x taking tho place of s,
(o) A reduction in the availability of credit may
increase functional saving by forcing a sub¬
stitution of deferred purchases for current
credit - financed purchases* If it is
assumed that oil credtt purchases require a
cash deposit, credit restription v;ill leave
some consumers with surplus funds* For example,
Ehat is, the combination of present x and present z
which the consumer chooses given , P„ is tho cemo
as the combination of future x and*'' presort z
which he would choose, given tho seme income, tho
same Pa and a subjective present cost of future x
equal to tho P„ of tho first case*
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if tho minimum percentage deposit for biro
purchase of cars is raised, households who
hoi saved up just enough to make the old
deposit will be faced with the choice of
continuing to save for tho new, higher do-
posit, or spending their savings on something
else. If ono con assume that the bent sub¬
stitute for a credit-purchased car now is
further saving towards a car, consumers in
this position are only deterred from using
oil of their "surplus" to save for a car by
tho disutility of saving* It therefore seems
reasonable to ergue that their coving for cars
will increase, (over what they would have
saved in the next period but for the credit
restriction) by the amount of the "surplus"
less a sum D, where D is the reduction in de¬
mand for credit-purchased cars which would
occur if their price went up by en ©mount
equal to the difference between tho actual
credit price on a car end the subjective pre¬
sent cost of a future car* In other words,
the increase in functional saving for x amount
to:
B - C..,E ((?*/ (1 - rm)n)- O **.****»<> (1
where:
S is the "surplus", tho difference between
the value of credit purchases of soma good
x which consumers made before the credit
3ZG
roctriction and tho maximum value of credit
purchases of now possible for thorn, if
they do not reduce their expenditure on
9
other commodities
S is tho price elasticity of demand
for credit-purchased x,
and C is tho credit price for x
x
Having outlined tho reasons why functional saving
mey increase, and proposed a method of prediction in
each type of situation (except (c), where no pro-
diction can be mode), the problem now is how to find
r . If this parameter were known, the expression
in
F'V (1 - rr„)n could bo solved,2w ' >i
How to .findthe t^.me^nrofar'crtce rate for money
A conventional consumer preference diagram showing
"future x" and "s" will now be considered (3oe Fig.!
below).
Fig. 1 Fig. 2
9' Just as it was assumed that saving for x is the next
host use for funds which cannot now be used for a cash
deposit on o credit purchase of x,'it is assumed hero
that continued saving for x is of smaller disutility
than reducing expenditure on otfa-r commiditics in
order to find the deposit. Both these assumptions are
corollaries of the hypothesis that functional saving
fox" a given commodity end its current purchase are





Given o particular income, en expected future price
of xf end a present price of a, the consumer will
choose some combination of future x end s which is
represented by the point C* This point must lie on
some price lino representing a budget constraint. Such
a price line will represent a particular ratio of
P„ to V\J (1 - r_)n# The s-end of the prico lino, B,
can easily be determinedj it is the number of units of
a which tho consumer could buy, if he spent ell his
resources 021 s, or, tho consumer's income divided by P «
Both the consumer's income end P„ ere given, so B can bo
c4
found# Tho "future x" end of the price line cannot,
however, bo found by the sane means as B# simply because
the subjective present cost of future x is unknown* It
is, however',simple to find the other end of the price
line, because two points on it ere already known, B and
0# Drawing a line through the two known points deter¬
mines the "future xw end, A, as shown in Pig# 2* The
point A represents c certain number of units of future
x - tho number which tho consumer could obtain if ho
saved all his income for future Uo then haves
A » Y
^ -V
Since r is the only unknown in this equation, its value
can now bo found# (Where n is an even number, a negative
solution as well as a positive one will bo found, but the
negative one soy be rejected as theoretically implausible).
t QA
As is usual in the analysis of consumer preference„
"income" is taken as tho total resources tho consumer
has available to spend on the two commodities in
question, holding his other expenditures constant#
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Obviously a number of such observations would be necessary
in order to obtain a rollobie estimate of r , and only by
tJX
experiment: could one find how consistent would bo
estimates derived from different observations« Once r„iSi
is known, the predictions of changes in functional saving
discussed ecrliex* can octuelly be made* Some points must
be considered, concerning the nature of end variations in
this:-
(1) one may expect r„ to 'bo culturally determined ?
ill i« ninar
firstly, it will be determined by the indi¬
vidual's preparedness to forego present con¬
sumption for future consumption# This willing¬
ness will bo inversely related to r » Secondly«
ill
it will be influenced by the degree of un¬
certainty surrounding the used of saved money
for the purpose originally intended# Un¬
certainty coy arise from two sources? one is a
lack of sufficient liquid assets to meet con¬
tingencies. Thus, uncertainty will bo greator,
the smaller the level of liquid assets and the
greater the unpredictability for the household
of the relationship between its future expenses
end future income. Hence, rp, will be greater
iL.
for poor families, and those with irregular in¬
come. But at the same time, these who have ir¬
regular incomes and can afford to save, will
tend to hoop a high level of liquid assets, as
has been shown by Friedman's work on entre¬
preneurial groups'(1957)* Irregular income, in
better-off groups capable of keeping a con-
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tlrgency fund, will therefore have two
different effects on r which may cencol each
m
other out. Secondly, uncertainty about the
availability of saved money for the purpose
intended will arise from the possibility that
other members of the family cay make claims to
it for other purposes. It has already been
pointed out that couples with the A-type house¬
keeping system ere more likely to undertake
joint saving for agreed purposes then the P-
typo couples.
Because r is culturally determined, one mayIS
expect it to hove a considerable variability
with income levels, budgeting arrangements end
values relating to thrift or forward planning
of financial affairs. But also, one would ex¬
pect it to be reasonably constant for con¬
siderable periods of time.
ry is not a concept which will bo subjectively
recognised, any more then is marginal utility
or its maximisation. But provided r can bo* LI
found empirically to have some consistent value,
there is no reason why one should not use the
concept in e predictive model.
To the extent that money may be considered by
the household as on interest-bearing asset -
for example, where saving takes the form of
savings bank deposits or dedowment policies -
r„. will be reduced by the rote of interest pay-
able on such assets. If, indeed, r, were found
to be positive, one would conclude that the
rate of interest received by the household on
its savings, exceeded the negative rate of
discount arising from the disutility of fore¬
going present consumption for future con-
consumption#
Summery and conclusions
This chapter has demonstrated the importance of con¬
sidering some pert of saving as en extension of tho com¬
modity chain rather then as the antithesis of consump¬
tion. The Edinburgh survey date suggest that by for ■
tho proctor part of saving by working-©less families is
saving towards specific future purchases«
Changes in functional saving may partlolly explain
fluctuations in the aggregate savings/incoae ratio.
Whilst decreases in functional saving hove a complex
effect on this ratio which is difficult to predict a
priori, increases in'functioned saving can easily bo
shown to create a temporary rise in the aggregate
savings ratio, which should not be too difficult to.pre¬
dict by the method outlined here. This method has two
stages: tho prediction of the sise of change in functional
saving which will result from a given price or interest
rote change, and then the prediction of the effect which
this change in functional saving has on the aggregate
savings/income ratio.
To test this predictive method would be too large
a project to enter into hero; but this chapter may serve
to indicate the potential value of further research in
tkis diroction»
I mentioned earlier that this method of finding
the individual's rate of tine preference for money
could bo of use in cost-bonefit analysis. If some
assessment of the individual rate is thought to be
relevant to the problem of establishing a social rate
of discount, the method presented here offers somo
advantage over IbC>C.G tiein's (1961). Whereas his method
of finding the individual's time preference rate is
based on a hypothetical question, this method is based
on consumers' actual behaviour* Howeverf I tend to
agree with Fsfegou (1952) and Dobb (I960) that the in¬
dividual's time preference rote is not a suitable basis
for determining a social rate of discount to be used in
public investment decisions, because, as they point out,
the individual's decisions are "myopic" - they embody
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in main sample conevol
couples
Honey hold as a reserve,
"in case of emergencies" ? 0
Permanent nest-eggj for
old ego, or as on ^ 1
interest-bearing invest- f
raont
Monoy set aside to pay
bills expected 22
quarterly 02? annually
Honey sot aside for
holidays 31
Saving to buy durable
goods, including houses




Saving for bouse im¬
provements 2 ®




No saving 13 1
Note: since many people saved for more than
0:1c purpose, the totals of the columns
ere greater than the number of couples*
Altogether 83 of the 90 couples in the
rain sample, end G of the control
couples, answered this question* Some
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This chapter is intended to show that the findings
on the division of income within the family in Chapter
5» nay be of use in economic forecasting. In this
section I have drawn heavily on the work of I. P.
Focroo (1961) who suggests ways in which the fore¬
casting of consumers * demand could be improved by di¬
viding the very large range of consumer goods in the
economy into categories according to the typo of demand
function they hove* lie entitles those categories
"neutrally went associated" groups of commodities. I
begin by describing this concept es ho presents it.
Ihe Theory of Ikmtral 1-,'ant Association
Pearco*s theory concerns the problem of esti¬
mating empirically the cross-elasticities of sub¬
stitution - the effects on the consumption of one good
of the price, of another. As on example of this concept
consider the effect on consumers1 spending of s rise in
the price of broad. Consumers will very probably buy
loss broad. Possibly, they may eventually spend the
same amount of money on bread as they did before the
price increase, in which cose they will hove a smaller
number of loaves, but the amount they will have loft to
spend on other commodities will remain the same as befo
Or they may spend less on bread than before the price
increase, and spend soma of the money which they former
spent on breed, on biscuits, breakfast cereal, potatoes
or anything else which they consider to be better
deserving of their money. In this type of reaction, th<
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consumption of some other commodity or commodities will
rise because of tho increase in the price of bresd. A
third typo of consumer reaction would bo where the de¬
mand for breed was completely inelastic - say where
bread is tho only kind of food consumers can afford,
and whore they cannot cake do with lees food# Then,
the physical quentitjyof broad purchased would remain
the sane despite the price increase, and consumers
would have to economise on non-food commodities (or
increase their income or get into debt). In this third
type of reaction, tho amounts of other commodities pur¬
chased would go down oo e result of the increase in the
price of breed (unless consumers increased their income
or increased their indebtedness)• In the second type
of reaction on the other hand, the amount of other
purchases would go up. The second typo of reaction is
more common, since there era very few commodities in
reel life for which demand is completely inelastic.
Clearly, tho kind of commodities tho purchases of
which are most likely to bo effected by increases in the
price of bread, ore those commodities which consumers
consider close substitutes for bread, that is, other
types of starchy food. Bread, being a food, is the sort
of commodity which has s large range of substitutes. But
what of commodities for which there are few substitutes?
Such as matches, or petrol? In suc'r^ cases, it becomes
Iocs clear from common ccnso whet consumers would switch
their expenditure to if tho price of tho commodity rises.
If, for example, the price of petrol goes up, motorists
are likely to make fewer journeys. This may mean that
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they spend less money on petrol then they did before
the price increase. The question is on what com¬
modities will they spend the money they save? They may
spend core on train fares, or on having groceries de¬
livered which they previously went to fetch; or the
economy on petrol may he regarded as a saving of ex-
•i'-
penditura on motoring for pleasure, in which ease
motorists may spend more on going to football matches
or the cinema. This leads to the apparently strange
conclusion that groceries (costing more because they
are delivered) or cinema tickets, are seen by tie con¬
sumer as a substitute for petrol. There is as much
logic in this conclusion as there is in the intuitively
more obvious proposition that travel by rail is a sub¬
stitute for travel by car. In'a sense, and a sense
which is very important for economic theory, it may bo
said that groceries ere a substitute for petrol. The
converse, that petrol is a substitute for groceries,
is also true; for if the price of groceries were to ris<
one may of making economies in their direction would be
to stop having them deii^eaed.
In general, it may be said that a commodity i is a
substitute for another commodity, j, if the consumption
of i changes in response to a change in the price of j,
and if this change in the consumption ofii is in the
opposite direction from the simultaneous change in the
consumption of 3, If, on the other hand, a change in
the price of j leads to s rise in expenditure on both 1
and 0, then i end ,j would be called c-cmplementsry goods
not substitutes. Goods which are complements in this
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empirical sorcg ray, like goods which are empirically
substitutes, bo quito unrelated, Thus, (lat us coy for
tho sake of argument) a motorist may economise whan the
price of petrol rises, both by buying lass petrol and by
buying loss cigarettes. Then petrol and cigarettes would
bo, empirically speaking, complementary commodities, al¬
though they fulfil quito different functions for the con¬
sumer, In general, a commodity i is a complement of
another commodity, j, if in response to o change .in the
price of the quantities purchased of both i and ,j
change in the seme direction. Those definitions of com¬
plements end substitutes are control to Poarco's theory.
Obviously coma commodities ere better substitutes
for a given good than others, Margarine is tho obvious
substitute fox* butter? but a consumer who particularly
disliked margarine might shift his expenditure to peanut
butter whoa the price of ordinary butter rose? end others
might substitute some commodity which was not a food at
ell. The relative magnitudes of tho increases in
quantities purchases of margarine, peanut butter, 3cm end
various other things (as a result of the price of butter
rising) might be interpreted cs representing consumers*
ranking of these commodities in order of their sub-
stitutability for butter. Margarine will show the
largest increase because it ie tho most popular sub¬
stitute, and those who spend their money on caviar instead
will bo rare indeed, go that the substitution response of
the demand for caviar will bo negligible.
The concept of e ranking of commodities in terms of
their substitutobllity for tho ith good loads Peorce to the
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idea of classifying oil commodities according to fchoirr
cubsfcitutebility for osch other# To explain this idea,
6one algebraic terras ore necassery*-
o. . will represent the change in the amount of1 j
coianodity i purchased, which results from
o change in the price of commodity j
will represent the marginal propensity to
consume 1
If income changes, the change in the amounts purchased
of commodities i and j will be in the proportions°i»
c j
(This ratio provides e standard against which to °
examine the magnitude of ratios of the type s,iw 3
ij »
aw
to examine, that is, the ways in which the amounts pur¬
chased of i end j will change in response to the price
change of a third good, w. It coy be considered that i
is a better substitute for w then ,j if:
& . V c.iw \ i \




But if j is o better substitute for w then i, thena
fX r+
iw / i ,.~n
aw -
If i end j ere equally good substitutes for w, then an
in-between case crises where 5
s... c.XW X. • /y\
"■iu °-5a« . a
This lest type of instance could occur where i end j
have to be consumed jointly; where in other words, thoy
era logical complements like cars and petrol. More
commonly, it could happen where i and J are goods which
fulfil a function for the consumer quit© different from
the function of w# Suppose that when the price of
butter goes up, the consumer does not decide to buy
anything specific instead, but simply spends loss on
butter. At the end of the week he finds himself with e
few more pence to spare which he had been accustomed to
spending on butter, end ha will spend these few pence on
whatever takes his fancy, bo it quite unrelated to butter
This could be a case where the substitution response to
the increase in the price of butter - the effect of the
consumer's economy on butter - is spread over e number
of commodities no one of which would be considered by the
consumer to be a better substitute for butter then any
other of them# (In fact, he v/ould not think of them cs
substitutes for butter at ell)# One could say of such c
case that there is a group of commodities (namely tho
typo of things which tho consumer spends his left-over
ponce on, say ico-croem or megssines) no one of which is
o better substitute for butter than the others. (Of any
pair from this group of commodities, equation 3 above
would bo true). This group of commodities so a whole,
might be c better substitute for butter, empirically
speaking, than some other commodity group quite un¬
affected by tho consumer's reaction to a change in the
price of butter# Thus there arises tho notion of s group
of commodities(which one nay label Q), all tho member
goods of which nro equally good substitutes for some non-
moabor good i, end which, as a group, oro either noro or
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loss good substitutes for the good i then the goods in
sorao other group R. Peerce defines groups of this kind
by the use of the torn "neutral went association"• A
group of commodities qx .*.< qn is said to bo in neutra
want association with another commodity x if*
(1) no commodity in the group ^ is a better sub¬
stitute for x than any other commodity in the
group Q*
(2) ell commodities in the group Q, end the group
Q considered as if it wore one slgglo com¬
modity, will bo either better or worse sub¬
stitutes for x than any commodity or group of
commodities not belonging to Q»
Those two parts of the definition may bo summarise
mathematically thus? .




(using the terms defined above)
Statement (2) above is equivalent to;
sq.:r =fcr sr.x-x 1 X
(where r. stands for any commodity or group




(where Q and R stands for composite com¬
modities, the group Q end the group of all
other commodities apart from x)
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Uson of the theory of neutral went association
The important point about this notion of commodity
groups outlined chcve is that is bos c.n important
potential for economic forecasting. This is because one
may bo able, by using this concept, to simplify the pro¬
cedure of working cut the cross-elasticities of sub¬
stitution - the amount by which consumption of any good
will change in response to a change in the price of an¬
other good. Since, in principle et least, o change in
the price of any commodity may affect the demand for any
other, not knowing the cross-elasticities may add signi¬
ficantly to errors of forecasting. Moreover, because
there ere many thousands of permutations of commodities,
it would be very difficult to calculate any but tho most
obviously important cross-elasticities* The concept of
neutral want association presents, therefore, a method
of dividing commodities into groups, oech of which
reacts to changes in the prices of other goods as though
the group wore one commodity* By this neons, the number
of cross-elasticities needing to bo calculated con be
reduced to o small fraction of the total number of
possible pairs of goods.
The Concert of a Utility 'Tree
By a series of mathematical theories, Paarca de¬
velops the notion of neutral want association into the
concept of o utility tree®"*' Such a tree is shown in
Diagram 1* The meaning of the tree is as follows!
1 The c ,;nc3pt of a utility tree is also used by S. II*
Strots: see his "The Empirical Implications of a
Utility Tree", Econometrica, Vol.25, Ko.2, 1957.
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commodities fell naturally, by virtue of their functions
for the consumer, into smell groups such as aergerina
cni button, cers end petrol, houses end furniture, point
end wallpaper* Such groups of complements or sub¬
stitutes ere the obvious ones to si>ecify the forming
hypotheses (on purely intuitive grounds) 03 to what
groups of commodities ere neutrally went associated with
other commoditiese Thus, since core end petrol satisfy
a quite different sort of went from butter end margarine,
it seams likely that cars end petrol will be equally ,
poor, or equally good, substitutes for butter and mar¬
garine, end thus will be "neutrally want associated"
with butter and margarine* Each of the initial pairs of
goods - butter and margarine, cers end petrol, wallpaper
and paint aro in neutral wont association with any other
good, Tho same is true of any of the pairs of goods at
the ends of the branches of the tree. Wallpaper, paint,
houses and furniture together form e group which is
neutrally want associated with any other good* The de¬
mand for each of the goods in a group changes, in res¬
ponse to a price change of a commodity outside the group,
in the sane proportion as expenditure on the, group as a
whole* Thus, if a change in the price of petrol causes
an economy on food, so that food expenditure is reduced
by 1^ expenditure on all goods in the food gi%oup will be
reduced by 1>J*
The utility tree clusters commodities according to
their degree -of substitutcbility for each other, just as
a toxonoaic tree clusters individuals according to the
similarity of their characteristics* This oubstitutebiliry
is defined and tested empirically according to the
definitions given above,
biagrao 1
An example of o utility tree
All commodities
~t" r" , t 1 '








It should be noted that nothing in the concept of
the tree implies that the goods in the initial pairs,
or "basic groups", as Pearce colls them, ere close sub¬
stitutes for each other. Some of the basic groups in
this imaginary tree are complements - such as houses end
furniture, cars end petrol - although some are sub¬
stitutes - such as butter end margarine, brood and cake,
t/sllpapor and paint could be regarded es substitutes in
come of their uses, end complements in others\ em¬
pirically, thoy could be either complements or sub¬
stitutes. Larger groups may also consist of complements
(wallpaper, point, furniture and houses) or substitutes
(cars, and train journeys). The definition of neutral
v;cnt association lies in the proposition that the demand
for ell commodities in a group Q should respond to a
price change of s commodity external- to Q so that the
proportions of purchases q^ •••**♦•Qn remain unchanged,
A common-sense classification of commodities into groups
of substitutes, such as all kinds of food, all methods
of travel, can help in constructing a utility tree only
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in co far as such groups ere nora likely to react to ex¬
ternal price changes then ara heterogenous groups such ae
butter, petrol and wallpaper* It is obvious that in
making some purchasing decisions the consumer is likely
to think of all foods eo one composite commodity* But
it remains to bo proved that such a common-sense
grouping as "all food" is in neutral wont association
with other goods* Shis nay be done by the mathematical
procedures which Pearce develops* By means of such pro¬
cedures, it is possible to identify groups somewhat
larger than the intuitively obvious ones; for example
there nay be neutral want association between food and
bousing, taken together, end other commodities, or be¬
tween travel and housing, taken together, end other com¬
modities*
An alternative concept to that of the utility tree
is that of nested seta of commodities* Tho tree
pictured in Diagram 1 could he re-represented thus:-
pbS
The goods in each circle ere neutrally want associated
with any of the goods outside it* Thus butter end mar¬
garine are neutrally went associated with all other
goods, including bread end cake; but all food is
neutrally want associated with all non-food goods• I
shall refer to any group of commodities which is
neutrally want associated with other goods es a "neutral
group"#
If such groupings can be determined erapiricclly,
the substitution responses of (say) butter, coke, mar¬
garine and bread can all be summarised under the heading
of the single substitution response of food# This mokes
the computation of cross-elasticities possible for fore¬
casting consumer demand# Peorce points out that it has
other uses too; in working out the effects of changes in
tarrifs and exchange rotos, and in helping to define
oligopoly by answering the ever-problematic questions of
what is a commodity, has it close substitutes end whet
ere they#
Determination of co ■ooditv groups and cos-
w niniM *a-i-m*n—i, 1»in— m* ir.'M^WaK#
-w C.- ij J.Oi'i <,L > U iJi.j t/ j„ o :,-l n.BJ1oi j
How can the groupings end their substitution, res¬
ponses bo discovered? By algebraic manipulation of his
bssic propositions (ibid, section 4, chapter 4)_, Poeree
derives the statements-
s * j 35 X/. . « dx • dx f i> \i J UJ X « .J »*#•*•*#«•«»•** \ rJ
ay dy
wherei
c.4 as before, is the change in expenditure on i
Xj
as a result of a price change of 3
dx. is the marginal propensity to consuao i (end
3y~ similarly, where the subscript is «j, the
term moons the marginal propensity to cons us?
a)
L. . isa scalar, subcripted boceuce there is e
* 0
matrix of such scalers , one for every good
end every price change
that this statement moons, then, is that the change in
demand for i, in response to e change in the price of J
is equal to some multiple of the product of the mar¬
ginal propensities to consume i and ,-]• According to
the notation previously employed, i end .j are indi¬
vidual commodities, but the seme statement could be meed
of neutral groups* Of, for that matter, end this is
the most useful sort of statement for forecasting pur¬
poses , the following statement could be made*-
ciQ " LiQ • dx± . dxQ ............ (5)
W x?-
whore Q is a neutral group
Poorce also proves that the some scalar L will describe
the substitution response which takes place when the
relation of the two commodities or groups is reversed,
so that;
xQ t.iiLr. (6)
or, if i is a component of the group H,
1tj ri 33 b r w lv\r» 53 «•*•«©«>* (?)
X'd Kb
Thus, if the neutral groups can be dofined, the problem
then is only to find the 's and the marginal pro-
penalties to consume each group (which must bo computed
from other parameters, not empirically defined, because
one is trying to find what the marginal propensities to
3TO
consume would be if no trends in prices nor changes in
testes were present)*
Pesrce then defines s set of unknowns, k-^* » • ♦ ,k^
for each commodity, which ore proportional to the un¬
known marginal propensities to consume, so thats
0. k.
The points of those unknowns is that they ore used,
firstly, to find which commodities ore neutrally went
associated, end secondly, to find the marginal pro¬
pensities to consume.
These may bo found empirically as follows* For
each of three successive tine-periods, say year 0 to
yoer 1, year 1 to year 2, and yeax1 2 to year 2# an
aquation can be sot up for o pair of commodities i end
j, involving their respective unknown k*s, The form
of tho equation is?-
dr. dx. dp* dp.
- *" "1 "* b ~ x f
i\ * dw • * f-.b ♦
2. J "X
where dx. is the change in demand for (expenditure on)
««»
1, in the time period to which the equation applies,
and dp*., dp* are the percentage price changes cf i and
_t_l
x"i
,j in tha same period, These equations can then be
solved simultaneously, (Pearce suggests that the
simplest way is to draw the three functions on a graph
end see if ond where thoy 'all three cross), Peersa
proves (ibid, pp,213-215) that if there is one solution,
for each k, consistent with all three equations, than the
two commodities i end .j are c neutral group, and the k's
ore found# If there is no consistent solution (i*o* if
the functions cross on the graph et two or three points
or not at all), then the two commodities era not a
neutral group# By the use of such equations, therefore
basic neutral groups nay be found and their k-vsluos at
the sens tiers*
She same type of equation as (9) can in principle
be used to test whether composite commodities form a
group at the second or o higher level in the utility
tree# 2hus, if it is found that bread and coke con¬
stitute a neutral group, and that butter and margarine
constitute c neutral group, one could coo whether the
sub-group brecd-and-ceke is in a larger neutral group
together with butter-and-nargerine# But this can only
be done if one has a way of defining the price changes
of the composite commodities* Pearco's theory demands
that the price change of a composite commodity should
be a weighted average of the price, changes of the in¬
dividual goods, the weights being proportionate to the
marginal propensities to consumeB Thus the weights to
be used in defining the average price change for the
groan bread-ani-coke, could bo 1c, „ , and k . , which° * oread coke
will be known from the first-stage equation.
She same type of equation can be used to find the
k's all the way through the utility tree. This pro¬
cedure will eventually lead to a stage here one knows v
to take the earlier imaginary tree cs on example,
housing ond fcoi oni *t?cvol'those two
groups by the subscripts Q end R respectively, it is
true that;
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^2 - ^2 (10)*
-R R
end also, assuming no saving, that
CQ + CR a 1 •••••••••••••••••• (11)
since these two groups together cover ell cornmo&itios.
She known kA and k_ con be used to find cr> in onK q
equation of the forms
kn cw
sj = or- cQ) (12)
Once Cq is known, can be found from equation (11).
In a real example where there is some saving, either
saving must be treated as a commodity, or the overall
average propensity to consume must be known (and put
in place of unity inequation 11 and 12) or total ex¬
penditure may be used in place of income. In view of
the arguments used in the last chapter, the first
approach is preferable.
Having got this far, it is only necessary to find
the L's for all pairs of groups, and then the sub¬
stitution responses may be calculated easily from
equation 4, which may be re-written with reference to
commodity groups as follows
•*h\T> dX,-» dX-m Xvi—} / "1 V \QR ^ «» R . QR ..... (ly)
dy dy
Hie L's ere found by means of another set of equations,
of the form:
1
kn / dxn0 » G L
U.V
T,? f\ t » 9 » ®
u i3 At OA)
where s is the sot of composite commodities added into
the utility tree between i end the "root" representing
3.^3
oil commodities. (See Pecrce, ibid., p.201). This set
includes eny composite commodity of which i is e pert;
i may be e simple or a composite commodity
- R is the composite good of which i is a component.
I shall now, following Pearce, label L.,0 eccording
uo
to the composite commodity or "group" which includes
both H end S. Thus:-
L (wellpsper and paint) maens L of wallpaper with
paint cr vice versa
L (houses end fuxmiture) means L of houses with
furniture or vice versa
L (housing goods) aeons L of wellpoper end/or paint
with houses end/or furniture
L (all non-trevcl goods) moans L of food (or -any
component of the food group)
with housing goods (or any
component of the housing goods
group)
Some illustrations con now bo given of the type, of
equations given above, such as:-
huttsr 7 cbatC2r * c Ctorch foois).L (food) t e
(housing goods).L (non-travel)
+ c (travel).L (ell)
kroo^ / cf0c^ 13 c (non-trevel).L (non-travel) + c
(trevel).L (all)
^"non-travel ^ cnon-trsvel " c (ell)
Since c (oil) - the mcrginel propensity to consume all
goods - is one, if there is no saving, end may be known,
if there is saving, 1 (ell) con immediately ba found from,
the third of these equations, end used in the second,
3Wr
which then has only one unknowns, L (non-travol). When
L (non-travel) is known, the first equation too is left
with only one unknown, Thus ell the L's ceil be found
end the substitution responses computed,
The relevance of the family buigetinn; system
in constructing a utility tree: en
empirical test
The problem with the whole procedure is, where to
stex't testing for the existence of neutral groups.
Clearly, to test ell possible combinations of commodities
would be emammoth tack, although not as much effort as the
task which the whole theory seeks to avoid, that of com¬
puting individual cross-elasticities from time series,
Poerce performs e test of his theory, using data from the
national Income Blue Book, to find the L's end use them
to predict changes in demand. He constructs a utility
tree from the Blue Bock data, taking an initial hypothesis
based on intuitive want-groupings (such as entertainment
end radio-television) end on the ranking of price-
elasticities. Ha says, for example: "It was thought;
worthwhile to try grouping items such as 'alcohol and
tobacco', 'rant end rates', end 'communication', which
intuitively we should expect to have rather lower price
elasticities than say 'electrical goods'" (ibid, p.2W).
Other groupings ho made arbitrarily♦ Pearca finds the
result of bis hypothesis rather disappointing, partly
because there was only "some evidence" in support of the
chosen hypothesis regarding the structure of the utility
tree, end partly because the published Blue Book ictfi are
very cruie for this rather refined method of forecasting.
In the end ho admits that: even though our methoci is
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shown to b. as good as any other it is only Just as good
as (e naive hypothesis" (i.e. o naive forecast).
It is here that the empirical data of Chapter 5 may¬
be useful. Q?he groupings of commodities suggested by
data on the ".ivision of expenditure responsibilities
within the family, provides a very plausi'-le basis for
the division of commodities into hypothetical groups,
particularly v/hen this knowledge may be supplemented by
grouping cn the basis of the commodity's function and
relative elasticities of demand. Working on the idea
that some commodities are generally paid for by the
husband, others generally by the wife, and some by one
or the other depending on the family, I decided to tost







































































notes Durable goods go equally well with
any of the 3 sain groups
Dlorrcra 3
Utility t roe "cntrl by !» F» Paarc 8
(Sea "A Contribution to Bestsnd Analysis 4
P. £^5)
3^8
I tested this tree Tor the years 1966-69, using the :ra; h
method described earlier, The values of k found are
given in the Appendix to this charter, which also gives
the precise definition of the commodity groups used as
the initial "simple goods". Changes in expenditure were
measured in millions of pounds, as in the Blue Book, illay
were taken from Table 23 of the .1970 Blue Book ("Con¬
sumers' Expenditure ot 1963 Prices")• Percentage price
changes v/ere estimated fron the cost of living index,
given in the Annuel Abstract of Statistics, 1970, The
tree which can bo derived from the data is very similar
to the one I postulated, esl is shown in Diagram 6,
Diagram 5 shows Pearee's tree for comparison. There ore
cone similarities in the initial groupings of goods -
both he and I put motoring end travel with house main¬
tenance, tobacco end alcohol together, end chemists *
goods with hardware and cleaning materials (these last
two sub-groups are presumably included in Pearce'c
"other household" goods). On the other hand, there are
sons major differences, for example, v/hoross I put rent,
rates and fuel together in on initial .set, Pecrca puts
thorn on opposite sides of his tree. The two trees are
difficult to compere in so for as Poerce has used finer
groupings than I have in defining tho initial "com¬
modities". I restricted myself largely to those groupings
given separately in the cost of living index, since 1 had
no hypothesis to cover such smell groups as Poerce uses.
This being so, there was no point in using the current
prices expenditure table of the Blue Book to calculate
price changes for smaller groupings, and onea the larger
3^9
groupings of the cost of living index ere used in
measuring price changes, goods in the seme price-change
group become automatically neutrally want associated®
Thus, for example, since there is one price change
measured for all clothing, men's and women's clothing
will be part of the same neutral group by definition,
since in the equations
&x^ - dx^ « dpp - dp^
kl p£ "pJ
the two price terms are equal, and the right hand side
is zero; thus the equation for each year is of the
forms
' kl ~
end the three euqations have a common pair of solu¬
tions where both k's are zero, I did not, however,
put men's end women's clothing in the same group be¬
cause it is obvious that these two commodity groups are
not necessarily identical as to price behaviour, and
the initial hypothesis provides strong reasons why they
should be in different sections of the tree. In the
case of "miscellaneous recreational goods" and "other
recreational goods" however, there is no reason for
believing that they are in different parts of the tree,
so that the fact that they are automatically neutrally
want associated, by reason of the price index having
only one appropriate category, "miscellaneous goods",
does not really matter.
Problems of the method of construction
of a utility troe
In performing the test, a number of problems
emerged which raise some doubts as to the value of the
method;-
'55G
(1) The k**values are very small indeed, so small
that chance variations in them, arising from
errors made in the collection of the Blue
Book data, could lead to considerable error's
in the estimation of the "true" marginal
propensities- to consume# Unless a further
test could be introduced to check the
accuracy of the estimate of k, the marginal
propensity to consume might be bettor
estimated directly from empirical data.
Except in the cases of commodities the prices
of which have consistently risen faster or
slower than other prices in recent years, so
that a consistent substitution effect dis¬
torts the estimate of the marginal propensity
to consume, this might not load to excessive
errors• In feet, because of this probable
wide margin of error in the estimation of k,
I used the marginal propensity to consume
determined from time sories data of the
o
period 1959-19/ to voigti^ the price changes
in drawing up average px'ice changes of com¬
modity groups•
A regression of consumption on income (i.e. for
practical purposes, total consumers' expenditure)
gives en equation of the form:
C «• a + b Y
Tho b-vcluo can be taken as tho marginal propensity
to consume* Poarco in fact uses the average pro¬
pensities to consume as weights in constructing the
average price changes of composite commodities, but he
does not explain why. It is of course not necessarily
true that the ratio of the average propensity to consume
to tho marginal propensity is the some for every commodity.
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(2) Where the k-values are very close to aero,
the Ids will also be very small. Since there
are so many very small It's, it seems that
many of the cross-elasticities to be esti¬
mated may be so small as to be hardly worth
estimating, at least, unless the sophisti¬
cation of data collection could be improved.
It is not worth having a method of fore¬
casting so sophisticated that the difference
between the changes it predicts, and the
changes a simpler method 'would predict, are
so small that they are smaller then the
margin of error arising through difficulties
of data collection.
On the other hand, one must not overlook the in¬
adequacy of the Blue Book data for the purpose of
estimating the k's, which may lead to their under¬
estimation; the Blue Book groupings of consumer ex¬
penditures do not correspond exactly to the groups I
would have liked to distinguish according to the ori¬
ginal hypothesis. For example, "catering, insurance
end other services" covers a variety of things in¬
cluding some so diverse as hair-dressing, restaurant
and canteen meals, stays at hotels, etc. Some of
these should be regarded as "wife's goods" and others
as "husband's goods". lien's and boy's wear is linked
together; women's, girls' and infants' wear together.
Footwear is not distinguished as to the sex of the
probable purchaser. "Miscellaneous recreational goods",
"miscellaneous goods" and "chemists" goods" (which in-
eludes medicines) suffer from the came sort of problem*
i'his means that heterogeneous categories of eats-*
modifies, some having large k's with respect to the
other commodities in the equation, and some having
small k's, ere thrown together* Larger k's could
occur between single commodities which have &
sufficiently distinctive function for consumers and
sufficiently separate pieces in the family budget, to
be validly separated# This explanation of the small-
ness of the k's in the calculations performed is
supported by the fact that k's occurring between largo
groups of commodities are smeller then k's between the
initial sets* (Peerce, too, finds that the higher-
order groupings of commodities ere difficult to detor-
ifiino# iiXgnor—order .n's ***** wore oil rathor smell,
suggesting that no very different result would have
been obtained by varying the- higher-order groupings"*
1 have already pointed out that small k's go together
with small L's).
Because of the problems of computation and the
limited value of the method with these data I decided
rot to proceed with forecasting changes in demand on
the basis of the groups found* Because of the large
margin of error in estimating the k's, it would have
been of little meaning to compero the accuracy of a
forecast based on my "troo" and tho- one based on
Paarco'o "troo". Further investigation of the fore¬
casting value of tho method in practice is not really
possible without better data, giving price end expend!-
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turo chcnsos for a much more detailed breekiown of
commodities.
In generel, the modal of noutrel went
association scorns to show promise, but one needs more




-• ... jj.i A.
The date used were for the periods 1966-?, 1937-8 end
1958-9• They were taker, fron Table 2? of the Blue
Book (National Income and Expenditure) 1970* The
accuracy with which the k-values can be estimated de¬
pends on the scale to which the graph cen bo drawn,
end therefore varies.
Commodity Definition value
1* Alcohol total approx. 1.0
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An attempt will now bo aado to drew together trio
threads of procoding chapters. In the first place, it
is worth considering how the concept of a utility tree
may be developed. This concept may be extended to form
the basis of a model which integrates some aspects of
the theory of savings behaviour and the micro-economic
theory of labour supply with the theory of demand for
individual commodities# Such & model would predict
substitution effects without assuming either income or
savings constant.
Despite the problems referred to in the last
chapter, it seems worthwhile speculating on some further
theoretical potentialities of the use of a utility tree.
By combining the main elements of Pearce's theory with
the main elements of Becker's "theory of the allocation
of time" (1965) end Lawrence Klein's work on the re¬
lationship between discretionary expenditure and saving
(Katona, Klein at si 195'0 * it would be possible to lay
tho foundations of an integrated modal ox* household
economic behaviour, linking tho areas of the consumption
function, demand theory and the family's supply of
labour.
In accordance with Becker's suggestion, leisure may
be treated as a consumption good, measured in time and
having e price corresponding to the wage rote. If a man
decides to take an extra hour's leisure when he could be
working, he foregoes the money he could have corned
during that hour; hence one hour's pay is the "price" of
35-£
his hour's Isisuro. A rise in the wage rote would there¬
fore mean a rise in the price of leisure. If leisure is
to be viewed as a commodity, the concept of income roust
also be changed, for leisure is not "bought" with monofc
income actually obtained, as are other goods; rather,
leisure is "bought" by foregoing the opportunity to ob¬
tain money income. In this context "income" is mora
suitably defined es the amount of money which s man could
earn if ho worked es many hours es his employer would
1
offer him work for.
Using this idea of maximum potential income, com¬
modities can bo thought of as being paid for in units of
labour-time rather than money. Then, a rise in the money
wage-rate con be seen not only as o rise in the price of
leisure, but also as e fall in the work-price of all
other commodities. The effect on the consumption
pattern of changing money income, can therefore be de¬
fined as en effect of the changing work-price of com¬
modities. Any commodity price change may have the offset
of changing the amount of leisure consumers demand, and
hence the amount they work. Or consumers rosy react to a
price change by altering the amount of saving they carry
cut. If leisure and saving are part of the commodity
chain in this wsy, they need to be incorporated into the
utility tree.
1 ' ;
I put forward this as e culturally realistic notion of the
maximum possible number of working hours; but perhaps
some modifications would need to bo made in respect of
moonlighting. It is in fact difficult to specify 8
hypothetical maximum, since hours actually worked, workers'
notions of how much it is possible to work, and employers1
ideas of how much overtime work should be offered to
employees, are of course mutually reinforcing concepts.
y »• try
'Where is leisure likely to fit into © utility tree;
Obviously it is both s wife's good and e husband's good,
in so for £3 each much hove some leisure. But here one
must be concerned with variable leisure, that part of
leisure which may be given up in favour of extra income
from work. In so far as people adjust their incomes to
meet temporary coeds, leisure and saving may well bo
substitutes for each other. Consequently it seems likely
that they should go together in the utility tree with
commodities for which money is saved or special effort
is made, such as durables or holidays. In the utility
tree I have established from the Blue Book dots,
durables fit equally wall with either "men's" or "woman!
or "joint" goods - the k-veluss in all three cases were
sero. let variable leisure is to a large extent a "man'
good" - it is the husband, rather than the wife, who
varies his working hours according to temporary needs.
As shown in Chapter 6, the age of children and attitudes
to their upbringing or to the role of 'women, have an
overwhelming effect on tie wife's propensity to work;
there is no evidence that women go out to work to obtain
money for specific purchase^, although most of them car
say to what uses their earnings are allocated., Svon tb
small group of mothers of pre-school children who work : I
apparently from financial necessity, hod o general ret'
than & particular financial need. 2?ke wife's decision ..
work or not to work is a long-term one, for the most par.
only two women in the sample said that they had worked
spasmodically "when thoy .needed to". Moreover, women
usually do not hsvo the sort of jobs in which thoy cnr.
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tend their hours of work on e wekk-to-woek bosio if the;
need more money then usual* Opportunities for variable
overtime are peculiar to men* Hence it seems clear
that it will be the man who obtains extra money for
specific temporary needs, such as coving up for the
snnuel holiday* In fact, e substantial minority of men
mentioned specific things of this sort which gave them c
reason for doing more overtime then usual at the time oi
the survey; most such references were to holidays, thou
this nay have been because of the time of year at which
the survey was carried out* It is not at ell clear, the
where savings end leisure should cone in the utility tr¬
ill so for as both are substitutes for expenditure on
holidays, it is logic©! that they should come on the hu
bend's side, and this is consistent with whet we know
about men's and women's work patterns* But in so far a.:
savings and leisure are substitutes for durable goods,
they should come on the women's side of the tree, which
is not entirely consistent with the data on work pat-tor
2
Clearly en empirical trial Is required to solve this
question* Eut is is here that the available
statistics present the most problems in the way of
empirical testing. Variable work opportunities ere
e feature of the manual worker's work-consumption
pattern, end not for all manual workers at that;
white-collar workers generally do not have such
opportunities, and most retired people in practice
do not (if only fox1 cultural and medical reasons)*
But aggregate data on consumer expenditure is only
available for ell consumers* Apart from the Blue
Book, the only alternative source Of dots which give...
expenditure for working-class families separately is
the Family Expenditure Survey# But this does not
give an adequate estimate of saving - in fact, total
expenditure exceeds income for the appropriate table,
which makes it impractical to use these figures to
fit savings and leisure into the utility tree#
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The implications of defining price as work-price
must be considered a bit further here. If the money
price of a commodity changes, whilst the wage rate re¬
mains constant, the change in the work-prico measured
in hours, is equal to the change in the money price,
divided by the wage rate per hour. But if the money
price of a commodity changes ©t the seme time as the
wage rate changoa, the change in the work-price of the
commodity is equal to the new price divided by the new
wage rate, minus the old price divided by the old wags
rate. Alternatively, the work-price can be measured in
money rather than hours; this is convenient as long as
the wage rate is constant, for ee long as this is so,
prices can be measured in money in the ordinary way.
But to measure the work-price in money as the wage
rate changes is conceptually more complex. A doubling
of the wage rate has the offoct of doubling the pur¬
chasing power of the consumer-worker * s labour, which is
identical to the effect of helving prices. The price
Fn {je^ms other
of leisure on the other hand is doubled^of discommodities.
A given change in the wage rote can
therefore be represented as a change in prices equal to
the reciprocal of the wage rote change - if the wage rate
doubles, prices are helved, end if the wage rate is
helved, prices double.
The only uses of income so far omitted from the
model arc residual and precautionary saving. The first
of theso arises as an accident, not because of any de¬
cision on the consumer's part; and therefore any notic:
of an "elasticity of demand" for such a use of income
56O
would bo nonsensicel. It is genorelly eccopted that it
can bost bo expleined in terms of deviations of actual
income from expected income (c, f. Friedman's permanent
income hypothesis) or in terms of the logged adjustment
of consumer expenditure to changes in income (c.f« Ruth
Heck's model )» A3 for precautionary saving, this
arises from uncertainty felt by consumers as to their
future income of future expenditure* It seems vary-
likely that undar financial pressure, consumers will
abandon precautionary saving end rely on the use of
£j.
discretionary labour power in emergencies• For example,
Friedman finds that entrepreneurs ore likely to save a
largo proportion of their incomes (compered to other
occupational groups) because of uncertainty concerning
the future level of their incomes; but although e
casual labourer suffers the same, if not greater, un¬
certainty, one cannot imagine him maintaining any sub¬
stantial level of liquid assets. Therefore, there may
be an interdependence between precautionary coving and
leisure at low income levels, which needs to bo investi¬
gated in order to complete the set of economic relation¬
ships which the integrated model should include,
A problematic consequence of including leisure in
the utility tree is that work on substitution responses
must use work-prices of commodities rather than money
prices. But these work-pricoo will vary far more between
3
Ruth Mack: Direction of change of income end the con--
ounation function: Review of Economic Studies, iiovsac.rr
19" lb
Mincer (19-32) finds that "negative transitory income com¬
ponents" , that is, situations where income is less t; n
the consumer's normal level, provide wives with on in¬
centive to go out to work.
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consumers then do monay prices» because the work-price
which a consumer pays for a good depends on his wege.
Thus, in the work-price model, it may be necessary to
draw up different sets of cross-elasticities for
different income groups. Does this lead to a model of
impractical complexity?
The point of sotting up highly complex, all-in¬
clusive models moy not be so much to use thera as to see
how adequate less complex models .are. As I pointed out
in the first chapter, it is not until one has con¬
structed & model of greet complexity that ono can. toll
whether this is a bettor model to use than the simpler
models from which it was developed. One can then see
where it is worthwhile to add elements of tho complex
model to tho simpler ones. To illustrate this point,
one may consider that the importance of substitution
effects varies greatly from one commodity to another.
In particular, the price changes of some commodities
must have a much greater effect on the demand for
leisure or the quantity of saving, then the price
changes of other commodities. Thus, there are some
typos of demand prediction fox' which it may bo importon
to use work-prices end e utility tree including leisure
end/or saving: other predictions where a conventional-
commodity utility tree and money prices will suffice,
and yet others where substitution effects are eltogeth;
unimportant,
I hove now attempted to show the way towards ono
type of improvement of models of household behaviour
which was advocated in Chapter 1; the improvement of th
5SZ
predictive power end generality of models by the inte¬
gration of different fields of theory.
Whet of the second type of improvement which was
advocated in Chapter the inclusion in models of cul¬
tural as well es economic variables? The construction
of the utility troe of Chapter 8 was booed on o hypo¬
thesis concerning the division of expenditures between
husband end wife, which was derived from the empirical
work of Chapter In so far as Chapter 3 also provides
some information about the social correlates of different
housekeeping system, it in possible to iseke some statement
about the range of data sots for which this particular
utility tree will be valid,
I? the utility tree changes, many of the cross—
elasticities of substitution would change, Thus the
model would only be operational as c predictive tool for¬
es long as, end in piece© where, the housekeeping systems
which the utility tree is based on remain reasonably
similar to those found at present, The utility tree ic,
therefore, a distinctly culture-bound model.
If the demographic indicators of the housekeeping
system which have boon identified in this study - owner-
occupancy, skill level of the husband's occupation,
traditional versus non~traditional occupations and so en -
could be verified in a larger end more broadly based
sample, it may bo possible to suggest, within Britain, for
whet groups of the population the utility tree established
in this study is likely to be valid, and what sorts of
social changes might cause it to become invalid. But it
must be emphasised that in other countries, family bud-
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gating practices could be quite differentt and even
some British practices say not bo identified by the
Edinburgh survey because of its restricted geographical
scope.
In Chapters 2 end 6, I have attempted to identify
some cultural influences on the individual's propensity
to work. In particular, it has been shown that the
nature of the housekeeping system effects the husband's
propensity to work, and that it is highly plausible that
. P-typo husbands are more likely than A-type husbands to
react to wage rate changes by working shorter hours#
However, no data are available to test this hypothesis
here. It must, moreover, be recognised that the house¬
keeping system is only one of a number of influences on
the individual's propensity to work, which are identified
in Chapter 6 end have also been identified by the Prices
and Incomes Board. Any of those influences may also
effect the elasticity of the individual's supply of
labour.
Although the findings in the Edinburgh survey are
similar to those of the KPBI in many respects, it woull
bo necessary' to make further investigations on larger
samples, drawn from a variety of regional and occupation •!
cultures, before ono could be really euro to whet sorts
of people those findings apply. Tiio carae could bo sal
of the typology of housekeeping systems, which is the
basis not only of some of the findings about the pro¬
pensity to work, but also of the utility treo.
The data presented in this thesis do not, unfortur-
ately, suggest any simple demographic indicators of
7jW-
loisure preference. Demographic indicators end in¬
dicators in industrial conditions could however be
found for individual factors effecting leisure pre¬
ference. For example,interest in sport could bo
measured in a sub-population of workers by, say, the
extent of membership of sports clubs in their
occupational group and district. Involvement in work¬
place friendships could bo found, on further investi¬
gation, to be associated with particular occupations
or working conditions, end thus easily identifiable.
Multiple regression analysis, suing as "coses" eithor
individuals, production establishments, or cities,
seems to be called for to determine the exact degree
of dependence of leisure preference on various social
factors, and what is the best way to measure those
factors.
'The difference between en integrated end a con¬
ventions! model of economic behaviour is not simply
that the former is broader in scope, that it leaves
less under the heading of "ceteris paribus". A furthe
major difference is that the integrated type of model
attempts to specify a more comprehensive system of
links go3 bafcw3cu» different behaviours and tho variable
which influence these behaviours. In other words,
economic actions and their cultural correlates era see
as o whole, as c pattern, 'fho predominant theme in the
empirical findings of Chapters 5 end 6 is that the A-
housekeeping system is associated with o greater pro¬
pensity to work and more extensive consumer ambitions
then the P-type system. But if one attempted to show
.C CT'
this simply by establishing en association on the one
bend between (say) the number of durable goods © family
*. wents, and its housekeeping system and on the other
hand between the housekeeping system and the amount of
overtime the husband works, the reader would be en¬
titled to say, surely these associations could very wall
be spurious\ what do they meen? It is only whan the
nature end implications of the 'budgeting system ere con¬
sidered in detail, bringing out the importance of joint
saving in the A-type system, the husband's responsibility
for income-elastic discretionary expenditure and so on,
that the interpretation I have given to those data be¬
comes plausible, and that the nature of the implicit
life style end its consequences for economic behaviour
becomes apparent»
Shis pattern-finding approach attempts to find the
real moaning of statistical relationships instead of
taking them at face value* As I argued in Chapter 1, it
is important to do this in order to avoid identifying
spurious relationships as real ones* It is also necessary
in order to be able to speculate constructively about
one's data* If one has attempted to understand the
logical meaning of the relationships one has found, it in
easier to suggest what might happen if c particular as¬
pect of the date pattern changes* For example, by
attempting to understand the relationship between the P-
typo housekeeping system end e traditional working-class
life stylo, it is possible to speculate that the groat--r
frequency of the A-type system amongst younger couples
is more likely to signify that this syteia is becoming ror
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common amongst successive generations of newly married
couples, rather than that it signifies e change from
the A-type to the P-type system during the life cycle«
It i3 this sort of speculation which makes it
possible to generate from on exploratory study hypo¬
theses which, if proved in further research on e
larger scale, could have predictive value.
Many economic models, indeed most of the simplest
and most basic building blocks of the discipline, leave
cultural factors out of account altogether. For example,
demand for a commodity i3 related to its price, end to
the household's income, but not to trends which might
influence "tester." such ss changes in consumers' housing
situation, working hours or conditions, or the
availability of public transport, recreational
facilities and so on. Such simplicity is obviously
justified to some extent by the fact that most economic
predictions need only be sbort-run. But increasingly,
our attention is drawn to the need for long-term pro-
dictions in a number of fields. Recent attention to aa --
power planning, to the use of natural resources (which
assumes increasing ecological significance) the in¬
creasingly long-term investment plans made by both
government end private industry, all point to the
necessity for economics to adjust its methods in order
♦ s
to make longer-range predictions," It is in such long-
range predictions that cultural factors must be taken 1st:;
account, for in the long period they cannot be assumed
constant,
5' Some of these issues are discussed in "Forecasting an ,
the Social Sciences" cd, Michael Young (1.968),
However, in attesting to outline a model which
incorporates cultural patterns as independent
variables, 1 have clearly laid myself open to a new sot
of difficulties• A number of important questions remain
unanswered, which must bo answered before one con use on
integrated model for long-term predictions. For how lor
will the housekeeping systems found in this sample re¬
main, for presumably now systems evolve es time goes on?
If more end more couples are adopting the A-type system,
when they marry, whet is making thorn do so? Is the most
salient factor higher living standards, increased fre¬
quency of owner-occupancy, a trend towards o more "joint15
conjugal role-relationship or what? Which is the host
easily observable indicator of the housekeeping system?
What proportion of couples change their budgeting system
in the course of their married life, and why? Clearly
further work 021 housekeeping systems is required to
answer these questions, which would need to have e
longitudinal perspective. Moreover (and this problem
would apply whichever sort of model was under discussion)
the decree of influence which the various correlates of
the propensity to work have on it has yet to be
quantified. Such quantification is not possible in a
snail exploratory study. This requires multiple re¬
gression analysis of a much larger* sample.
The explanation of variations in the propensity to
work is of interest to employers and government even in
the short rim. It is relevant to predicting people's
reactions to wage and price changes, changes in basic
working hours end changes in overtime opportunities. In
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Chapter 6 I have added et least one, and possibly two,
important influences on raen#s propensity to work, to the
list established by the Prices and Incomes Board. Tho
first of those in the housekeeping system, and second
the type of acquaintance network s men end his wife have.
Data on tho latter is, however, weak in my survey, so
that I cannot be conclusive on this point.
The data permit some interesting speculations on
future trends in the propensity to work. Firstly, the
finding that having at least e part-time job appear3 to he
©Irtiost universal amongst women who have their first child
after 1955 end havo no longer any pre-school children,
suggests that the labour force participation at least of
working class wives say ba approaching its maximum in this
country (although confirmation of this finding too is
required from a larger sample and one more widespread
geographically). One may then ask, if having a .job be¬
comes so general in this group, will women without pre¬
school children consider any longer that they have a
choice about whether to go to work or not? Mien house¬
wives net committed to the core of young children nearly
all contribute to the .family income, will this practice
become mandatory? This would represent on important
end interesting change in current social values end
family roles.
Secondly, it may well be that the P-type husband's
relatively low propensity to work, and the fact that he
spends his retentions on goods for most of which the in¬
come elasticity of demand is low, may mean that ho is
more likely then tho A-type husband to work shorter houas
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when his wage rata rises, is it possible, then, that
if the A-type system is becoming more common, es I have
suggested elsewhere that it aay he, that the relative
frequency of negative income effects will fall, and
that of positive reactions to wage rate changes rise,
as tine goes on? If this occurs, it is.possible that
too working hours of manual workers could rise, instead
of fluctuating around the seme long-run level, as they
have done in Britain since 1915• If so, this could lead
to increasing unemployment, if it is profitable to em¬
ployers to take advantage of an increased willingness to
wo id: overtime instead of maintaining the sine of their
labour force#
However, these can only he opecul £* t} JL01 *3 c Many
questions remain unanswered in this work, and many of
its findings are inconclusive* I can only hope that,
as on exploratory study, this thesis has opened up a
useful area for future research, and that it has served
to illustrate the potential value of predictive models
which attempt to span disciplinary boundaries#
"either the integrated model of substitution effect.,
in household behaviour, nor the analysis of culture! in¬
fluences on the elasticity of tho individual's supply of
labour, have emerged in this thesis as completed models
which would bo operational for predictive purposes* Ac-
was my intention, I have devoted my limited resources to
constructing a more outline to the solution of o very
wide research problem, rather thou to providing o com¬
pleted- solution to a small part of this problem# I have
used this approach precisely because, as I stated in the
370
first chapter, it in important to define the boundari
of one's field of investigation with references to
social reality, rather than from academic convenience
I have been concerned to demonstrate the voluo for
economics of examining u number of areas of household
behaviour frora a sociological standpoint 5 end if I
have succeeded in doing this, I hope I may be .justi¬
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W * Could I start by asking you about your side of the family budget?
W How much would you say your regular housekeeping money is each week?
£.•••••«•s(
NR R
TV 6f Does it all come from your husband?
If no, explain breakdown:-
VERBATIM:
N NR




W 8. Do you ever borrow from your hushand if you run
out at the end of the week?
W 9. Do you ever borrow from anyone else if you run short -
I know a lot of this used to go on before the war, I
wonder if people still do it?
FURTHER COMMENTS:-
Xi 10. (if borrows) 'who do you borrow from - your mother,
neighbours or who?
FURTHER COMMENTS:-
X! 11. If working children in the household:
How much does your soi\7<laughter give you each week?
(if covered in q. 6, write "see q. 6")
XI 1 2. If working children Does he/she get anything back
out of that for pocket money or fares?


















XL ... ^.and ...
EXPLAIN FOR FURTHER
WORKING CHILDREN:-
SON GETS RACK ,. .s FOR
DAUGHTER FOR
W 13« Do you have anything on HP?
NR R
ITEMS
W 14? Do you belong to a clothing club or anything like that?
(if covered in q.13 write "see q.13")
DESCRIBE TYPE OP CLUB:
Y N NR




W 16. Could you look at the list on this page and put a tick
against the things which are covered by your housekeeping
money?
Then could you put a cross beside the things your husband pays
for with money you don't handle?
(if something is shared between you, put both a tick and a cross)




cigarettes for your husband
children's pocket money
clothing for yourself
clothing for your husband








drink to keep in the house
repairs, decorating, do-it-
yourself materials
saving up for anything
cinema tickets, entertainment
















bus fares for your husband
bus fares for you and the children
hairdressing, cosmetics
Y N NR R
T/hat sort of things do you save for?
VERBATIM:




Do you have any savings
(if yes) Could you put a figure to it?
- soy for how much you have saved in the
last twelve months?
FURTHER COMMENTS ON SAVING:
E 22. I/hat kinds of insurance do you have?










E 23« Now could you look at the list of things on the bottom of this page
and tell me which you have - could you mark them with a tick?
DINING SUITE











GAS OR ELECTRIC FIRES
ELECTRIC SETTING MACHINE
Now please mark with a cross anything you need badly but haven't got.





GOLF CLUBS OR SKIS
CAMERA
VENETIAN BLINDS
And put a star by anything you'd like to have but which isn't really a
priority.
J
B 24. Is there anything which isn't cn the list which you think
you need:
NEED
FURTHER COMMENTS: NOTHING- NR
SECTION 3: HUSBAND'S JOB
H 25. How long have you had your present job? SINCE 19
( = same type of work with present firn) NR
H 26. Have you been a there for all that time?
Y N NR
H 27. What were you before that? JOB
• 1 >
H 28. How long was that for? ....
NR
H 29. What did you do before you worked for your present firm?
JOB
H 30. How long was that for? ....
NR
II 31 • End before that?
JOB
V
How long for? ypow
••••••<)••• J. ilO •
Repeat q, if necessary till get back to time he left
school and write answer here:-
H 32. (if not mentioned already) Did you complete an apprenticeship?
Y N NR
(NB If informant has mentioned an apprenticeship not connected
with his present trade, make sure you ascertain whether he
completed it - he may have given it up on starting national service)
H 33« How many hours did you work last week? H
(NB actual time, not what he was paid for - overtime may
count as'time and a half" for wage purposes)
H 34. Was that a fairly usual week? Y N NR
H 35* Doss it vary at all with the time of year? Y N NR
If yos. probe and write explanation here:
H 36. How many hours of what you worked last week was overtime? HRS.
H 36a. What is the rate per hour for overtime? SAT. RATE SUN. RATE ....
OTHER DAYS





How is overtime allocated?
VERBATIM:
How much overtime can a man got if he wants as much as possible?
VERBATIM:
H AO. Do you do any shift v/ork?
H M. Is shift work compulsory in your job?
(i.e. do you effectively have the chance to opt
out of a shift system if you don't like it)
H 42. How does the shift system work - could you explain what your
hours are on the different shifts? How often do you do each one?
NAME OF SHIFT HOURS HOT? OFTEN TICK IF PREFERS
H A3. Which shift do you prefer? (tick above)
H AA. Why? VERBATIM:
Y N NR
Y N NR
H 45. Are you paid by the hour or by the amount of work you do? - Is there any
kind of production bonus?
HOUR PIECE HOURLY RATE WI3H
INDIVIDUAL BONUS
(piece includes nileage basis
for transport workers) HOURLY RATE WITH
GROUP BONUS NR
H 46. Do you do anything apart from your main job? Y N NR R
H 47. (if yes) How many hours have you spent at that in the last month?
HRS.
DESCRIBE JOB: CAN'T SAY
NOTHING RECENTLY
NR R
H 48. How much does that bring in? £ s
NR R
H 49- Does the amount of tax you are goint to pay discourage you
from trying to earn as much as possible? Y N NR
H 50. (if yes) Do you actually work shorter hours than you would if
the tax rates were lower Y N NR
H 5"l • Do you try to work out hov/ much tax you will have to pay? 1 rJ r»K






Does the amount you earn vary fron week to week? Y N NR
(IL no) Could you write here(If ye s) Could you write in here a
rough maximum and minimum of your wages, , , , .° j ) what you earn after tax and
after tax and national insurance is
taken off?
MINIMUM: £ s
national insurance is taken off?
MAXIMUM £ s
NR R
K 54. How much of that is your basic wage? £,
NR R
Provide slip of paper and envelope if required
/ire there any deductions from that figure - for a holiday
fund or pension scheme or anything like that? Y N
(if yes) How much do you got taken off for that?
NR
If your pay went up by £2 per week, how would you spend it? (if says
save) what for?
VERBATIM:
SECTION 4: WIFE'S JOB If she has none, ask 58-63 only
Could I ask you a few questions about wives working now?
¥ 58. IThat was your job before you were married?
Note industry, type of work and type of
establishment
W 59. In what year were you married, by the way? 19.
NR
If has no job now (if has a job go to 61)
V 60. "when did you give up that job? 19.
NR
V 61. Have you had any job since your marriage? Y N
JOB FT/PT
V 62. (if yes) a. What was that
b. when ?
c. For how long?
d. Was it full time or part time?
w 63 Would you prefer to work rather than stay at home? (Probe)
VERBATIM:
If has a job now '
W 64. How long have you had your present job? SINCE 19
(i.e. period of work with same employer)
¥ 65. Have you had any other job sinco 3rour marriage? Y N




W 66. (if has different .job from what had before marriage)
Tiliy did you change your job?
VERBATIM
V? 67. What are your hours of work? FROM TO NR
IF VARIABLE EXPLAIN:
V 68. Which days of the week do you work? MON/ TUES/ WED/ THUR/
FRI/ SAT/ SUN
17 69. What 3ort of things do you nainly spend your nioney on?
VERBATIM:
17 70. What would you cut down on if you had to give up working?
VERBATIM:
TV 71• So do you think you would manage if you ever had
to give up work or not? Y N DK NR
17 72. Would you go on working if your husband earned
£30 per week? Y N DK R
FURTHER COMMENTS:
17 73. Some wonen go out to work because they are saving up for something special,
others to get out of the house, some for the company and some just to nake
ends meet.
That is your main reason?
SAVING FOR MAKE ENDS MEET COMPANY
(name of item)
GET OUT OF HOUSE DK NR
DIFFERENT REASON:
Ivj "7<W . RAW tuuciv do crtvu n- j-_ £ _____
SECTION 5; HOUSING
Nov/ could I ask you a few questions about your house and how you find it?
I<
E 74. How long have you lived in this house? ' YRS.
E 75. Have you lived anywhere else since you were narried? Y N NR
E 76. There? 77. In v/hat type of house? If no go to 7U






E. 77. TThere were you brought up? H
(Note city or county within British
Isles, country if abroad) ¥
Ask all not on Corporation estates:
E 79. Firstly, is your house rented or do you own it?
OWN skip to 83-6, then 89
RENT
RENT FREE skip to 84,85,86 then 89
RELATIVES OWN
OR RENT
E If rented, check; that's from a private landlord, is it
Y N NR
Private tenants: if no, go to
E 80. Hot/ much is the r ent?
....... s per
E 81. Hov; much do you pay for rates? .3 s. per yr.
(make sure you get what is paid not
rateable value)
E 82. Are you on the Corporation waiting list for a house?
■> - - Y ' N NR R
Owner-occupiers
E 83. Is the house mortgaged? Is it an ordinary mortgage Y, ORDINARY
or the kind that is a life insurance policy too? Y, INS. HORTGACE
(L ■ Hew iuuC-U. Lp-tV N
t 5 —
E 84. How much do you pay for rates? £ s per yj..
E 85. How much do you pay for feu-duty? £ s per yr.
E 86. .ire you on the Corporation waiting list for a house? y ^ ^ ^
Ask Corporation tenants only:
E 87. How much is the rent? £ s per
E 88. Has the recent ' ' increase in Corporation rents affected you yet?
Y N NR
(If yes) How much has it gone up ?
kj
Ask all types of householder:
E 89• (if the main room is not also a kitchen)
Is your kitchen large enough to eat in? Y
E 90. So how many apartments have you apart from the kitchen
E 91 • Have you a bath?























94. In general, have you any complaints about the house or not?
VERBATIM
H: VI:
B 95. Would you prefer to live in any other district?
If yes Which? H; Y
Hj V;j Y
Wj
Ask all tenants, not owners









B 97* (if yes) Are you actually saving up for a house at the moment?
Y N NR
SECTION 6; EDUCATION AND CAREERS
I'd like to go on to a few more general topics if you have time - by way of background
information - could I ask you a bit about your own and your children's education?
i
Ask re all children 1 2 plus but not yet working
E 98. Which school is he/she at? SCHOOL
SCHOOL
SCHOOL
B 99. What do you want him/her to do when he/she leaves school?
VERBATIM: (Probe)
H; vrj
B 100. Ask re all children under 1 2
What sort of secondary school do you want hinv/her to go to?
VERBATIM:
H; W;
B 101 How old were you when you left school?
H; 1A 15 16 17 18 NR TV; 14 15 16 17 18 MR
B 102. If you could go back to leaving school again at the present time,
would you have chosen a different sort of job or education from
what you have had?
(Probe; this q. is intended to get at what they would do if they had




B 103. What sort of jobs did your parents have when you left school?
H's FATHER W's FATHER
H's MOTHER TV's MOTHER
Further comments on parents' jobs:
104. I don't know if it sounds at all relevant to talk about your friends, but
it's often suggested that there is some kind of common idea spread around
a group of friends about what is and isn't worthwhile in the way of things
to buy and the amount of work you do. Do you think this is true?
(probe)
H; Y N NR DK ¥; Y N NR DK
FURTHER COMMENTS:
H; XI;
105. it's often said that people get to know others who live in the same
way and on the sane level. Is this so with you?
VERBATIM:
H; 17;
106, I supposo most people's friends would fall into five categories;
; relations, then other people they grew up with; people they work with
or have worked v/ith in the past, and then neighbours. Which of the
five groups would you say your most closest friends come into? (Probe)
H; V7;
B 107. Amongst the people you know, who has similar attitudes about what to
spend money on?
H; W;
B 108, Do you and your friends discuss that kind of thing with each other? (Probe)
VERBATIM:
H; 17;
B 109. What sort of tilings do you do in your spare time?
H; 77;
B 110. Do you get out much? What sort of things do you do when you go out -
visiting, pubs, the pictures or what?
H; r;
B 111. Do you mainly go out together, or do you have separate interests?
Probe - Is there anything you do on your own?
H; 77;
B 112. Does anyone else go along with you when you're out - like your parents
or people you know from work? (Probe)
H; 77;
B 115. (IT friends other than parents or workmates mentioned) What sort of
jobs do they have?
B 11 A. 77hat sort of jobs do your friends have in general?
H; IV;
SECTION 8; OPINION OF ECONOMIC SITUATION
H Do you have any fears about redundancy in your job? Y N DK NR
COMMENTS:
H 116, (if yes) How far would you be prepared to move to get another job?
VERBATIM:
B 11 7» Do you think that people in Edinburgh will be poorer or better off
two or three years from now?
H; POORER W; POORER
BETTER OF? BETTER OFF
SAME DK NR . SAME DK NR
B 118. Are they better off than they were two or three years ago? - or not?
H; BETTER OFF W; BETTER OFF
WORSE OFF WORSE OFF
SAME DK NR SAME DK NR
FURTHER COMMENTS:
H 119. Do you expect your own income to rise or fall during the next year?
RISE FALL DK SAME NR R
H 120. (If yes) By how much? shillings
DK NR R
H 121. How long has your family income been at the same level as it is now?
MONTHS
DK NR R
B 122. Have you had to economise on anything because of the increase in the
cost of living in the last year?
H; Y N DK NR XI; Y N DK NR
B 1 23• (if yes) What have you had to cut down on?
H; T/J
INTERVIEWER'S COMMENTS ON INTERVIEW IE A WHOLE:
INTERVIEWERS' INSTRUCTIONS
Hoy/ to introduce yourself:-
The Sociology Department of Edinburgh University is doing a survey to find
out hoY/ people manage these days on the money that comes into the house.
We think running a house and looking after a family these days must take a
lot more attention and skill than it used to, and we v/ant to find out how
people-do-it-. The. results will eventually be published, but nobody's name
will be mentioned and you can be "sure that the information you give will be
treated confidentially.
Supplementary explanation of research -purpose:-
Inflation, a greater'vafiety-of-goods in.the standard budget than ten or
fifteen years ago, and the frequency of re-housing, means that budgeting is.,
a lot more complex than it used to be. We v/ant to knov/ how people make the
choices they have to make.
Finding out the human side of the economic situation is important and some¬
thing which is often overlooked by official bodies. In any case separate
Scottish statistics are rather scanty and it may be important to show in
what ways Scotland is different from the rest of Britain.
We also v/ant to know how people's standard of living is connected with the
amount of work they do.
If anyone is reluctant try the following arguments:-
1) The busy people, i.e. those who do a lot of overtime, or wives who have
fall time jobs, may be all alike and could be particularly interesting.
It would bias the results if they all say no. Choose your own time to
be interviewed - if you want to talk while you do the ironing or
anything, that's all right by me.
2) If the objection is that the questions may be "too personal" emphasise
a) Confidentiality, b) informant's right to refuse a particular question,
c) that the questions don't ask for many actual figures. People don't
mind doing the Family Expenditux-e survey which the government uses to
work out the cost of living index, and there are 3,000 of them each year.
Finding out the human side of the economic situation can only be done by
talking to people.
3) If you have reason to suspect from informant's comments, in the case of
a husband, that he does not v/ant other members of the family to know his
wages, point out that he can write them down on paper and seal the paper
up in an envelope - "I know people don't like talking about their wages
but
Abbreviations:-
H ; husband W ; wife E ; either B ; both
These four letters are found in the left hand margin to show of whom each
question should be asked. By skimming down this margin you can see what
to ask if one spouse is out of the room.
Y ; yes N ; no DK ; don't knov/, nothing to say on that point.
¥ho to interview
Interview both spouses if possible, together if possible. If one is unwi'k'cfng
or quite unavailable, interview the other alone. In this case opinion
questions relating to the absent spouse may have to.be left out.
R ; refuse to answer NR ; no reply obtained (because of communication
problems or forgetting to ask the question)










1 2 5 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 15
1. Husband's Take Home
Pay
; 2. Husband's Gross Wage 0.83
(90)
3. Net Family Income 0.63(90)
0.79
(90) f ■












































































































































































































































































































































































THKA as Percentage of
Husband's Take Hons










































































































































1 2 5 4 5 rO 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
N's for each calculation are given in brackets. Controls
are excluded.
